3 - Regime Maintenance through Consociational Bargaining

Summary

The case of Malaysia [1955–69] provides the … example of reasonably successful consociational democracy in the Third World, although the nature of its plural society and the kind of consociational institutions it developed differ considerably both from Lebanon and from the European cases.

(Arend Lijphart 1977)

Kuala Lumpur was a city of fire; I could clearly see the conflagrations from my residence at the top of the hill and it was a sight that I never thought I would see in my life-time. In fact all my work to make Malaysia a happy and peaceful country through[ou]t these years, and also my dream of being the happiest Prime Minister in the world, were also going up in flames.

(Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra 1969)

Many scholars of conflict resolution argue that intense ethnic conflicts in deeply fragmented societies are rarely resolved by orthodox democratic means such as pure majoritarianism, ordinary parliamentary opposition, political campaigning, and winning elections. Therefore, scholars have proposed the alternative “consociational” model, probably best defined by Lijphart in terms of “grand coalition”, “mutual veto”, “proportionality”, and “autonomy”. Lipjhart argues that through government by an élite cartel, a democracy with a fragmented political culture is stabilized. This model is used to deal with intense conflicts, both in the smaller developed European countries and the post-colonial plural societies of the Third World. This chapter explores the relevance of consociational conflict resolution for regime maintenance, to the first period of Malaysian ethnic politics, 1957–69.

The intense ethnic and societal cleavages in Malaysia have inclined many scholars to view consociational élite bargaining as the most useful theoretical approach to analysing regime maintenance in the Malaysian political system.