Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-02T18:49:37.123Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Ecological concepts are problematic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette
Affiliation:
University of South Florida
Earl D. McCoy
Affiliation:
University of South Florida
Get access

Summary

the queen, in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass, claimed that she was able to believe six impossible things before breakfast. Unlike the Queen, most of us cannot believe impossible things. We, like Alice, cannot believe that inconsistent definitions of the same term or concept are both true. Often, however, we subscribe to different concepts or definitions without realizing that they are contradictory. Perhaps this occurs because we fail either to trace the logical consequences of our assent to particular beliefs or to recognize the assumptions necessary to our assent.

If community ecology, indeed, any science, is to progress, then we must learn to recognize the ways in which we, like the Queen, “believe impossible things.” One way to achieve such recognition is through clarification of foundational concepts. In fact, clarification of concepts like “community” and “stability” is a necessary condition for having a science that is public, empirical, and testable. Without clarification of and consensus about – such concepts, different ecologists will fail to make logical contact with each other. Instead, they will operate with various “private” ecologies; they will fail to provide authentic replications, confirmations, or falsifications of the findings of other scientists allegedly working on the same problem.

In the Preface to his recent philosophy of biology, Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist (1988), and in his earlier Growth of Biological Thought (1982), Ernst Mayr emphasized that recent progress in evolutionary biology is a result of conceptual clarification, not a consequence of improved measurements or better scientific laws.

Type
Chapter
Information
Method in Ecology
Strategies for Conservation
, pp. 11 - 67
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×