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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2023

Erik Stei
Erik Stei
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Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
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Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence , pp. 208 - 217
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Print publication year: 2023

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  • References
  • Erik Stei, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
  • Book: Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence
  • Online publication: 23 March 2023
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  • References
  • Erik Stei, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
  • Book: Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence
  • Online publication: 23 March 2023
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  • References
  • Erik Stei, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
  • Book: Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence
  • Online publication: 23 March 2023
Available formats
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