INTRODUCTION

I THE PLACE OF THE *QUOD DETERIUS* WITHIN THE *ALLEGORICAL COMMENTARY*

Philo's exegetical works, all on the Pentateuch, are normally divided into three groups: (1) the *Quaestiones*; (2) the *Allegorical Commentary*; (3) the 'Exposition of the Law'. The first two series are verse-by-verse commentaries, while the third gives a more thematic presentation. The difference between the *Quaestiones* and the *Allegorical Commentary* is that the former is made up of shorter explanations, which seem to be set out at a more elementary level, while the latter contains long and involved exegetical discussions, and would appear to be directed towards the most advanced hearers or readers.[1]

The *Allegorical Commentary* consists of twenty-one books or treatises that cover Genesis, especially chapters 2–17, with many gaps, and also parts of chapters 28, 31, 37, 40, and 41. The first three books have the title Νόμων ἱερῶν ἀλληγορία(ι), hence the English designation, whereas the following books have separate titles, at least in the manuscripts, based on subject matter. The *Quod deterius*, which covers Gen 4:8–15, is the third treatise that falls into this category, following the *De cherubim*, on Gen 3:24 and 4:1, and the *De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini*, on Gen 4:2–4. It will be observed that there is a gap for Gen 4:5–7. As is the case for many of the gaps in the commentary, we do not know whether Philo discussed these verses in a book that has been lost, or whether he did not comment on them at all. Following the *Quod deterius*, there is an additional treatise that covers the Cain and Abel saga, namely, *De posteritate Caini*, on Gen 4:16–25.

[1] For a detailed survey of Philo's exegetical works, one may consult Royse, 'Works of Philo', 33–50.

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In the Italian translation of these four works, entitled *Le origini del male* (published 1984), which also includes the two following treatises, Radice set out, in his introduction, the hypothesis that the four treatises mentioned constitute a 'tetralogy'.[2] Previous scholars had sometimes spoken of a Cain trilogy, without including the *De cherubim*.[3] Radice, however, took the view that this work should be joined to the following three, pointing out that at least the second part of the text (§§ 40–130) is about Cain, and arguing that one may find a more general unity of content in all four, and a 'guiding idea' for each one. Unfortunately, the theory is premised partially on an oversight, viz., the assumption that the lemmata (= the verses set for comment) of all four of the treatises are contiguous.[4] As already noted in the previous paragraph, however, there is a break in these lemmata, consisting of Gen 4:5–7. Moreover, there are some uncertainties regarding the transmission and division of the first books of the *Allegorical Commentary*.[5] Among them is the fact that in the indirect tradition of the *Sacra parallela*, a medieval florilegium in which many excerpts from Philo are preserved, the *Quod deterius* is cited as the 'seventh and (= 'or'?) eighth' (book) of the Νόμων ἱερῶν ἀλληγορία, and the *De posteritate Caini* as the 'eighth and ninth'. Circumstances such as these should make us wary of assuming that all books in this part of the series have come down to us in their original form, and consequently, that the current sequence reflects an original Philonic design. As regards content, the case for a 'guiding idea', at least in the case of the *Quod deterius*, seems a difficult one to make. But it is best to consider this matter more fully in a later section.

[2] *Origini*, 7–30. In the bibliography, this work is listed under the names of Mazzarelli (the translator) and Radice.

[3] E.g., Arnaldez, in the introduction to his edition of *De posteritate* (PAPM 6), 11. This manner of division seems to be now advocated by Sterling, 'Structure', 1236–7.

[4] *Origini*, 9; contrast 'Appendice A', 495.

[5] For these, see Morris, 'The Jewish Philosopher Philo', 832–5; cf. Cohn, 'Einteilung', 393–7; Schürer, *Geschichte*, III, 652–3.

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II THE TITLE OF THE TREATISE AND THE MAIN LINES OF INTERPRETATION

The title of the treatise in Greek is Περὶ τοῦ τὸ χεῖρον τῷ κρείττονι φιλεῖν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, usually rendered as 'That the worse tends to attack the better'. That it goes back to Philo himself may be determined from its meaning, as we shall see presently, but also from external evidence. For it is attested not only in the manuscripts, but also by Origen, who, in his *Comm. in Mt.* 15.3, cites the work by name when quoting from it (at § 176).[6] The use of the neuter substantivized forms indicates that Philo is not wanting to highlight the human characters, but rather more impersonal or abstract entities. This has been noted by Amir in the introduction to his translation, and he takes the view that they are to be identified with hedonism and virtue.[7] While this proposal is not without foundation, Philo is probably making reference, at least in the first instance, to the parts or faculties of the soul. This seems to be suggested by a striking parallel in *Fug.* 23–4, where he is discussing another pair of brothers, Esau and Jacob. He quotes Rebecca's warning to Jacob that his brother is threatening to kill him, and he should flee to Haran until Esau's anger subsides (Gen 27:42–5). He then interprets this to mean that there is a legitimate fear lest 'the worse part of the soul (τὸ χεῖρον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος)' should attack the better part (τὸ κρεῖττον), by ambush or openly, and defeat it.[8] Now, Philo also employs the terminology of 'worse' and 'better' in speaking of the not unrelated conflict between body and soul, as in *Leg.* 1.106.[9] And he acknowledges that the body may 'plot' against the soul in *Leg.* 3.69, 71. However, the most relevant exegetical

[6] Cf. Adler, *Studien*, 35–6.

[7] *KFA* IV.1, 227.

[8] In *Migr.* 208–9, Philo quotes just the last three verses Gen 24:43–5, and also speaks of the 'better' and a plot of the 'worse', with the adjectives in the masculine form. But the exegesis is different, since the plot of the 'worse' is not directed against the 'better', and while the 'worse' may be Esau, the 'better' does not appear to be Jacob.

[9] For the soul or mind as 'better' than the body more generally, see *Sobr.* 5; *Jos.* 71; *Spec.* 1.269. For 'worse' and 'better' of body and mind or soul, see Seneca, *Ep.* 65.24; Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 28.4; cf. Plato, *Phaed.* 79e–80b.

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parallels corroborate the suggestion that in the title of the present treatise, Philo is referring to a conflict or attack within the soul. At the beginning of the *De sacrificiis*, Philo speaks of the brothers Cain and Abel in a manner comparable to the way that he speaks about Esau and Jacob in *Fug.* 23–4, and indicates that they symbolize warring elements within the soul of an individual. At first they represent two opposing views or doctrines, the 'self-loving' (Cain) and 'God-loving' (Abel), and just later they represent vice and virtue, or more precisely, vice as caused by passion, and virtue (§§ 1–3; 11–16). In both instances, Philo confirms his interpretation of Cain and Abel by similar interpretations of stories about Jacob and Esau (§§ 4, 17–18). It would appear then that Philo maintained a set of interpretations about brothers in a state of strife, to the effect that they symbolize various entities within the soul that are in conflict.[10]

That the interpretations belong to the same category may be seen by a shared feature. Philo often indicates that the warring entities, be they 'doctrines', virtue and vice, or parts of the soul, tend to be mutually exclusive, or that when one has the upper hand, the other must be in retreat, defeat, or some other such state. This feature is found in the interpretations of Cain and Abel as 'doctrines' and as vice/passion and virtue at the beginning of *De sacrificiis* (§§ 3; 15–16), and in those about Jacob and Esau as virtue and vice in *Sacr.* 135 and *Ebr.* 8–10.[11] Philo believes that the same circumstance holds true in the case of the conflict between the parts of the soul, as one may conclude from his remarks about reason and passion in *Leg.* 3.116–17, 186–7.

Among these different entities that may be opposing each other within the soul, the terminology of 'worse' and 'better' is most often applied to the soul's actual parts or faculties, the irrational and the rational. This we find to be the case whether Philo is speaking of the Platonic or Stoic parts of the soul. In *Leg.* 1.72–3, he follows the Platonic partition, and identifies the

[10] For the broader context of these interpretations, see Harl, 'Adam', 363–74, esp. 369–72; Hay, 'Psychology of Faith', 898–902.

[11] In *QG* 4.220, Philo presents the interpretation about Jacob and Esau as part of a general theory about opposites. On mutual exclusivity in the soul, cf. Porphyry, *Abst.* 2.38.2; *Marc.* 21.

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rational part of the soul as 'the better' (τὸ κρεῖττον), and the irrational parts, both the appetitive and the irascible, as 'the worse' (τὸ χεῖρον). He also indicates that harmony is achieved when the worse part is ruled by the better. He says much the same thing with the same terminology of 'better' and 'worse' in *Leg.* 2.50 and 3.222, but in these passages he identifies those two parts of the soul as 'mind' and 'sense-perception', following a more Stoic model, according to which the five senses constitute five of the seven irrational parts of the soul. He also implies that the conflict between the passions and the mind is one between worse and better (*Leg.* 3.116–17 + *Praem.* 48), and this comes down to the same thing, since the passions are closely associated with the irrational parts of the soul, be they conceived in a Platonic or a Stoic sense (the former in *Leg.* 1.72–3, 3.116; the latter in *Leg.* 2.50).[12] In addition, Philo likes to use the verb ἐπιτίθεσθαι, the same verb employed in the title of the *Quod deterius*, when speaking of the 'attacks' of the irrational parts of the soul on the rational, of the senses on the mind, etc.[13]

These portrayals are in line with Greek philosophical thinking. Especially in the *Republic*, Plato speaks of the better and worse parts of the soul (430e–431b; cf. 603a). And it would appear from a discussion in Galen's *De placitis* that Posidonius followed Plato in his use of similar terminology.[14] In fact, it may have been Posidonius who was the source for Philo's more specific statements on these matters. Of particular importance is fr. 35 Edelstein-Kidd. In a discussion of the faculties (δυνάμεις) of the soul, he alludes to a conflict between a 'better' and a 'rascally' (μοχθηρά) one, and also speaks of how human beings may be overcome (νικηθῆναι) by the latter. It is also likely that he talked about one faculty of the soul attacking and 'overpowering' another, like Philo does in *Fug.* 24 (although here Philo

[12] Other passages where 'better' and 'worse', or equivalent terms, are used in connection with the rational and irrational parts of the soul include *Migr.* 185; *Spec.* 3.99.

[13] See esp. *Somn.* 2.151; see also *Leg.* 3.200; *Agr.* 108; cf. *Opif.* 79; *Somn.* 2.269.

