Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by Juan Linz
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: Political parties, theories of regime change, and the Uruguayan case
- PART I THE CRISIS AND SURVIVAL OF URUGUAYAN POLITICAL PARTIES
- 2 Politicians and parties in Uruguay: origins and crisis
- 3 The breakdown of democracy
- 4 The failure of military institutionalization and political engineering: the survival of political parties
- PART II FROM AUTHORITARIAN CRISIS TO TRANSITION
- PART III POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
- Conclusion: Parties and regime change – some lessons and comparisons
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
4 - The failure of military institutionalization and political engineering: the survival of political parties
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by Juan Linz
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: Political parties, theories of regime change, and the Uruguayan case
- PART I THE CRISIS AND SURVIVAL OF URUGUAYAN POLITICAL PARTIES
- 2 Politicians and parties in Uruguay: origins and crisis
- 3 The breakdown of democracy
- 4 The failure of military institutionalization and political engineering: the survival of political parties
- PART II FROM AUTHORITARIAN CRISIS TO TRANSITION
- PART III POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
- Conclusion: Parties and regime change – some lessons and comparisons
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
Summary
When a modern military force seizes power in a democracy, the leaders face a number of dilemmas as they seek to institutionalize their rule. As their rule is born of a state of exception, they must early on seek to establish two things: (a) decision-making structures that will clearly distribute authority and (b) succession and promotion mechanisms to designate officeholders. These two goals require the establishment of an internal balance of power as a first priority. Subsequently, military regimes born of a state of exception must seek to regularize their forms of interaction with civil society, restoring the links through which information flows to decision makers and, eventually, by which assent is granted by citizens to state policies. As one Blanco politician who ran for high office put it, echoing Talleyrand: “Bayonets are good for everything except sitting on.” This second external dimension, or phase, of institutionalization is necessary if the state is to end its isolation from society, but sooner or later it inevitably must give rise to acute dilemmas regarding liberalization and participation.
The collegial military-technocratic rule that emerged in Uruguay after 1973 ensured complete physical control of the country. The nation's compact size and small population permitted levels of surveillance and social control that reached the upper limits of the authoritarian ideal type.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Negotiating DemocracyPoliticians and Generals in Uruguay, pp. 50 - 76Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991