Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 RULING AGAINST THE RULERS
- 2 THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION
- 3 A THEORY OF COURT-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS: INSECURE TENURE, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
- 4 JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS: INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999
- 5 THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
- 6 THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
- 7 CONCLUSION: BROADER LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
- Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court
- Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set
- Appendix C Equilibria Proofs
- References
- Index
2 - THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 RULING AGAINST THE RULERS
- 2 THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION
- 3 A THEORY OF COURT-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS: INSECURE TENURE, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
- 4 JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS: INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999
- 5 THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
- 6 THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
- 7 CONCLUSION: BROADER LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
- Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court
- Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set
- Appendix C Equilibria Proofs
- References
- Index
Summary
When a judge decides a case in favor of the government, is it because he or she simply agrees with the government's position in the case? Or does his or her decision instead reflect a fear of reprisal were he or she to stand up to the government? Conversely, when a judge decides cases against the government, is it because he or she truly disagrees with the government's position? Or is it for some other reason?
Drawing on the tools of positive political theory, this chapter and the next explore a new set of answers to these questions by recasting fundamentally the connection between the choices judges make and the constraints they face. At the core of the argument is the idea that judges rule against the rulers not because judges enjoy independence in a conventional sense but because they fear being punished by the government's successors. I label this phenomenon strategic defection. Strategic defection constitutes a logical – but heretofore under-theorized – judicial response to a particular institutional setting, namely one in which judges lack institutional security and the main threat to their security stems from incoming political actors rather than incumbents.
To develop this argument, the chapter unfolds as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the standard view of judges as strategic decision makers. Section 2.2 shows how strategic defection differs from several familiar views of judicial behavior. Section 2.3 uses a simple spatial model to offer a first cut at exploring the conditions leading to strategic defection.
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- Courts under ConstraintsJudges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, pp. 20 - 40Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004