[14] See Posidonius, fr. 187 Edelstein-Kidd = fr. 417 Theiler; cf. Reinhardt, 'Poseidonios von Apameia', 747–8. For the use of the terminology in the later tradition, see Porphyry, *Gaur.* 14.2–4; cf. Apuleius, *Dogm. Plat.* 1.13.

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says μέρος).[15] Similar language about the rational 'motion' of the soul yielding to or being overcome by the irrational, or about persons being impelled 'toward the worse' by the bestial element (sc. of the soul) when it gains the upper hand, is attested in later sources with a Posidonian connection.[16] Moreover, in the same fragment 35, slightly afterwards, arguing against the view of Chrysippus that vice comes to human beings from the outside, Posidonius acknowledges that it has a seed and root (ῥίζα) within us, 'from which it sprouts (βλαστάνει) and grows'. The implication is obviously that vice develops in connection with the worse or 'rascally' faculty in our soul.[17] Philo comes very near to this formulation of the matter in *Ebr.* 8–10: 'from one root (ῥίζα) in/of our mind come the two shoots of virtue and vice, although not sprouting (βλαστάνοντα) or bearing fruit at the same time'.[18] He then indicates that this theory is in tune with the statement in Gen 27:30 about the brothers Jacob and Esau, that as soon as Jacob went out, Esau arrived. For Jacob symbolizes *phronesis* (the lead virtue in the Stoic scheme), and Esau the 'friend of folly'. Philo says something similar in *Congr.* 82, namely, that the twofold stalk of virtue and vice comes from one

[15] This possibility emerges from an Arabic summary of Galen's opinion that may be related to what he (Galen) says in his *De sequela* (the source of Posidonius, fr. 35). For this, see Walzer, 'New Light', 93–4.

[16] The sources are Marcus Aurelius, *Ad se ipsum* 7.55, and the *Vita Pythagorae* in Photius, *Bibl.* cod. 249 (440b). For the details, see Reinhardt, 'Poseidonios von Apameia', 761, 767–8. The passage from the *Vita Pythagorae* is attributed to Eudorus by Theiler, *Poseidonios*, I, 358.

[17] Cf. Kidd, *Posidonius*, II.1, 177–8. It is his view that the passage and the metaphor of the root come 'directly from Posidonius'. For the imagery of the root, however, cf. also Menander, *PCG*, fr. 300.

[18] Adler, in his notes on this passage in PCH V, 11, is correct in pointing out the influence of Plato, *Phaed.* 60b (Philo himself makes the allusion earlier in § 8), and of (Old) Stoic monism in this passage, citing *SVF* III.20 (he means I.202; cf. III.459). The latter is clearly present since Philo speaks of one root in or of our mind (ἡγεμονικόν). But it must be recalled that Posidonius, even if he speaks of different faculties of the soul, did not abandon Stoic monism as regards the 'parts', the substance, or the location of the soul. See frs. 142, 145–6 Edelstein-Kidd, with Pohlenz, *Stoa*, I, 226–7; Kidd, *Posidonius*, II.1, 544. See also Seneca, *Ep.* 92.1, for the view that an irrational component is within the ἡγεμονικόν.

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root, although here he does not cite a biblical allegory in support.[19] The near equating of the conflict between virtue and vice with the one between the rational and irrational parts or faculties of the soul also belongs to the philosophical discourse of the time. Cicero alludes to the conflict between the better and worse parts of the soul, that is, between reason and *libido* and *iracundia* (= the Platonic/Posidonian parts or faculties), as one between *sapientia* (= *phronesis*) and the 'vicious parts' of the soul.[20]

We see then that the primary elements of the conflict between the 'worse' and the 'better' may be understood on the basis of Greek precedents. Nevertheless, the influence of Jewish tradition is not to be excluded. For we also find in the Judaism of the time the idea of two conflicting entities or forces within an individual. Of particular importance is the 'Treatise on the Two Spirits', a section of the *Rule of the Community* found at Qumran. According to this text, God has placed two 'spirits' in the human being, one of truth and one of deceit, and the spirits vie with each other in the heart (1QS III, 17–19, IV, 23–5). It has been hypothesized that this text or some related source was employed by Philo in *QE* 1.23, where he portrays the conflict between the 'powers' (δυνάμεις) in the soul as related to a larger cosmic dualism.[21] However that may be, the warring forces in the soul described in *QE* 1.23 are clearly the same as those represented by Jacob and Esau in the allegorical interpretations mentioned above, as scholars have acknowledged.[22] And this would no

[19] Philo uses the phrase τὸ δίδυμον στέλεχος to designate the twofold stalk, and in *Somn.* 2.70, he also uses the adjective δίδυμος to describe the tree of knowledge of good and evil in Gen 2:9, 17. This raises the possibility that he may also have been influenced by these verses in using the imagery of the root and the plant or tree. Cf. Harl, 'Adam', 369.

[20] *Rep.* 3.36–7 (ed. Powell, 106–7).

[21] See esp. Philonenko, 'Philon d'Alexandrie'; Leonhardt-Balzer, 'A Case of Psychological Dualism'; cf. also the broader discussion in Wlosok, *Laktanz*, 107–11. Others have taken the view that the dualism in *QE* 1.23 can be explained by Platonic and Middle Platonic antecedents. See the references given by Terian in his edition of *Quaestiones in Exodum* (PAPM 34c), 277–8. For the rest, one should not necessarily understand δυνάμεις here in a Posidonian sense.

[22] Kamlah, *Form*, 114; Baudry, 'Théorie', 287.

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doubt also hold true for the parallel interpretations about Abel and Cain. Other Jewish sources besides the 'Treatise on the Two Spirits' make mention of two moral impulses within the individual. There are some passages in the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* where the antecedents of the rabbinic doctrine of the two inclinations in the human being, evil and good (*yezer ha-ra* and *yezer ha-tov*), emerge with perhaps even greater clarity.[23]

The occasion for applying this kind of thinking and imagery to the Cain and Abel episode is no doubt Gen 4:8, the verse that describes Cain's attack on Abel. The description is very succinct in the biblical text, where it is stated simply that when the brothers were in the plain, Cain rose against his brother and killed him. Philo, however, may also have been influenced by an exegetical tradition that probably developed as an embellishment of Cain's words to Abel, 'Let us go out to the plain,' absent from the Masoretic text but present in the Septuagint and other versions. According to the tradition, Cain lured Abel to the field, as part of a premeditated plot.[24] It may have been linked by Philo with the idea that the worse part of the soul or the vice in the soul may 'ambush' the better part of the soul or the virtue in the soul (*Fug.* 24; *Sacr.* 135).

It would appear then, that in using the title Περὶ τοῦ τὸ χεῖρον τῷ κρείττονι φιλεῖν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, Philo is wanting to interpret the conflict between Cain and Abel, at least as it develops from Gen 4:8 onwards, as an allegory about two parts of the soul, two 'doctrines', or vice and virtue. Nevertheless, he does not set out or maintain an allegorical exegesis of this sort in the *Quod deterius*. He does make an allusion to the interpretation of Abel and Cain as 'doctrines' in *Det.* 32, and this would seem to be in tune with his exegesis of Gen 4:2 at the beginning of the *De sacrificiis* (§§ 1–3, 5). The allusion may explain why some scholars, most notably Feuer in her edition and translation of the text, have

[23] See esp. T. Ash. 1:3–9, where the term διαβούλιον is used for *yezer*. For this and other texts, see Baudry, 'Théorie', 280–2; cf. also Bousset and Gressmann, *Religion*, 404 (+ 403 n. 1). For the later rabbinic doctrine, see Urbach, *Sages*, 471–83.

[24] See *Det.* 78 with the relevant note below.

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thought that the conflict between Cain and Abel, as portrayed in the *Quod deterius*, is an allegory of a mortal struggle within us or a 'psychomachie'.[25] But this is to impose the interpretation of the beginning of the *De sacrificiis* onto the structure of the following treatise. A careful reading of the *Quod deterius* reveals that, however inconsistent or uneven it may appear, Philo employs other interpretative frameworks in his presentation of the fight between the brothers.

What are these other frameworks? The main ones are essentially two in number. In the first part of the treatise, §§ 1–45, Philo portrays the conflict between Cain and Abel as an ἀγὼν λόγων, or debate, between two men. This is not an allegorical interpretation. The debate does not take place within the soul of an individual, like the one between the personified pleasure and virtue that we find in *Sacr.* 20–45. This debate Philo introduces when elaborating on the allegorical interpretations of Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob, and the two wives of Deut 21:15–17 that he had presented in the previous §§ 1–19.[26] By contrast, the debate in the *Quod deterius* is similar to the dialogue between Cain and Abel that is attested in the Palestinian Targums on Gen 4:8. Indeed, there is probably a genetic relationship between the two sources. The setting and content of the debate is anachronistic, as one might find in an *agon* scene in Euripidean tragedy, but the discussion is between two persons.[27]

It is only from § 47 onwards that Philo takes up an allegorical interpretation of the two brothers. Here, in connection with the final words of Gen 4:8, 'and he (Cain) killed him (Abel),' using a rather creative 'reading' of the text (αὑτόν (= ἑαυτόν) for αὐτόν), Philo introduces the notion that Cain killed himself, by eliminating the 'God-loving' dogma (= Abel) within him. According to this interpretation, Abel does represent the 'God-loving' doctrine, as in *Sacr.* 1–3, but Cain does not

[25] PAPM 5, 13–14, cf. 17 (on §§ 1–2). So also, probably in her wake, Coria, *OCFA* II, 118. Cf. Whitaker, PLCL II, 198; Bosman, *Conscience*, 132.

[26] The interpretation of the two wives is also found in *Sobr.* 21–5; cf. *Leg.* 2.48. On *Sacr.* 20–45, see Wendland, *Fragmente*, 138–45.

[27] For further specifics, see the *Summaries* in the commentary for §§ 1–31 and §§ 32–46.

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represent the contrary 'self-loving' doctrine. He is rather the base person or φαῦλος, or the soul or mind of that person, who commits ethical suicide, by killing the Abel within himself. Philo maintains this same scheme, at least when he is interpreting the episode allegorically, until Abel departs the scene in § 103. In fact, it is noteworthy that when Philo does use language reminiscent of the title in § 69, there is a reference to Abel as τὸ κρεῖττον, but not to Cain as τὸ χεῖρον. To sum up, Cain and Abel do not represent parallel warring elements in the soul, but Abel is an element within Cain.

