PART II - NATURALISM AND MEANING TALK
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2011
Summary
To say that a certain person desired to do A, thought it his duty to do B but was forced to do C, is not to describe him as one might describe a scientific specimen. One does, indeed, describe him, but one does something more. And it is this something more which is the irreducible core of the framework of persons.
In what does this something more consist? First, a relatively superficial point which will guide the way. To think of a featherless biped as a person is to think of it as a being with which one is bound up in a network of rights and duties. From this point of view, the irreducibility of the personal is the irreducibility of the “ought” to the “is”. But even more basic than this (though ultimately, as we shall see, the two points coincide), is the fact that to think of a featherless biped as a person is to construe its behavior in terms of actual or potential membership in an embracing group each member of which thinks of itself as a member of the group …
Thus, the conceptual framework of persons is the framework in which we think of one another as sharing the community intentions which provide the ambiance of principles and standards (above all, those which make meaningful discourse and rationality itself possible) within which we live our own individual lives …
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Grammar of MeaningNormativity and Semantic Discourse, pp. 239 - 240Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997