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21 - United Kingdom

The scope and dynamics of corporate governance regulation

from B - Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2013

By
Marc T. Moore
Edited by
Andreas M. Fleckner  and
Klaus J. Hopt
Andreas M. Fleckner
Affiliation:
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany
Klaus J. Hopt
Affiliation:
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany
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Summary

General information on corporate governance

Definition and general scope of corporate governance

Definition of corporate governance

There is no formal legal definition of corporate governance in the UK. Traditionally in the UK, internal corporate governance issues such as board structures have tended to be regarded as purely private affairs for the informal resolution of companies and shareholders themselves, as opposed to matters of public concern to be defined and resolved by regulators. The prevailing functional definition of corporate governance in the UK therefore remains the influential one posited by the Cadbury Committee in 1992, which described corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled.” One of the most authoritative academic definitions of corporate governance in the UK meanwhile is that provided by Professor John Parkinson, who in more specific terms than Cadbury referred to it as “the processes of supervision and control (of ‘governing’) intended to ensure that the company's management acts in accordance with the interests of the shareholders.”

General scope of corporate governance

More recently, the statutory implementation of the principle of “enlightened shareholder value” under section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 has apparently expanded the orthodox (shareholder-centric) scope of UK corporate governance, by specifying the numerous “stakeholder” interests to which directors should have regard in complying with their statutory duty to promote the success of the company. However, setting aside for now the practical limitations of this provision as an effective non-shareholder protection, it remains the case that the highly influential UK Corporate Governance Code, as descended from Cadbury and promulgated today by the quasi-governmental Financial Reporting Council (“FRC”), is focused exclusively on the protection of shareholders by means of placing appropriate institutional constraints on the decision-making power of senior executive officers.

Type
Chapter
Information
Comparative Corporate Governance
A Functional and International Analysis
 , pp. 913 - 956
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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  • United Kingdom
  • Edited by Andreas M. Fleckner, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany, Klaus J. Hopt, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany
  • Book: Comparative Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 05 July 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139177375.026
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  • United Kingdom
  • Edited by Andreas M. Fleckner, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany, Klaus J. Hopt, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany
  • Book: Comparative Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 05 July 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139177375.026
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • United Kingdom
  • Edited by Andreas M. Fleckner, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany, Klaus J. Hopt, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Germany
  • Book: Comparative Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 05 July 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139177375.026
Available formats
×