We see then, to our surprise, that Philo does not follow through on the interpretation of the conflict between Cain and Abel that is implied in the title of the *Quod deterius*. Why such an inconsistency? It is likely, as the relevant parallels in *Fug.* 23–4, *Sacr.* 1–18, and other passages indicate, that Philo did have a general view that brothers in the Pentateuch, when in conflict, may symbolize elements within the human soul. And the title of the treatise alludes to this same view. But when it came to actually executing the exegesis, Philo came under the influence of other traditions or ideas. On the one hand, there was the aggadic tradition of the ἀγὼν λόγων, which did not involve an allegorization. On the other hand, there was the ingenious 'reading' of αὑτόν (= ἑαυτόν) for αὐτόν in Gen 4:8. The charm of this slight textual adjustment was no doubt impressive, and the idea that Abel was something within Cain could find confirmation in the wording of Gen 4:9, where the implication is that Cain should have 'guarded' or preserved his brother. These factors may perhaps explain why Philo abandoned the more usual allegorization of the conflict between Cain and Abel in the body of the treatise, although he was able to maintain at least part of it (Abel = the 'God-loving' doctrine).

Only in the last two paragraphs of the treatise, §§ 177–8, does Philo interpret the figure of Cain as something parallel to Abel, and resembling the 'self-loving' doctrine mentioned in § 32. He is not quite that, but represents folly (ἀφροσύνη), which might be a kind of 'secular' equivalent of 'love of self' (φιλαυτία) or impiety (ἀσέβεια). Moreover, Cain symbolizes the vice or evil not just in a single individual, but in humankind as a whole, that is,

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the evil reaches cosmic proportions. Indeed, as Philo says in his concluding sentence, it is the source of 'undying ill'. One might be justified in calling this ending 'gnostic'.

III LITERALISTIC INTERPRETATION AND VARIETIES OF ALLEGORESIS

It has been noted in the preceding section that one has to reckon with literalistic interpretation in the *Quod deterius*, as well as differing frameworks of allegorical exegesis. The principal protagonists are depicted as historical or quasi-historical figures in aggadic fashion, as 'souls' or character types, and even as more abstract entities such as 'doctrines' or vices. This kind of elasticity, however confusing it may be for readers, is a characteristic of Philo's approach to the 'historical' or 'genealogical' part of the Pentateuch.[28]

In fact, it emerges in one of his more programmatic presentations of its content. In *Abr.* 47–55, Philo is concluding his portrayal of the first 'trinity' of early pentateuchal heroes, Enosh, Enoch, and Noah, and beginning his discussion of the second, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He indicates that we may view them 'as men' or as 'dispositions (or types) of soul' (τρόποι ψυχῆς), with the implication that these two conceptions of them are in continuity with each other. What this probably means is that whether we understand these patriarchs as men who lived long ago, or simply as 'dispositions of soul' which had no historical existence, they constitute ethical models to be emulated.

It is clear that Philo conceived of the 'lives' recorded in the Pentateuch as a set of *exempla*, with didactic value. This may be demonstrated from various statements. On one occasion, he calls the historical part of the Pentateuch 'a recording of lives, good and bad, and punishments and rewards determined for both, in every generation' (*Praem.* 2; cf. *Mos.* 2.47). And at the beginning of the *De Abrahamo*, he says that the virtues of those who have lived righteously are engraved in the Scriptures so as

[28] Philo uses these terms to refer to the narrative sections of the Pentateuch outside the cosmology. See my 'Biblical Interpretation', 73–4.

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to encourage others to follow in the same path (§ 4). All of this is said with reference to the literal level of the text, and to the persons conceived 'as men'. Such a conception of history, where the emphasis was on the moral lessons learned from it, was common in the Hellenistic period. However, that this conception could evolve into an understanding of or focus on the *personae* of history as 'dispositions of soul' emerges with particular clarity when we consider the conclusion of Tacitus' biography of his father-in-law, the *Agricola*. Here Tacitus calls on the daughter and the wife of the deceased hero to embrace in their memory the 'form and shape' of his spirit, rather than of his body. This is because while the physical aspects of a person or any physical images made of him are perishable, the *forma mentis* is imperishable, and may be honoured through imitation (46.3). While the disparagement of the body and privileging of the soul or mind might be traditional in eulogies of this sort, the language is noteworthy. Tacitus seems to be at least flirting with the notion that Agricola, or rather his soul/mind, is not simply an *exemplum*, but has become a kind of Platonic model, existing beyond history.[29] We find something very similar in Philo, when he says that Moses has left his life as a divine work, a pattern (παράδειγμα) and form (τύπος) for others to imitate (*Mos.* 1.158–9).

One need take only one further step to turn such an approach to history into allegorism, and that is by denying, or more often in Philo's case, by ignoring and showing open disinterest in the historicity of the persons, events, and other details of the narration. We need mention only a few examples. In *Congr.* 43–4, Philo denies that the information provided in Gen 22:23–4 about Nahor, Abraham's brother, and his wife and concubine is (part of) a 'historical genealogy', and at the end of the same treatise he says that the story of Hagar and Sarah is not about women, but about 'minds' (*Congr.* 180). Similarly, we need not read the story of Terah's migration to Haran as if from the pen of a 'historical writer' (*Somn.* 1.52), and Samuel may have existed

[29] Cf. the comment of Ogilvie (taken over from H. Furneaux) in his edition and commentary, 315. For antecedents, see Isocrates, *Evag.* 73–5; Cicero, *Arch.* 30; for other parallels, Plutarch, *Cim.* 2.2; Julian, *Or.* 2(3).15, 124c.

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as a man, but it is his status as a 'mind' that is of significance (*Ebr.* 144). Finally, in *QG* 4.103, in speaking of Rebecca's words to Abraham's servant in Gen 24:18, Philo says that the passage is not about mortal persons, but about the characters or mores (= τρόποι?) of those who strive for immortality.

But what does Philo mean by τρόποι ψυχῆς, the expression used in *Abr.* 47 and 52a? On the one hand, they seem to be types of persons, and are differentiated from the various capacities of which they partake, which are, in the cases of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, teaching, 'nature', and practice. This is the clear implication of the Greek text of the first sentence describing them.[30] Such a usage appears to correspond to Philo's constant references to the persons of the Pentateuch as certain kinds of minds or souls, who personify a specific capacity, quality, or virtue or vice. Thus Abraham is called the λογισμὸς φιλοθεάμων (*Congr.* 63), Jacob the ἀσκητὴς νοῦς (*Leg.* 2.89, 3.18), the ἀσκητικὴ ψυχή (*Somn.* 1.159, 182), Pharaoh the ἀκόλαστος ψυχή (*Ebr.* 210), etc. The term τρόπος appears often enough in essentially the same sense, for example, in *Plant.* 64, where 'the mind which is fully purified' is identified with the Λευίτης τρόπος (cf. also *Abr.* 203; *Leg.* 3.237, *Migr.* 159; *Fug.* 126).

Just afterwards in the same passage, however, that is, in *Abr.* 52b and 54, the presentation is slightly different. The patriarchs, as portrayed here, no longer represent types of soul or person, but symbolize and are juxtaposed to the capacities themselves, or as Philo says here, 'virtues', that is, in the case of the patriarchs, teaching, 'nature', and practice. In other words, the biblical characters represent not generalized types of person, but more non-personal or abstract entities. And this phenomenon is of course very common throughout the Philonic corpus. The *personae* of the Bible can symbolize, as we have already seen in section II, parts of the soul, 'doctrines', and virtues and vices. What must be noted in the present context, however, is that the same word, τρόπος, can be applied in instances of this sort.

[30] In *Abr.* 52a, in the phrase, τὸν μὲν ἐκ κτλ., the noun to supply is τρόπον, with reference to the previous τρόπους.

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For in Philo, and in ancient Greek generally, a τρόπος of the soul can also be something like a 'character trait' or 'tendency'. And thus, in Philo's system, biblical characters, *qua* τρόποι, can represent traits and tendencies within a single individual. This emerges quite clearly in *Abr.* 217–24, and in passages such as *Sobr.* 24 and *Somn.* 2.98.[31] Accordingly, when Philo indicates, in *Abr.* 52a, that the patriarchs are τρόποι ψυχῆς, this is not entirely inconsistent with the fact that, in §§ 52b and 54, he says that they symbolize the more impersonal or abstract virtues or capacities (δυνάμεις).

Philo's manner of conceptualizing human persons and their characteristics, his use of the expression τρόπος ψυχῆς, and his broad application of the term τρόπος, may ultimately go back to Plato's *Republic*. At the end of book 4, the beginning of book 5, and in book 8, Plato speaks of five types of constitution, and how they correspond to five kinds of soul (445c, ψυχῆς τρόποι). It becomes clear in the course of the discussion, however, that the five kinds of soul are five kinds of person or character type (449a, 543c–544a). Indeed, Plato goes on to speak of ἀνθρώπων τρόποι, and immediately afterwards uses the phrase κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς as an equivalent (544d–e). He also uses the expression 'tyrannical soul' (τυραννικὴ ψυχή) in parallel to 'democratic man' (545c). We have seen just above that Philo is fond of using the term 'soul' or 'mind' (νοῦς) in the same fashion. No doubt, this manner of speaking is related to the fact that for Plato, the human person is 'nothing other than soul' (*Alc.* I, 130c). Moreover, we find that in the same discussion in the *Republic*, Plato applies the word τρόπος when referring to a character trait or tendency, even in cases where more than one such tendency is discernible in an individual. The democratic man, in fact, possesses within himself (ἐν αὑτῷ) a plurality 'of examples of constitutions and of τρόποι' (561e). In other words, we find the same elasticity of application in the employment of the term τρόπος that we find in Philo, and in a similar context.

[31] The two slightly different applications of the term τρόπος are noted by Schur, *KFA* II, 85 n. 46, 94 n. 87.

