Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Atlantic Ocean
- Introduction The Many Panics of 1837
- Chapter 1 A Very “Gamblous” Affair
- Chapter 2 The Pressure of 1836
- Chapter 3 Practical Economists
- Chapter 4 Mysterious Whispers
- Chapter 5 The Many Panics in 1837
- Chapter 6 Parallel Crises
- Chapter 7 States of Suspense
- Epilogue Panic-less Panics of 1837
- Notes
- Index
Chapter 6 - Parallel Crises
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Atlantic Ocean
- Introduction The Many Panics of 1837
- Chapter 1 A Very “Gamblous” Affair
- Chapter 2 The Pressure of 1836
- Chapter 3 Practical Economists
- Chapter 4 Mysterious Whispers
- Chapter 5 The Many Panics in 1837
- Chapter 6 Parallel Crises
- Chapter 7 States of Suspense
- Epilogue Panic-less Panics of 1837
- Notes
- Index
Summary
It was a matter of minutes. The meeting on April 6, 1837, was the first one recorded in the sixtieth volume of the minute books of the Court of Directors of the Bank of England. A few pages in, a clerk’s clear penmanship noted a significant historical event not in terms of centuries, years, or even months, but as fractions of an hour. In perfectly formed oblique and horizontal lines, the clerk spelled out the situation:
Resolved,
That the Governor & Deputy Governor be requested to wait upon his Majesty’s Ministers to represent to them the further aid required by Messrs. Wildes & Co., and that they are unable to offer to the Bank any further security than their own personal engagement – and to draw the attention of His Majesty’s Ministers to the consequences which may be likely to ensue upon the suspension of the House in question.
At 4 o’clock the Court adjourned to enable the Governors to carry into effect the foregoing Resolution.
At ½ past 5 o’clock the Court was held again, – when the Governor stated that accompanied by the Deputy Governor, he had had an interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and from whom he had received the following letter dated this day.
In exactly ninety minutes, two of the world’s most powerful capitalists not only traveled to and from the British Empire’s political capital but also obtained a letter resolving any doubts about the role the government would play in the crisis. Although the two men had “waited” on the minister and although the long wait for transatlantic news had motivated George Wildes & Co. to seek the BOE’s assistance, no delay could be discerned in the decision of the BOE directors to save this failing firm.
Years later, another clerk transcribed these same minutes into a book labeled “American Accounts, 1836–1842” to justify the actions taken by the BOE in this climactic and controversial period. Twice written in the primary sources, the story of how the most powerful financiers in the world decided to bail out one of the world’s largest merchant banking firms with no collateral is worth retelling, even if we must return to the beginning of the panic in 1837.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Many Panics of 1837People, Politics, and the Creation of a Transatlantic Financial Crisis, pp. 157 - 190Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013