[24.1] The legislative history of a statute includes the extrinsic materials relating to that history. Pre-parliamentary materials and parliamentary materials are a significant category of those extrinsic materials. There is a common law principle that permits access to extrinsic materials. As well, each state and territory has provisions in their respective Interpretation Acts governing consideration of extrinsic materials. These statutory and common law gateways to extrinsic materials coexist, although their requirements vary.

[21.1] Legislative antecedents are the enactments that constitute the historical legislative development of the statute or statutory provision being interpreted, such as repealed statutes and successive amendments to the statute made by the same Parliament. Antecedents may also include statutes made by other parliaments where it can be inferred that the statute being interpreted is derived from that other statute.

This paper examines the position taken and the discourse on the right of silence in Singapore. By position, I mean what the law is and how it got there. By discourse, I mean how officials talk when they go about defending legislative amendments or praising the current law. Does the experience in Singapore reveal a distinctly Asian perspective to the right of silence? The study of Singapore will be used as a springboard for theoretical reflections on the right in general. I hope to illustrate or instantiate this general point: while evidential reasoning is primarily theoretical; it is legally regulated by rules that are often shaped by practical – including political and ethical – considerations.

This chapter focuses on the exclusionary powers of the trial judge. Two forms of exclusion are examined: discretionary, where the trial judge has a choice whether to exclude the evidence; and mandatory, where the trial judge is required to do so. The discretions under the Act play a more significant role than the discretions at common law in determining the admissibility of evidence, as noted in the extract below. This may be because the Act adopts the logical relevance test. However, despite evidence being admissible and relevant, the trial judge has the discretion to exclude the evidence. Further, many exclusionary rules of evidence at common law (discussed in the earlier chapters) are relaxed and the Act adopts a more flexible approach to the admissibility of evidence.

This chapter first considers the discretionary and mandatory exclusions regulated by Part 3.11 (ss 135–9) of the Act. The concepts of ‘probative value’ and ‘unfair prejudice’ govern the exercise of the discretions. The chapter then considers how unreliability may affect the weight of the evidence: Parts 4.4 and 4.5 (ss 164–165B) have altered the common law.

This chapter is about the admissibility of evidence in court as opposed to the adducing of evidence in court. The concept of relevance has a non-legal meaning where it assists in determining an issue or question in a rational manner. Likewise, the fundamental rule in evidence law is that evidence that is relevant is admissible, unless it is excluded by one of the rules of exclusion. Where the evidence is irrelevant, it is inadmissible, and there are no rules of inclusion. Therefore, relevance is the first hurdle in considering whether an item of evidence is to be admitted in court. Relevance is a significant concept that is, and should be, considered when reading about the other topics discussed in this book.

To be admissible, evidence must be relevant to a fact in issue. In other words, the item of evidence must be able to affect the assessment of the probability that the fact in issue exists. Facts in issue are determined by reference to the substantive law. If an item of evidence assists the tribunal of fact to decide the issue rationally, it will be relevant.