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The same kind of thinking and manner of expression is found in Dio Chrysostom's *Fourth Oration on Kingship*. In this oration, Dio attributes to Diogenes the Cynic a speech in which the latter describes three kinds of spirit or *daimon*. The three spirits animate human beings as they live three kinds of lives and seek after wealth, pleasure, or honour and fame. However, Dio is not speaking of spirits as entities that enter an individual from the outside, but is following the rationalistic tradition often associated with Heraclitus, according to which one's character (ἦθος or τρόπος) is one's *daimon*.[32] He is, like Plato, giving a kind of survey of character types, but is interested not in political constitutions, but in ethical values.[33] In the introduction to the survey, Diogenes (Dio) says that he will, like an artist, portray the characters (τρόποι) of the three genii of the three lives, referring no doubt to the three different types of person that pursue the three different objectives in life (*Or.* 4.87). Indeed, later on, after mentioning the *daimon* that pursues honour, he uses the words τρόπος ψυχῆς as an equivalent, and then immediately afterwards describes the *person* that changes his mind often (§§ 125–7). This usage is parallel to that of Philo in *Abr.* 52a.

In short, we see that when Philo speaks of the *personae* of the Pentateuch as τρόποι ψυχῆς, he is employing language that is attested in the Platonic tradition. Moreover, even his application of the term τρόπος to refer to either a character type, a kind of person, or to a character trait or tendency within an individual, is found in the discussion of the *Republic*. But how did it come about that such terminology is employed in an exegetical

[32] In *Or.* 4.80, Dio says not ἦθος or τρόπος, but νοῦς. For further details, see Moles, 'Date and Purpose', 256. As von Arnim, *Leben und Werke*, 401, puts it, what Dio is trying to portray is the 'Seelenzustand' of each individual.

[33] For Plato's influence on Dio's discussion, see Moles, 'Date and Purpose', 256–7; Trapp, 'Plato in Dio', 225–6 with n. 34; Pernot, 'Quand Diogène', 177–8. However, their attempts to align Dio's three spirits either with Plato's four degenerate types or with the three types corresponding to the parts of the soul are off the mark. Dio's three spirits pursue three different 'popular' values that are mentioned in classical times and in Aristotle, and are often attacked as a triad in the Stoic and Stoicizing moralists of the imperial age. See the commentary on §§ 9 (ad τὴν πρὸς σῶμα) and on §§ 33–4 below. Cf. Pernot, 178 n. 29.

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setting, and in particular as part of Philo's allegorical approach to Scripture? Only a brief and condensed attempt to answer this question can be provided here.

As we have seen (11–12), the stories of Cain and Abel, and those of the pentateuchal heroes in general, were part of what Philo calls the historical or genealogical part of the Torah. Moreover, we have also seen that at least on one level, Philo seems to accept the existence of these heroes 'as men'. At another level, however, and perhaps in tune with his own inclinations as opposed to inherited conceptions, he often moves beyond the 'historicity' of the heroes and allegorizes them in one form or another. By contrast, as is well known, allegorical interpretation in the Greek tradition developed primarily in connection with the stories or 'myths' about the gods, and in particular as they were handed down in the ancient poets, Homer and Hesiod. This may be gleaned from even brief references to allegorical interpretation in Plato and Plutarch, and from the more explicit remarks of Theodore of Mopsuestia.[34] Still more illuminating, however, is the discussion of Eustathius in the prologue to his *Parekbolai on the Iliad*. He indicates that there are some extremists who have allegorized everything in Homer, not just the mythical, but also the admittedly historical matter (τὰ ὁμολογουμένως ἱστορούμενα). This procedure stands in contrast to that of the 'more accurate' interpreters, who have left the historical material to stand on its own, without allegorization.[35] And indeed, it would appear that in the classical and Hellenistic periods, with the exception of Metrodorus and perhaps his teacher Anaxagoras, interpreters generally refrained from the allegorization of 'Heldensagen', although this did become more common later on, among the Neoplatonists. So much has been demonstrated by Heinemann.[36]

[34] Plato, *Resp.* 378b–d; Plutarch, *Aud. poet.* 4, 19e–f; Theodore, *Fragments syriaques*, [II], tr. Van Rompay, 11, 13.

[35] *Ad Il.*, prooem., ed. van der Valk, I, 4. For some good comments, see Cesaretti, *Allegoristi*, 230–1.

[36] 'Wissenschaftliche Allegoristik', 7–11, 15–16. Cf. also Cullhed, in the introduction to his edition of Eustathius' *Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*, I, 25–6*.

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In view of this circumstance, the question of any Greek impetus or models for Philo's allegorization of pentateuchal *personae*, which was no doubt already part of Judeo-Hellenistic exegesis by his time, becomes all the more acute. Nevertheless, despite the general practice of pre-Neoplatonic interpreters of Homer outlined in the previous paragraph, it is possible to identify, at the beginnings of the imperial age, some tendencies that may help explain Philo's particular approach. In the first place, one should mention another speech of Dio Chrysostom, *On Homer and Socrates* (= *Or.* 55). In this speech, Dio explains how Socrates (he means Plato), introduces named characters into the dialogues, and presents their personalities, in order to reveal the traits or in many cases passions and vices by which they are afflicted. As Dio puts it, when Socrates introduces a boastful man into a dialogue, he is really speaking about boastfulness. When he introduces a person who is prone to anger, he is trying to dissuade his audience from anger (*Or.* 55.12–13). Dio then goes on to say that Socrates took this technique from Homer, and supplies plenty of examples. The story of Dolon is about cowardice, that of Pandarus is about impiety (ἀσέβεια) and folly (ἀφροσύνη). By contrast, in relating certain incidents involving Nestor and Odysseus, Homer is really giving lessons about practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and generalship (*Or.* 55.14–19). This is of course not allegorism. But it reveals the desire of readers to highlight the *personae* of, in this case, the *Iliad*, and see them as suggestive of more general and abstract phenomena such as vices, virtues, skills, and the like.

One can note a further step towards the allegorization of ἱστορούμενα and/or *Heldensagen* in the work of Maximus of Tyre. His perspective is not always easy to understand. On the one hand, in *Or.* 18.8, he seems to regard the stories of the heroes as 'historical matter' (note the verb ἱστορεῖν). Elsewhere, however, and especially in *Or.* 26.5–6, 9, they seem to be part of 'myth'. Indeed, in § 5, Achilles and Agamemnon are called 'images of the passions, of youth and of [wilful] power' (εἰκόνες παθῶν, νεότητος καὶ ἐξουσίας). Theristes is said to be fashioned by Homer as ugly, and rash in speech and thought, 'to be an image (εἰκών) of an undisciplined demos'. In § 6, Maximus tells us that

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we are to see in Homer 'virtue and vice lined up against each other', as personified by the various characters: Paris is licentious and a coward, Hector is moderate and brave; other virtues are 'distributed' among other characters, bravery to Ajax, boldness to Diomedes. Odysseus, for his part, is presented by Homer as 'an image (εἰκών) of the good life and of true virtue'. Trapp, in his translation of Maximus' work, is perfectly comfortable in rendering the word εἰκών as 'allegory'.[37] A similar perspective is advocated by Napolitano.[38] Kindstrand, by contrast, is more cautious, and does not think exegeses of this sort are allegorical, because the heroes retain their human character.[39] At the same time however, he acknowledges that, for Maximus, the heroes are not mere *exempla*. They have a higher degree of abstraction, and constitute what he calls 'Urbilder'. This meaning of the term εἰκών is probably similar to, as Kindstrand intimates, what Seneca has in mind when he speaks of Cato as a *virtutium viva imago* in *Tranq.* 16.1.[40] The 'living model', we might say, comes to exist beyond history, in a Platonic or quasi-Platonic sense, as in Tacitus' *Agricola* 46.3, discussed above (12).[41] In any case, the portrayal of the heroes as *Urbilder*, probably best translated in this context as character 'types' or 'archetypes', comes very close to Philo's conception of the patriarchs as τρόποι ψυχῆς in *Abr.* 52a. And for Philo himself at least, this represents an allegorical understanding of the text.

[37] *Philosophical Orations*, 218–19. In the description of Odysseus, however, he says 'model'. In favour of the translation 'allegory', one might cite the use of the term in Porphyry, *Antr. nymph.* 34, where in an explicitly allegorical interpretation attributed to Numenius (= fr. 33 des Places), Odysseus is said to be (literally 'bear') the εἰκών of the person who travels through the stages of generation. For the rest, Maximus does seem aware of Neopythagorean allegorizations of Odysseus as a soul caught up in body and matter (*Or.* 7.5, 11.10).

[38] 'Studi omerici', 87–8, cf. 97, 99–100. The more recent remarks of Gangloff, 'Héros', 163–4, are too general to be of significance in the present context.

[39] *Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik*, 181.

[40] Ibid. The 'intimation' lies in his reference to Alewell, *Über das rhetorische ΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΓΜΑ*, 21 n. 2, who cites the passage from Seneca in the course of his discussion of the term εἰκών.

[41] Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 95.68–73 (the term *imago* in § 69).

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Whether we can say that in Maximus we have an allegorism similar to that set out by Philo in *Abr.* 54, whereby the characters symbolize even more abstract entities, such as capacities, virtues, and the like, is a separate question. The notion that Achilles and Agamemnon are 'images of the passions' certainly seems to point in this direction. In any case, however, we do find such a phenomenon in the *Quaestiones Homericae* (also called *Allegoriae*) of a certain Heraclitus, who is now generally dated to the first or early second century of the common era.[42] Although Heraclitus is primarily concerned with the gods, in his treatment of Odysseus he clearly allegorizes the hero, at least at one point, as φρόνησις, wisdom.[43] In other words, the interpretation of the heroes as *Abstrakta*, even if rare in this period, is attested in pagan exegesis.

We see then that the ambiguity that seems to be present in *Abr.* 52–4, where Philo indicates what the patriarchs may symbolize, is clarified to some extent when certain Greek antecedents are considered. On the one hand, Philo's use of the expression τρόποι ψυχῆς may be understood in light of a famous section from Plato's *Republic*, and the later echoes of it in Dio Chrysostom. On the other hand, the interpretation of persons who were thought to be historical in an allegorical manner, be it as character types or archetypes, be it as more abstract entities such as virtues or capacities, may be found in the Homeric exegesis of early imperial times. We may also observe that, like Philo, the imperial exegetes of Homer were not particularly concerned to differentiate between these two varieties of allegorization. Why then do we need to do so here? Because in the part of the *Quod deterius* where Philo sets out an allegorical interpretation of the two brothers (§§ 47–103, with some interruptions), he chooses to interpret the figure of Cain at one level, and that of Abel at another. Indeed, as illustrated above in section II, it is

[42] See the discussion of Konstan in the edition of the *Homeric Problems* by Russell and Konstan, xi–xiii, and that of Pontani in his edition, 9–13.

