5 - Towards Mahathir's Personal Dominance

Summary

[T]he first critical threshold in the transition to democracy is precisely the move by some group within the ruling bloc to obtain support from forces external to it.

(Adam Przeworski 1986)

I am sad and disappointed that UMNO which my colleagues and I had built and supported until it became a huge and powerful party, a party which for 42 years the Malays depended upon to protect their well-being has suddenly been demolished and destroyed. … It is those with power that have destroyed UMNO. It is because they have become intoxicated with their power that they forgot to save UMNO.

(Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra 1987)

Until recently, many scholars have given primary attention in their analysis of conflict management in multi-racial societies to the role of national élites and sub-élites. And it has been assumed that in a severely divided society the national élites and sub-élites tend towards a consociational framework in preserving regime stability as well as democratic procedures. In a recent study of Malaysia, Case argues that the behaviour of the ruling Ãlites and the extent of consensual unity between them is crucial in managing socio-political and ethnic conflicts.

But, what if the ruling élites are not unified? What if they are divided, being from different ethnic communities and from different factions within the ruling bloc? In other words, how do rivalries within the dominant ruling élites affect their behaviour and the extent of consensual unity in a multi-racial society? In Malaysia, would the unambiguous Malay dominance after the 1969 racial riots be renegotiated towards the recovery of consociational frameworks or would the Malay dominance be strengthened and consolidated, if the national leadership were severely fragmented? Or would it eventually be replaced by another, possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule?