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8 - Implications

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Branislav L. Slantchev
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
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Summary

The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect.

Carl von Clausewitz

The central conclusion from the analysis in this book is perhaps normatively troubling. Military threats can be useful in several ways. First, they can enable actors to establish commitments necessary to obtain better deals. Second, they can communicate these commitments credibly so that the opponent can believe them. Third, they can undermine the opponent's commitment and make it more likely that he will concede, which in turn can reduce the risk of war.

Military threats can serve a useful purpose in crises. They may reduce the risk of war relative to purely diplomatic actions.

One may be tempted to think that military coercion is a cheap alternative to war preparation. As such one may wonder whether an opponent could be coerced by sending a battalion of Marines or perhaps one task group. The analysis in this book suggests that this is unlikely to work if the force being sent is significantly smaller than what one would need for actual operations. In fact, the model suggests that it may have to be quite a bit larger.

The reason for this has nothing to do with credibility – as we have seen, preparation for war is just as believable as an optimal military threat.

Type
Chapter
Information
Military Threats
The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace
, pp. 255 - 258
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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  • Implications
  • Branislav L. Slantchev, University of California, San Diego
  • Book: Military Threats
  • Online publication: 03 February 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511778940.008
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  • Implications
  • Branislav L. Slantchev, University of California, San Diego
  • Book: Military Threats
  • Online publication: 03 February 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511778940.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Implications
  • Branislav L. Slantchev, University of California, San Diego
  • Book: Military Threats
  • Online publication: 03 February 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511778940.008
Available formats
×