[43] *All.* 70.8, in the editions cited in the previous note. Heinemann, 'Wissenschaftliche Allegoristik', 15 with n. 68, and Stein, *Allegorische Exegese*, 5, do not acknowledge this, but they may have read this chapter too cursorily. See Pontani's note in his edition, 228 n. 195.

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this manner of proceeding that distinguishes the interpretation found in the body of the treatise from that implied in the title, and attested in other parts of the Philonic corpus.

IV LITERALISTIC INTERPRETATION AND DEPENDENCE ON TRADITION

Although the *Quod deterius* is part of the series called the *Allegorical Commentary*, this does not mean that literalistic interpretation is absent. Indeed, it seems to play a rather significant role in this treatise. This is not entirely surprising, since already Theodore of Mopsuestia had noted Philo's tendency to respect part of the 'historical' sense of the text. Theodore surmised, and modern scholarship has confirmed, that this often has to do with his acceptance of earlier tradition(s).[44] On some occasions these traditions find parallels in other sources of ancient Jewish and Christian exegesis, and on other occasions in Philo's works where literal interpretation is more explicitly acknowledged and has greater prominence, in particular, the *Quaestiones* and the 'Exposition of the Law'.

There are a few instances where these strands of interpretation play a major role in the structure or general intent of the *Quod deterius*. They may be briefly outlined here. We have already noted that at the beginning of the treatise, Philo portrays the conflict between Cain and Abel as an ἀγὼν λόγων, in a manner similar to the Palestinian Targums. This construct prevails up until § 45, that is, it extends through approximately one quarter of the treatise. The ultimate lesson we are to gain from this episode is explained in §§ 35–7 and 45, and it is that one should not do as Abel did in going out to debate a talented rhetor, without first gaining competence in the art of speaking. The case of Abel is presented as a negative *exemplum*, and warns us what not to do. Such an interpretation of the incident is in accord with Philo's view of the 'historical' part of the Pentateuch

[44] For Theodore's text, see *Fragments syriaques*, [II], tr. Van Rompay, 15; and see my comments in 'Biblical Interpretation', 72–3.

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as presented in the 'Exposition', according to which it is made up of *exempla* that have didactic intent.[45]

The next instance of a significant non-allegorical interpretation comes in the middle of the treatise, in §§ 79–92. This happens to be one of the most well-known sections of the work, and regards Gen 4:10, according to which the blood of Abel 'cries out' to God after he is killed. Philo here immediately takes up the apparent contradiction between the literal meanings of two biblical verses, Lev 17:11 and Gen 2:7. According to the first verse, blood is the substance of soul, but Gen 2:7 implies that it is *pneuma*. Although Philo does not at first explain why he takes up this matter, it emerges later on that his intention is to better explain an idea, attested in 1 Enoch 22, that he seems to take for granted, namely, that Abel's blood represents his soul (§§ 91–2). This probably would have been seen as a case of synecdoche, not allegory. In any case, as Philo sees it, Abel's soul has survived after his death, and is making entreaty to God. What is stunning about Philo's reliance on this tradition here is that it stands in contradiction to the interpretation of Abel's death that he had just offered as part of his allegorical exegesis: Abel does survive after his death, but that survival is impersonal, since Abel symbolizes the 'God-loving doctrine', which is eternal (§§ 75–8). The tradition attested in 1 Enoch, by contrast, entails the personal survival of Abel. In short, Philo has made use of two differing interpretations, without indicating that fact.

In the final third of the treatise we find two important instances of literalistic interpretation. The first relates to Gen 4:12c, which is the subject of §§ 119–40. According to the biblical text, God tells Cain that he shall be 'groaning and trembling upon the earth'. Philo understands these physical actions to be signs of the emotions of grief and fear, to which Cain is subject, and this leads him to a long discussion of the emotions (πάθη) and the 'good emotions' (εὐπάθειαι). That Cain's 'groaning and trembling' are taken to indicate emotions is not an instance of allegorism, and Cain retains his status 'as a man'. Indeed, this may be confirmed by the fact that we find a similar exegesis in

[45] For the details, see the *Summary* in the commentary for §§ 32–46.

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the 'Exposition' (*Virt.* 199–200; *Praem.* 68–73), where Cain is presented as a historical person. In the immediately following segment, §§ 141–9, Philo discusses Gen 4:13, where Cain speaks of himself and laments. According to Philo's understanding of the Greek, which is different from our own, Cain says something like, 'The punishment that lies in my being abandoned is very grave.' Philo interprets this statement not in any allegorical manner, but he takes it as a γνώμη, a general maxim about human life and its circumstances. Cain is speaking of the condition of being abandoned by God, something known from the Psalms but also from Greek tragedy. In fact, both of the interpretations just mentioned lend support to the idea that Philo's portrayal of the Cain and Abel saga was influenced by his knowledge of tragedy. To this matter we will return in section VI.

Finally, there are additional cases of literalistic exegesis which may not have great bearing on the structure or overall thrust of the *Quod deterius*, but do further attest to Philo's reliance on traditional sources or ideas. With regard to Gen 4:9, he takes Cain's lie about not knowing the whereabouts of his brother after he has killed him as an attempt to deceive God, due to his disbelief in or ignorance of divine omniscience. These kinds of speculations have parallels in later Jewish exegetical sources.[46] Also noteworthy are Philo's comments on Cain's fear, expressed in Gen 4:14, that every person who finds him would kill him. Philo contends that this would not be every person, but only the just person, and that Cain himself knows this. This is a form of narrative aggadic interpretation, and is paralleled in a later targumic source.[47]

V SECONDARY EXEGESIS AND THE PORTRAYAL OF CONTRAST

One of the most noteworthy features of Philo's interpretation of the Pentateuch, especially in the *Allegorical Commentary*, is his citation and use of other biblical passages and biblical testimony.

[46] See the relevant notes on § 61.
[47] See the *Summary* in the commentary for §§ 164–6.

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Sometimes the passages function as proof-texts, sometimes rather as parallels that provide illustration of a given point. The use of these 'secondary passages' can be very elaborate, and they often become the object, in their own right, of further exegesis. Indeed, the secondary exegesis can often determine the structure of a lemmatic unit, and even make up the bulk of its content. The procedure is no doubt part of midrashic method, but Philo gives it his own bent.[48]

The secondary texts and testimonies are employed in many different ways in the *Quod deterius*, but there is one recurring pattern that may be noted. It involves an exegesis of contrast. In much of the treatise, the focus is on the figure of Cain. This is of course a reflection of the biblical text itself in Gen 4:8–15. The ethical profile of Cain, however, is a negative one, and we see that Philo often finds other biblical figures to set in contrast to him, who, from a moral standpoint, may be viewed in a more positive light. Moreover, these figures are often portrayed as attaining various levels of moral progress. It seems then, that the figure of Cain was too limiting, and did not allow Philo to fully accomplish his objective of moral edification. One may probably find an explanation for this phenomenon in the influence of Stoicism, in which there was not only a highlighting of the differences between the wise man or σοφός and the base individual or φαῦλος, but also an emphasis on the different stages of moral progress that one might achieve.[49]

The clearest instances of this type of secondary exegesis are found from the middle of the treatise onwards. The following summary may be given. In §§ 57–61, Philo is discussing Gen 4:9a–b, where Cain answers God's question, 'Where is Abel your brother?', with the lie, 'I do not know.' Before even getting to Cain's response, Philo compares the answer Abraham gives to God's question, 'Where is Sarah your wife?' in Gen

[48] For the importance of the secondary texts in Philo, see Runia, 'Structure', 238–40. The use of the term 'lemmata' to refer to these texts, however, is not quite accurate (there may be a few exceptions, as in §§ 6b–28 of the *Quod deterius*), and is somewhat misleading.

[49] For these categories and concepts in Philo, see Turowski, *Widerspiegelung*, 41–2.

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18:9. It emerges from Philo's discussion that Abraham's answer entails an acknowledgement not only of divine providence, but of divine grace or something like it. Cain by contrast, through his lie and his attempt to deceive God, reveals that he does not even believe in divine omniscience. Although Abraham is called σοφός in this segment, one may observe that the profile assigned to him in this case does not completely align with that of the Stoic sage.

In the remainder of the examples, one finds a greater correspondence between Cain and the Stoic φαῦλος and the positive figure(s) and the Stoic sage, but sometimes the correspondence is rather general, and/or involves a more eclectic kind of philosophical characterization. In §§ 62–8, Philo discusses the second part of Cain's answer to God in Gen 4:9, where he implies that he is not his brother's guardian. This non-guardianship is contrasted with the guardianship of the senior Levites as described in Num 8:24–6 and of the Levites in general in Deut 33:9–10. Philo interprets these texts to the effect that the younger Levite of Num 8:24–6 is a kind of progressor or προκόπτων, who is engaged in an active life, while the senior Levite is a sage or τέλειος, who is engaged in more contemplative tasks, including the 'guarding' of the sacred oracles and teachings.

In §§ 104–11, Cain as a 'worker of the earth' (Gen 4:12a) or unskilled labourer is compared with Noah the technical farmer (Gen 9:20). This comparison is applied to the ethical sphere. Noah represents the σπουδαῖος who practises the art of 'soul-cultivation'. This means, essentially, that he tends to the soul with knowledge, avoids passions and vices, and attains the fruits of virtue. Cain, for his part, symbolizes the φαῦλος, who focusses on the body and its wants, and through ignorance and 'non-technical' actions, ends up damaging his soul.

The contrast in §§ 112–18 is similar. Here Philo discusses Gen 4:12b, where God tells Cain, according to Philo's understanding of the Greek, that the earth will not add its strength to him (Cain). The allegorical meaning is that Cain's body and senses (symbolized by the earth), because they are insatiable, will not only not add but will actually take strength away from him. However, strength here is not physical, but of the soul. This is, in

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the Middle Stoa, a 'non-intellectual' virtue that one gains from the exercise of virtue. Cain, however, by serving the body and the senses, has engaged not in virtue but in vice. Consequently, any strength of soul would be lessened. His fate is contrasted with that of those whom God has 'led up upon the *strength of the earth*', mentioned in Deut 32:13, a verse of the Song of Moses. Philo understands such persons to be of the people of Jacob, as understood, however, in an ethical sense. They are, as Jacob, 'lovers of knowledge', which for Philo means something like would-be sages. These people are not like Cain, who serves the earthly or bodily element in himself, but rather they are 'upon it', that is, they dominate and have control over the body and the senses. They are able, like Noah, to attain the 'produce' of virtue (imagery from Deut 32:13), that is, its results, with God's assistance.

