Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- SECTION I
- SECTION II
- SECTION III
- 6 On the Political (In)Efficacy of Pork-Barreling in the Chamber of Deputies
- 7 Progressive Ambition, Federalism, and Pork-Barreling in Brazil
- 8 Institutions of Their Own Design? Democratization and Fiscal Decentralization in Brazil, 1975–1995
- 9 The Cardoso Administration and Changes in Brazilian Federalism
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Coding of Political Positions by Level of Government
- Appendix 2 List of Interviews
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
6 - On the Political (In)Efficacy of Pork-Barreling in the Chamber of Deputies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- SECTION I
- SECTION II
- SECTION III
- 6 On the Political (In)Efficacy of Pork-Barreling in the Chamber of Deputies
- 7 Progressive Ambition, Federalism, and Pork-Barreling in Brazil
- 8 Institutions of Their Own Design? Democratization and Fiscal Decentralization in Brazil, 1975–1995
- 9 The Cardoso Administration and Changes in Brazilian Federalism
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Coding of Political Positions by Level of Government
- Appendix 2 List of Interviews
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Summary
“The organization of Congress meets remarkably well the electoral needs of its members. To put it another way, if a group of planners sat down and tried to design a pair of American national assemblies with the goal of serving members' electoral needs year in and year out, they would be hard pressed to improve on what exists.”
—David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral ConnectionINTRODUCTION
Does the organization of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies meet the electoral needs of its members? In the United States, scholars argue that if House members act strategically to further their career goals, then form will follow function. If politicians are no more or less strategic outside the United States, then this claim ought to apply elsewhere as well. That is, we ought to be able to explain legislative institutions and processes in different democracies as a function of the nature of political ambition in each country.
In this chapter I begin to explain how political ambition helps explain legislative processes and structures in Brazil. If Brazilian Deputies behaved like their U.S. counterparts and sought a long-term legislative career, then the design of the Chamber might reflect that desire. However, the reelection assumption does not accurately depict political careerism in Brazil. Consequently, no stable majority of incumbency-minded deputies ever exists in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. This impedes the institutionalization of legislative norms that would in turn enhance the status of incumbency.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil , pp. 111 - 133Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003