from QUINTESSENTIAL ISSUES
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
In September 2009, the United States announced a new course in its policy towards Myanmar following a seven-month review undertaken by the Obama administration. Recognizing that decades of pursuing policies of isolation and sanctions had done little to influence change among Myanmar's military leaders, the United States decided to maintain its sanctions on Myanmar while simultaneously undertaking direct dialogue with senior leaders of the regime in Naypyidaw. Dialogue, according to the United States, will supplement, rather than replace, decades of U.S. sanctions policy. These talks have already begun, and the United States has indicated that any improvement in relations between the two countries is possible only when Myanmar's military regime enacts meaningful and concrete reforms in the country, particularly in the areas of democracy and human rights.
On the other hand, in adjusting its policy towards Myanmar, the United States must face reality with a clear vision. Among other things, this vision must recognize that the United States’ ability to help solve Myanmar's problems and to influence the course of the country's governance is extremely limited. American influence in Myanmar is unlikely to outweigh that of increasingly powerful Asian neighbours. Therefore, the United States’ priority must be to clarify its fundamental objectives in Myanmar and follow them through consistently with some flexibility. Moreover, Myanmar is not likely to rank very high on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities in the foreseeable future; so resources to address U.S. goals in Myanmar will be limited, compared with priority countries and regions.
OBSERVATION OF THE MYANMAR IMPASSE: BREAKTHROUGH OR FALSE DAWN?
Recently, there have been signs of a thaw in U.S.-Myanmar relations in light of the Obama administration's policy review on Myanmar. In August 2009, Myanmar's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) allowed Senator Jim Webb to visit and meet with the junta chair as well as with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and it subsequently released American John Yettaw who had been convicted of breaching security laws by sneaking into Suu Kyi's home.
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