The lengthy discussion of Gen 4:12c, in §§ 119–40, where Cain is told that he will be 'groaning and trembling upon the earth', has already been noted. The groaning and trembling are understood to be physical manifestations of the emotions or passions, grief and fear, that the φαῦλος is bound to experience. This means that of the four passions (πάθη) of the Stoic classification, Cain will experience only the negative ones, and not the positive ones of pleasure (ἡδονή) and desire (ἐπιθυμία). By contrast, the person who pursues virtue (§ 120), or the wise person (§ 140: ἀστεῖος), will experience not the passions, but the 'good emotions' (εὐπάθειαι), and of those the positive ones, namely, joy and hope. Philo then shows, by way of a discussion of three secondary texts, Gen 21:6, Exod 4:14, and Gen 4:26, how other biblical characters, namely, Sarah and Abraham, Aaron, and Enosh, fall into this latter category.

The Greek text of Gen 4:15b, discussed in §§ 167–76, is very difficult, and concerns the possible slaying of Cain. It is generally translated, 'Whoever kills Cain shall pay a sevenfold penalty.' Philo, however, takes it to mean, 'The one who kills Cain shall disband [or 'loose'] seven punishable things.' He acknowledges the difficulty of the text at the literal level, so he turns to the allegorical. As he sees it, Cain symbolizes the rational part of the soul, as one would expect, of the φαῦλος. Accordingly,

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whoever kills this part, will also 'undo' or cause the destruction of 'seven punishable things', which are the seven irrational parts of the soul, since these cannot survive without the rational part. The 'punishability' of the seven irrational parts of the soul of the ἄφρων or φαῦλος is then contrasted with the purity of the irrational parts of the soul of the sage, who is symbolized by Noah. That Noah had the irrational parts of his soul in a pure state may be confirmed by an allegorical reading of Gen 7:2, according to which he is instructed to introduce seven pairs of pure animals into the ark. Here again, the secondary text is used to illustrate a characteristic of the morally good person or sage, as compared with Cain the φαῦλος.

The contrasting of the good and the bad is of course common in many cultures and many forms of literary expression. In the Bible itself, the juxtaposition of the righteous and the wicked is found often, especially in the wisdom tradition.[50] The same kinds of juxtapositions and comparisons can be seen in exegetical literature. That Philo was influenced by aggadic traditions, in which there was a tendency to sharpen the moral contrasts between the different biblical characters, can hardly be doubted.[51] One also sees moralistic juxtapositions of *personae* in the Homeric interpretations of those two public lecturers we have already mentioned, Dio Chrysostom and Maximus of Tyre. This propensity has been well discussed by Kindstrand, who rightly emphasizes the use of comparison (σύγκρισις) in (earlier) popular philosophical preaching, and the didactic focus and intent of the two specific authors.[52] Philo's *Allegorical Commentary* also shares features of diatribal writing, as well as the didactic aims, so it is not surprising that his treatment of the *personae* of the Pentateuch is similar.

However, Philo also understands ethical contrasts from an advanced philosophical perspective, and he reveals that perspective in his portrayals. He makes the general pronouncement that nearly all phenomena are best known through their opposites,

[50] See Ps 1; Eccl 3:16–17; Wis 3:1–12; for Proverbs, see Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 510.

[51] Cf. Stein, *Allegorische Exegese*, 15.

[52] *Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik*, 134–6, 182.

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and he then includes virtue and vice and other topics of ethics in the broad listings that he provides (*Ebr.* 186–7; *Migr.* 219). Elsewhere, he writes about the teachings concerning opposites being attributed to Heraclitus, but claims that Moses knew them first.[53] In any case, he clearly saw the study of opposites as part of the philosophical tradition. And in the specifics of his exegesis, as already intimated, he relies heavily on the categories of the Stoics. The contrast between the σοφός and the φαῦλος is common (Philo acknowledges, de facto, its importance for exegesis in *Somn.* 2.301–2), and we also find many details about the levels of moral progress. This leads us to wonder if Philo's portrayals and comparisons might be regarded as a kind of exegetical variation of what Posidonius calls ἠθολογία, mentioned by Seneca in *Ep.* 95.65–7. It entails the description of character and behaviours, rather than admonition, for instructional purposes, and also appears to have involved a drawing of contrasts between the good and bad.[54] Some have seen Seneca's own tragedies and Plutarch's *Lives* as influenced by this approach.[55] The question of whether Philo made any use of the same model, however, is best left for another occasion.

VI THE INFLUENCE OF GREEK TRAGEDY

The similarities between the Cain and Abel saga and Greek tragedy have long been noted.[56] Philo's knowledge of classical drama has also been widely recognized.[57] Accordingly, it will hardly be cause for surprise that in his brief summaries of the episode in the 'Exposition of the Law', Philo characterizes it in a way that is suggestive of Greek tragedies. He emphasizes the

[53] *Her.* 207–14; *QG* 3.5. On the statements about opposites, see the note of Winston and Dillon on *Gig.* 3 (another relevant passage) in *Two Treat.*, 234–5.

[54] See Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, 56–7.

[55] Dihle, 'Posidonius' System', 53–4; Kidd, *Posidonius*, II.2, 651.

[56] Recently, Scarlata, *Outside of Eden*, 207–12, has argued that already in the Septuagint one may detect the influence of tragedy.

[57] See the listings under the names of Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles, in the index nominum in Leisegang, *Indices*; for a full study, see Koskenniemi, *Greek Writers*, 47–61, 64–8.

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terrible nature of the crime of fratricide, calling it an ἄγος (pollution) and Cain ἐναγής. He also makes explicit what the biblical text only implies, namely, that Cain has polluted the earth with the blood of Abel, and accordingly, has caused it to be infertile (*Virt.* 199; *Praem.* 68). The term ἄγος does not occur in the Greek Bible, but is typical in tragedy. The notion of a physical pollution of the ground, caused by murder, while it is found in the Pentateuch (Num 35:33–4), is very prominent in tragedy, especially in Aeschylus.[58] The motif of the infertility caused by a homicide is also typical of tragedy, and is perhaps best known from the beginning of Sophocles' *Oedipus rex*.[59]

The influence of tragedy also seems discernible in a number of passages of the *Quod deterius*. In § 96, when introducing God's curse of Cain (Gen 4:11a), Philo speaks of the 'extreme nature of the pollution of fratricide' (ὑπερβολὴ ἄγους ἀδελφοκτονίας). This again reminds us of Aeschylus, who emphasizes the permanence and profundity of the stain of that crime (*Sept.* 681–2, 734–7). There are a few other features of this passage that also have a tragic flavour.[60]

We have already mentioned above (21–2) the interpretation of Cain's 'groaning and trembling' (Gen 4:12c) set out in § 119. The actions are the external symptoms of the two passions to which he will be subject, grief (λύπη) and fear (φόβος). Now, the Stoics were wont to see the passions or emotions as the source of much unhappiness in human life. To make this point, Chrysippus often cited examples from tragedies, in particular those of Euripides. In his *De affectibus*, he says that human beings betray 'friends and cities' and commit 'shameful acts' when subject to emotions, and then cites an incident concerning the behaviour of Menelaus from Euripides' *Andromache*. He also seems to have relied on the portrayal of stories about Eriphyle and Medea.[61] In

[58] See *Cho.* 66–7, with Harrison, *Prolegomena*, 219–21; *Eum.* 166–7; *Suppl.* 265–6.

[59] Cf. Mikalson, *Honor Thy Gods*, 54–5.

[60] See the commentary on § 96.

[61] See the quotations and summaries in Galen, *De placitis H. et P.* 4.6.7–9, 11, 15, 19 (partial in *SVF* III.473). The story of Eriphyle may have been better known from a tragedy of Sophocles by that name, which perhaps is the same play that is called *Epigoni* in some sources.

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Philo's own era, Seneca, no doubt following in the footsteps of the Stoic masters, employed the vehicle of tragedy himself, so as to make vivid the devastating effects of the passions, with an apotropaic intent.[62] In view of this background, it is not impossible that Philo's understanding of Cain's 'groaning and trembling' as manifestations of grief and fear was influenced by his readings of Greek tragedies. For the punishment of his murderous act is having to live, as it were, an ongoing tragedy.

The interpretation of Cain's lament in Gen 4:13 as a cry about abandonment by God has also already been mentioned, and will be further discussed below.[63]

Finally, it is possible that Philo's cryptic remark, in § 79, about the 'sublimity' of the words 'the voice of the blood of your brother cries out to me from the earth' (Gen 4:10), owes something to his reading of Greek tragedies. For he seems to be referring to a metaphor of personification, and a very similar one occurs in Aeschylus, *Cho.* 400–2.[64]

VII PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS AND BELIEFS

As mentioned in section I, in the Italian translations published under the title *Le origini del male*, Radice takes the view that one may find a 'guiding idea' in the *Quod deterius*. It is virtue and vice, or rather, the contrast between them, as understood 'a livello metafisico-ontologico'.[65] The basis for this suggestion seems to be the contrast between Abel and Cain as they are described in different parts of the treatise. For the figure of Abel is apotheosized, or more precisely, assimilated to a kind of Platonic form of the 'God-loving' doctrine, in § 78. Cain, for his part, if only at the end of the treatise, in § 178, becomes a symbol of everlasting vice or evil. One may infer from these passages a kind of ontological

[62] See Chaumartin, 'Philosophical Tragedy?', 654, 660–4; cf. Pohlenz, *Stoa*, I, 325–6.

[63] See the *Summary* in the commentary for §§ 141–9.

[64] For further discussion of this matter, see my 'Philo and Ps.-Longinus', 231–3.

[65] *Origini*, 15, 25–7 (at 27, for '§§ 167 ss.', he probably means §§ 177–8). According to Radice, the same contrast, 'a livello etico-psicologico', is the guiding idea of the *De sacrificiis*.

