To understand why a narrative conception of identity offers a robust basis for understanding the nature and ethical significance of the role of personal bioinformation in self-characterisation, it is necessary first to establish what such a conception involves. This chapter reaches beyond metaphors of storytelling to review the key features of several prominent philosophical theories of narrative identity – exemplified by the approach by Marya Schechtman. According to these theories, our practical identities are constituted by our first-person accounts of who we are. Our self-narratives comprise multifaceted, diachronic characterisations of who we are as whole individuals, agents, and moral beings. We do not simply ‘have’ our identity narratives. We construct and interpret them, and they play a key role in supporting valuable experiential, evaluative aspects of a practically engaged and flourishing life. Our self-narratives are only capable of fulfilling these practical roles to the extent that they provide relatively intelligible and integrated accounts of our characteristics and experiences – in our own eyes and also in the eyes of those around us. This is, therefore, a crucially normative conception of identity, according to which the attainment of a coherent, inhabitable practical identity is an achievement, albeit a provisional and ever-evolving one.