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11 - The Objectivity of Values

from II - Later Papers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2020

Richard Rorty
Edited by
W. P. Małecki  and
Chris Voparil
W. P. Małecki
Affiliation:
University of Wrocław, Poland
Chris Voparil
Affiliation:
Union Institute and University, Ohio
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Summary

This paper aims to explain why the question about “the objectivity of values” is a bad one. It begins by investigating its historical roots in Plato and in the philosophy of the seventeeth and eighteenth centuries. It then argues that the question presupposes a distinction between qualities of objects that are “in them” and those that are “in us,” a distinction Rorty suggests is pointless. In light of this stance, it goes on to criticize J. L. Mackie’s famous argument that there are no objective values, the notion of moral principles, and the very idea of moral philosophy.

Keywords

ethicsmetaethicsvaluesmoral skepticismJ. L. Mackieargument from queerness
Type
Chapter
Information
On Philosophy and Philosophers
Unpublished Papers, 1960–2000
 , pp. 172 - 190
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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