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contrast, even in a near gnostic sense. Others, however, have seen unity in an actual dogma or tenet of belief. Leisegang, the author of the much older German translation, while acknowledging the presence of digressions, thought that the dominant thesis of the *Quod deterius* is that good always triumphs over evil, despite the plots and attacks of the latter.[66] He seems to have read the text from a more Stoic perspective. In any case, his position appears to have influenced Adler, who accepted the notion of a main theme. Indeed, he put forward the hypothesis that in the *Quod deterius*, Philo was freeing himself, to some degree, from formal dependence on the biblical text. His view was that this treatise represents a kind of midpoint in Philo's development, in which he was moving away from the more atomistic exegesis found in the *Legum allegoriae* towards the more thematic presentation of the *De agricultura* and the *De ebrietate*.[67]

It is difficult to endorse these views. The very difference between the proposals of Radice and Leisegang raises a doubt. The idea of an implied contrast between virtue and vice, at the metaphysical level, can certainly be derived from the juxtaposition of §§ 78 and 178, especially if the latter passage is read in light of the parallel in *Fug.* 60–4. But Philo does not make reference to any cosmic or metaphysical contrast in the passages of the *Quod deterius* in question. Nor would the notion of such a contrast, if applied backwards from § 178 through the text, as a key for interpretation, be found to have much of a connection with the range of interpretative frameworks and philosophical contents found in the treatise. There are many portrayals of the contrast between vice and virtue, as indicated in section V, but these are at the level of ethics. As for the suggestion of Leisegang, it would seem to have validity for the primary allegorical scheme that appears in §§ 47–103, but not for the other parts of the treatise. One may also concede to Adler that some of the formulae of transition, used to indicate a progression from one lemma to the next, are well developed in the *Quod deterius*. But

[66] PCH III, 269.
[67] *Studien*, 33–5.

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some of his observations are misleading or erroneous.[68] And more important, he does not take into account the major differences and/or inconsistencies in exegetical approach found throughout the treatise, only some of which have been indicated in sections II and IV above. Nor does he attempt to explain the long digression in §§ 6b–28.[69]

Overall, it seems more prudent to speak of lines of interpretation, as we have done in this introduction, rather than a single leading idea. Indeed, the most striking feature of the *Quod deterius* that emerges from a close reading of the text is the discontinuity to which we have just alluded. In light of this circumstance, it is hard not to have sympathy with the position taken by many German scholars from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards as regards the nature of the *Allegorical Commentary*. It is not quite a commentary in the strict sense, but a collection of homilies, or perhaps more precisely, an exegetical work that relies on homiletical material.[70] This older view gains additional support from the 'diatribal' element present in many of the treatises, to which we may now turn.

VIII HOMILETICAL AND DIATRIBAL COMPONENT

The treatises of the *Allegorical Commentary* do include the technical and expository discussions generally associated with 'grammatical' commentary in late Hellenistic and early imperial times. However, they also go beyond such discussions, and include a significant homiletical element. To employ the distinction of Theophrastus, there is, on the one hand, an orientation

[68] The continuity of the interpretation of Gen 4:8b given in §§ 47ff. with what precedes is only apparent; the citation of Gen 4:16 in § 163 is not a departure from the sequence of the biblical text, because the verse is cited as a proof-text, not a lemma; the fact that the first words of Gen 4:15 are interpreted together with the end of 4:14 is a departure only from modern verse division, not from biblical order. For all of this, see the *Summaries* in the commentary for §§ 47–56, 150–63 (with n. 118), and note on the lemma for §§ 164–6.

[69] For his part, Sterling, 'Structure', 1233–5, does not mention the *Quod deterius* in his discussion of the 'thematic unity of individual treatises'.

[70] See esp. Cohn, PCH I, 6–7; Heinemann, PCH III, 5; cf. Thyen, *Stil*, 7–11.

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'towards the subject matter' (πρὸς τὰ πράγματα), but also one 'towards the hearers' (πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροωμένους).[71] These different orientations of discourse may be observed in the form of presentation and in the style, which tend not to be uniform in many treatises. Scholars have distinguished two primary types of presentation and/or style. Often we encounter a scientific or technical kind of prose, sometimes termed *Fach-* or *Sachprosa*. Other passages reveal much higher levels of rhetorical pretension.[72] It may be that this phenomenon is due to the circumstance already mentioned in the previous section, namely, that homiletical material has been edited and reshaped, no doubt by Philo himself, so as to form longer exegetical treatises.[73]

Among the segments that seem to be derived from homilies, by far the most numerous and the most typical are those called diatribal. Most contemporary scholars accept the legitimacy of the term 'diatribe', so long as it is used not to specify a literary genre, but to indicate a style employed in lecturing or teaching (*Vortragsstil*). That style may also be called 'popular philosophical dialexis', and is for the most part understood to have undergone changes in the course of its history, and to have been employed differently by the different practitioners.[74] At least some authors who employed the term in connection with Philo's writings a hundred years ago had in mind primarily this stylistic sense.[75] Excellent surveys of the diatribal elements in Philo's various works have been produced by Wendland and Thyen, and it will be possible to refer to them throughout the commentary.[76] These elements are especially plentiful in the *Quod deterius*.

[71] Fr. 78 Fortenbaugh. Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.7.1; and Gottschalk, 'An Errant Fragment'.

[72] See Adler, *Studien*, 11; Schwabe, in the introduction to Mann's Hebrew translation of *De opificio*, XXIII; Siegert, 'Early Jewish Interpretation', 179.

[73] Cf. also Siegert, *Drei Predigten*, II, 15.

[74] See esp. Uthemann and Görgemanns, 'Diatribe', 530–2; cf. Kindstrand, *Bion*, 97.

[75] Norden, *Kunstprosa*, I, 393 n. 2; Schwabe, loc. cit. (n. 72).

[76] Wendland, 'Diatribe', Thyen, *Stil*.

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Moreover, there are a number of longer passages in the treatise that stand out not only for stylistic reasons, but because they reveal an immense knowledge of various literary and especially diatribal traditions on Philo's part. Among the most notable are the following: the speech of the 'lovers of self' in §§ 33–4; the polemic against the 'sophists' in §§ 73–4, the warnings against the dangers caused by the senses and irrational parts of the soul in §§ 101–3a and 173–6, and the (non-polemical) description of agricultural operations in §§ 106–8.[77]

IX THE TEXT OF THE *QUOD DETERIUS*

The text of the *Quod deterius* was edited by Cohn in the first volume of the critical edition of Philo's works that was published by Cohn and Wendland between 1896 and 1915.[78] As presented in that edition, the text is based on four manuscripts, designated U, F, H, and L. These manuscripts date from the thirteenth or fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, and are divided into two families, the UF family, and the H family, which take their names from these very manuscripts. The manuscript L belongs to the H family. The UF family is known for containing an 'aberrant' text of the Septuagint in the lemmata, but this phenomenon is not present in all treatises preserved by those manuscripts, and not in the *Quod deterius*.[79]

Since 1896, additional sources for the text of the treatise have become known. Some passages were discovered in a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus which dates from the third century, and in a late exegetical compilation among extracts of the *Glaphyra* of Cyril of Alexandria. However, neither of these sources provide any significant variants to the text of the treatise as it appears

[77] In the commentary, each of these segments is prefaced with a brief introduction.

[78] For the details of the edition, see the list of abbreviations under 'PCW'. The last volume of text, VI, appeared in 1915, but the *Indices* were not completed until 1930.

[79] The matter of the aberrant text is treated by Katz, *Philo's Bible*, and most recently by Munnich, 'Retouches'.

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in Cohn-Wendland.[80] A more promising avenue for progress may lie in an Athenian palimpsest that has come to light, and contains considerable segments from the *Quod deterius*. But not enough has been published from this codex to allow for an adequate assessment.[81]

At this point in time, the Cohn-Wendland text has not been superseded. Accordingly, it has served as the basis for the present edition. The text has been revised only on a handful of occasions, and these are listed on a separate page just before the text and translation. There are many other passages where textual variants merit consideration, but in these cases the discussions are relegated to the commentary. A more significant departure from the Cohn-Wendland edition involves the presentation of the biblical citations and allusions, for which see section XII.

X PREVIOUS ANNOTATED TRANSLATIONS

There are some very good annotated translations of the *Quod deterius*, all of them done in the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and published as parts of larger collections of Philo's works. Most of them have already been mentioned in this introduction, but it may be helpful to list them here, in chronological order:

H. Leisegang, in PCH III (1919): German
G. H. Whitaker, in PLCL II (1929): English
I. Feuer, PAPM 5 (1965): French
C. Mazzarelli, with annotations by R. Radice, in *Filone di Alessandria: Le origini del male* (1984): Italian
Y. Amir, in *KFA* IV.1 (1997): Hebrew
M. Coria, in *OCFA* II (2010): Spanish

[80] For the details of these texts, see the commentary on § 51, ad ἀτεκνίαν, and the commentary on § 50, ad γυναιξὶ ταῖς.

[81] For this manuscript, see Alexander, 'Neglected Palimpsest'. Of the two readings he mentions at 6 n. 1 as pertaining to *Det.* 19 and 109 respectively, the first is, as Alexander acknowledges, an 'inferior variant'; the second seems to pertain not to *Det.* 109, but to *Post.* 109.

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All of the translations have been executed with care, and I acknowledge my debt to them. The annotations in the German, Italian, Hebrew, and Spanish editions are more extensive, while the ones in the English and French editions are rather minimal. Within the body of the present commentary, these translations are cited by the name of the translator/annotator alone, without further qualification, with the exception of the annotations of Radice in *Le origini del male*.[82]

XI PHILO'S LEMMATA AND UNITS OF COMMENTARY

The divisions or sections of Philo's commentary can generally be determined by the lemmata he provides from the Bible. In addition, he usually employs various formulae of transition, indicating that he has concluded his discussion of one lemma and is passing on to the next.

In the *Quod deterius*, however, Philo does not follow a uniform approach in the way that he presents the lemmata and comments on them. In the first half of the treatise, or slightly more (through § 95), he introduces a longer lemma, and then breaks up the discussion of it into several parts. In nearly all of these instances, he begins the new unit of commentary by re-quoting the part of the lemma that is to be the subject of the new discussion, or by referring back to it with a paraphrase. This procedure is also employed in the mini-treatise on Gen 37:13–17, found in §§ 6b–28.

In the second half of the treatise, or slightly less (§§ 104–63, 167–78), Philo follows a simpler procedure. He gives a smaller lemma, completes his commentary on it, and then proceeds to the next lemma.

