Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 RULING AGAINST THE RULERS
- 2 THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION
- 3 A THEORY OF COURT-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS: INSECURE TENURE, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
- 4 JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS: INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999
- 5 THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
- 6 THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
- 7 CONCLUSION: BROADER LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
- Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court
- Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set
- Appendix C Equilibria Proofs
- References
- Index
6 - THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 RULING AGAINST THE RULERS
- 2 THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION
- 3 A THEORY OF COURT-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS: INSECURE TENURE, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
- 4 JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS: INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999
- 5 THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
- 6 THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
- 7 CONCLUSION: BROADER LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
- Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court
- Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set
- Appendix C Equilibria Proofs
- References
- Index
Summary
Everything is subject to appeal, thus everything is subject to impeachment.
Anonymous Argentine Supreme Court JusticeThe findings of the previous chapter contrast sharply with the conventional wisdom that courts under attack rarely challenge the government of the day. In accordance with the theory of strategic defection, the last chapter found substantial evidence of a reverse legal-political cycle in which judges under dictatorship and democracy alike defect from the government once it begins to lose power. That I was also able to rule out several competing hypotheses lent further credibility to the theory of strategic defection. To delve more deeply into the mechanisms underlying the strategic defection account and its consequences for the rule of law, this chapter develops a qualitative picture of the Argentine Court's behavior over the last two decades.
For each of the four governments, I examine further the validity of the strategic account by focusing on the Court's handling of the most important and visible issues. Overall, the case studies presented below strongly confirm the expectation that judges under threat defect in the most controversial cases of the day. They also suggest support for several additional hypotheses regarding issue convergence and concentration. I conclude by examining whether defection worked and with a brief epilogue that applies the lessons of the previous chapters to the Court's role in the midst of Argentina's recent political and economic crisis of 2001–2.
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- Courts under ConstraintsJudges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, pp. 126 - 152Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004