Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 RULING AGAINST THE RULERS
- 2 THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION
- 3 A THEORY OF COURT-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS: INSECURE TENURE, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
- 4 JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS: INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999
- 5 THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
- 6 THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
- 7 CONCLUSION: BROADER LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
- Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court
- Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set
- Appendix C Equilibria Proofs
- References
- Index
4 - JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS: INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 RULING AGAINST THE RULERS
- 2 THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION
- 3 A THEORY OF COURT-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS: INSECURE TENURE, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
- 4 JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS: INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999
- 5 THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
- 6 THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
- 7 CONCLUSION: BROADER LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
- Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court
- Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set
- Appendix C Equilibria Proofs
- References
- Index
Summary
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
Constitución Federal de la República de Argentina (Art. 96)Legal guarantees are often not observed, judicial tenure is not respected, and courts are suspended or successively limited in their jurisdiction. The common theme of excessive deviation from the formal rules of the game is valid in Latin American systems as far as the judiciary is concerned.
Von Lazar (1971: 41–2, cited in Verner 1989: 475)In the last two chapters I have explored the logic of strategic defection, developed a formal theoretical model describing the conditions under which it occurs, and discussed several testable implications that emerge for court-executive relations. The task to which the next several chapters turn is to evaluate how well the model performs empirically by focusing on court-executive relations in Argentina.
To begin to move from a stylized model to an analysis of events in the real world, this chapter focuses specifically on exploring the key assumptions underlying strategic defection. First and foremost, evaluating strategic-based accounts requires establishing ex ante actors' preferences, beliefs, and expectations. In this case, for example, how plausible is it to assume that Argentine judges believed that their fates lay in the hands of incoming governments? Did judges have sufficient information about which government was likely to come to power?
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Courts under ConstraintsJudges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, pp. 61 - 97Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004