Finally, there are two cases where Philo employs a third kind of technique (§§ 96–103, 164–6). He breaks the lemma into

[82] The recent edition of the *Quod deterius* by E. Filler, which includes the Greek text, Amir's Hebrew translation (with revisions), and a commentary (Tel Aviv 2021), reached me only after my work had already been submitted. His commentary, however, has little overlap with the present one.

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two parts in a single exegetical exposition. That is, he quotes the first part of a lemma and comments upon it, and then, within the context of the same discussion, cites the second part of the lemma and completes the exegesis. The basis for making such a determination, namely, that these sections of text should be regarded as single rather than as distinct lemmatic units, seems fairly self-evident. In one instance, Philo's summary of his own remarks seems to refer back to one integrated discussion (§ 103), and in the other, the very brief explanation of what I am calling the second part of the lemma simply repeats and applies what had been said about the first part (§ 166).

XII BIBLICAL CITATIONS AND ALLUSIONS

The paramount position of the biblical text is obvious in the *Quod deterius*, as in all of the *Allegorical Commentary*. Philo is constantly occupied with passages of Scripture. As just noted, his commentary is structured on biblical lemmata, and as indicated above in section V, he often introduces other biblical testimony as an essential component of his exegesis.

However, the manner in which Philo refers to biblical texts and biblical testimony is not uniform. He may introduce a direct citation from the biblical text, and for this he employs different formulae, which are fairly explicit.[83] In some instances, such as at the beginning of a treatise, but also elsewhere, the mere lemmatic position of a citation serves to indicate its status to his hearers or readers.[84] Besides direct quotation, however, Philo also employs indirect speech to introduce biblical texts, often with the same formulae used for direct quotations. These citations usually take the form of an indirect statement or an indirect command, the latter since injunctions are common in the Pentateuch. In addition, he employs various other indirect means to refer to biblical texts. Finally, Philo makes reference to biblical testimony by

[83] There is a good brief list in Ryle, *Philo and Holy Scripture*, xlv–xlvi; for more detail, see Thyen, *Stil*, 68–71.

[84] There seems to be only one instance of paraphrase for the presentation of a lemma, viz., § 104, on Gen 4:12a. For this procedure, cf. Gibson, *Interpreting a Classic*, 15.

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allusion, that is, simply by embarking on a discussion of a given biblical incident, datum, or command, without indicating that he has a passage or text in mind, although in the course of such discussions he may make use of the actual words of Scripture. This manner of procedure is to be explained no doubt by the fact that in the *Allegorical Commentary* he takes for granted that his audience or readers are thoroughly familiar with the pentateuchal books.

This threefold distinction is admittedly to some degree artificial, and cannot be regarded as exhaustive or completely consistent. Nevertheless, it is based on formal criteria, and consequently, one may acknowledge that Philo was intentional about citing the biblical text in direct form, in indirect form, or merely alluding to it. At the same time, he does not exercise the same degree of precision in referring to his source text as would a modern scholar, or even some later Christian Fathers, such as Eusebius. Of course, as one would naturally expect, we find the liberal use of paraphrase in both indirect citations and in allusions. However, even in his direct citations Philo sometimes proceeds rather loosely and uses what we might call paraphrase or semi-paraphrase. This usually has to do with an assimilation of the biblical phrasing to a different grammatical and syntactic context, that of his own discourse, or with an application of his own stylistic sensibilities. But sometimes the changes are more substantive, and are due to an attempt to abbreviate or emphasize. And of course, one must also consider the possibility that he was relying on a text of the Septuagint different from the transmitted one.

On account of these circumstances, in this edition I have made a departure from the practice of Cohn and Wendland (and the editors that followed them) as regards the presentation of the biblical citations and allusions. In Cohn-Wendland, quotation marks are introduced not only when a biblical text is directly cited, but also many times when one has been identified on the basis of its similarity to what is found in the printed editions of the Septuagint, even if it is strictly speaking an allusion. And with respect to the use of quotation marks for indirect citations, it is difficult to find any measure of consistency in the Cohn-Wendland edition of the *Quod deterius*.

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In the present edition a greater restraint has been employed in the formal marking of quotations. They are, incidentally, indicated not by quotation marks, but by the use of italic type, but only in instances when they are introduced by Philo as direct citations with one formula or another, or when they stand in what can be reasonably determined to be 'lemmatic position'.[85] These texts in italic type are also accompanied by a numbered footnote, in which the quotation is identified. The indirect citations and allusions are given in roman type, but are accompanied by numbered footnotes in the same manner as the direct citations. In view of the variety of ways that Philo makes his references to the biblical text and biblical testimony, the system employed here cannot be regarded as perfect or without any inconsistency. Nevertheless, it contributes a certain measure of caution to the process of determining what constitutes a biblical citation and consequently, evidence of the state of the text of the Septuagint in Philo's time. The matter is often addressed in the commentary on a case-by-case basis.[86]

Finally, it should be noted that obvious references and allusions to an immediately preceding cited biblical text, which are part of Philo's exegetical discussion, are generally not marked in the text itself. And the same is true in the case of other single-word or more remote allusions to scriptural passages. But most of these are given in the commentary, and in any case can be located by means of the *Biblia patristica*, and the forthcoming revision of that work undertaken by S. A. Adams.[87]

[85] This latter category will include re-quotation of a lemma, as that procedure has been explained just above in section XI.

[86] As regards the general question of the relationship of Philo's biblical text to the text of the Septuagint transmitted in the biblical manuscripts, it seems best to refer to the most recent treatments of the topic for further details and bibliography, namely, Royse, 'Philo', and Pearce, 'Philo and the Septuagint', esp. 411–13.

[87] For the *Biblia patristica*, see the bibliography under J. Allenbach et al. Dr Adams informs me that his revision is to be entitled *The Philo of Alexandria Scripture Index*.

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XIII THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT COMMENTARY

The commentary is divided, like Philo's treatise itself, into chapters based on the biblical lemma. For each chapter or unit of commentary, there are four segments.

The first segment is devoted to the textual form of the lemma. That Philo's text was the Septuagint is taken for granted, and the differences between that text and the Hebrew Masoretic text are not discussed, unless they are specifically relevant for Philo's commentary. The main concern is with Philo's presentation and understanding of the Septuagint.

Our initial objective will be to delineate and account for any textual variations that Philo's lemmata exhibit with respect to the text of the Septuagint transmitted in the biblical manuscripts. The edition of Genesis employed for purposes of comparison will be that of Wevers, published in 1974, in the series commonly known as the Göttingen Septuagint. In undertaking this comparison, we shall also consider other instances in the Philonic corpus where the same verse is cited. As already noted, the variations in Philo are often better explained as minor adjustments, occasioned by a different grammatical and syntactic context or by his own stylistic sensibilities, than as reflections of a truly different biblical text.

The second and more important objective of this segment is to reach an appreciation of Philo's understanding of the Greek text, in those cases where its simple meaning might be subject to differing interpretations. Such cases are frequent in the second half of the *Quod deterius*. This is often not an easy task, because Philo has a tendency to hurry on to the allegorical meaning of a lemma without offering comments on how he understands its literal sense. He sometimes provides a paraphrase, but not always in complete form. In many cases, one must extract his understanding of the simple vocabulary and grammar of a given lemma from deep within the flow of an extended comment. Of course, one may also turn to other passages in Philo where the same biblical verse is discussed. These efforts are well worth making, however, because the more detailed a comprehension we

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can gain of his interpretation of the literal sense, the better we can understand his allegorical exegesis. After all, he himself held the view that every detail of Scripture is significant (*Fug.* 54).

There is an additional comparative technique that can serve us in our attempt to acquire a better awareness of Philo's understanding of the Greek. This involves looking beyond the Philonic corpus to the broader tradition of transmission and interpretation of the Greek Bible. Reference to this tradition can assist us in getting a sense of the nuances of the biblical text in Greek that might otherwise escape us. This is all the more true when we consider that we are sometimes at a disadvantage on account of our own post-Reformation habit of reading and understanding the Old Testament in its Hebrew form, or modern versions of it. Attention to the Greek exegetical tradition, although much of it derives from a time later than Philo, can nonetheless bring us closer to his perspective.[88]

The next two segments, called 'analysis' and 'summary', are meant to be taken together. The analysis constitutes an attempt to present the structure of Philo's discussion and argument in a brief outline form. The following prose summary is intended to explicate that outline in further detail. The purpose of these segments is to help readers confront one of the most difficult challenges posed by Philo's allegorical treatises, that of coherence and readability. The train of thought is sometimes very hard to follow. Some techniques can be helpful, however, even if they cannot resolve all of the problems. In the first place, it is vital to recognize the importance of the secondary biblical texts and testimony in the structure of Philo's discussion. Secondly, it is sometimes useful to look beyond the Philonic corpus for sources and parallels in the exegetical tradition that concerns the Bible, and also for parallels in ancient exegetical thinking in general. Thirdly, one must pay heed to the homiletical and diatribal character of the treatises, especially in recognizing the presence of certain expansions and amplifications.

[88] The remarks in the two preceding paragraphs are largely derived from my article, 'Writing Commentaries', 128–31, to which I refer for fuller details and the bibliographical background.

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The fourth and final segment is the commentary proper. Here the objective is to explicate the meaning of Philo's discussions, as it is expressed in his own language. By paying close attention to the language, we are able to learn how reliant he is on the learning and traditions of the Greek and Hellenistic worlds. Indeed, more often than not, the key to understanding Philo's arguments and expositions lies in the recognition and/or reconstruction of the broader context to which they relate. This can in most cases be achieved by reference to sources outside the Philonic corpus. In view of Philo's multiple approaches to the text, 'grammatical', homiletical, and philosophical, a very wide net must be cast. Similarly, the chronological parameters of the investigations must be very broad. For Philo is heir to the classical tradition, as well as being a student of Hellenistic and contemporary learning and philosophy. Moreover, post-Philonic sources can hardly be neglected. This is because many later authors, pagan and Christian, were treating similar issues, and employing the same traditions to do so. They can therefore be highly illuminating for an understanding of Philo's thought. The rabbinic sources also have their relevance, although not to the same degree.[89] That parallels from Philo's own works are also helpful is natural. Philo is not known for his brevity, and in some passages he may discuss more fully what he takes for granted or leaves unsaid in others.

[89] For the rabbinic sources on the Cain and Abel story specifically, one may consult Erzberger, *Kain, Abel und Israel*, and Gregg, *Shared Stories*, 7–40.

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