This study advances a coopetition perspective to argue that an intangibility gap, defined as the difference in intangible asset intensity between industry-frontier foreign firms and local firms, generates both competitive threats and cooperative opportunities for local firms. Thus, an intangibility gap may affect local firms’ internal research and development (R&D) efforts beyond a linear, catching-up way of thinking. Using a sample of manufacturing firms in China, we find that intangibility gap has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the internal R&D intensity of local firms such that a moderate intangibility gap is more likely to stimulate local firms’ R&D than a small or large intangibility gap. Moreover, the results show that export intensity and state ownership of local firms serve as two boundary conditions under which the inverted U-shaped relationship becomes less and more pronounced, respectively.

Integrating the resource-based view (RBV) and attention-based view (ABV), this study explores the impact of firm-specific knowledge (FSK) on a firm's exploratory innovation and the role of government support in this process. We argue that firms with a high degree of specificity in their knowledge assets tend to have a more localized attention focus, leading to those firms with less exposure to distant and diverse information and knowledge. Consequently, such firms are likely to have reduced exploratory innovative outputs. However, government resource support could expand a firm's attention focus beyond local searches, mitigating its negative effects. Based on a unique combined two-wave survey and archival data from over 500 firms in China, we find that the level of FSK is negatively related to a firm's exploratory innovation output. We provide evidence that localized attention focus partially mediates the negative effect of FSK on firms’ exploratory innovation. We further reveal that state ownership and state financial support for firm innovation weaken the negative main effect. This study makes important contributions to the literatures on the RBV, FSK, and firm innovation.

This article aims to explain the considerable state ownership in listed companies in Norway (SOiN) at present. The extant literature has pointed to alleged national idiosyncrasies to explain this special feature of Norwegian capitalism. The main contribution of this article is a comparative perspective. It shows that most European countries have pursued selective protectionism (i.e., to secure national ownership in key companies). It also shows that financial capital was not crucial for selective protectionism. On this background, the article discusses why state ownership became the mode of selective protectionism in Norway. It argues that the main reason is that large private (often multinational) companies did not develop in the wake of the second Industrial Revolution. Another key reason is that a specific hybrid ownership model that was developed after 1945 became an available institutional solution for securing national ownership after 1990. A common ground and a compromise were found on this model, based both on trust and distrust toward the state: a trust in that the state could operate as a passive and private owner, and a corresponding distrust in the state as an active industrialist and owner.

This paper discusses how a Norwegian entrepreneurial state has performed over more than seventy years, based on an analysis of state involvement in Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk/the Kongsberg Group from 1945 and to 2015. Mariana Mazzucato has argued that bold technological investments by the state has long-term beneficial effects. The development of the Kongsberg companies adds nuance to this picture. On the one hand, the defense company Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk failed as a company in 1987 and was unbundled into a number of new companies independent of one another. On the other hand, some of the successor companies have been very successful, both in the oil and gas sector and within defense. Taking the defense and oil and gas company the Kongsberg Group as a case, this paper argues that a new style of entrepreneurial state developed in the 1990s and that it proved very successful. The old entrepreneurial state was heavy-handed, bold, and very long-term in its aims; the new entrepreneurial state was cautious, many-headed, and worked through the management of the company. The new entrepreneurial state combined state ownership, stock listing, and procurement considerations and was supported by both the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Defense. This new governance structure facilitated a stable corporation that over time integrated other Norwegian maritime electronics companies, which themselves had a checkered history under the old entrepreneurial state. A new corporate governance regime emerged and managed both to protect old and established product lines and to facilitate innovation both in defense and maritime electronics.

Autocrats typically seek public support on the basis of economic growth-promotion and redistribution policies, and China is no exception. As important as these factors are for authoritarian resilience, we argue that economic legitimation is a more complex phenomenon than has previously been acknowledged. Beyond improvements in material well-being, citizens form judgements about the state's effectiveness in carrying out a variety of economic roles beyond growth promotion and they also care about the fairness of these market interventions. In this study, we use original survey data collected in late 2015 and early 2016 to evaluate Chinese citizens’ perceptions of two economic roles of the state that have been hotly debated in recent years: state ownership and market regulation. We find that while citizens view the ideas of state ownership and interventionist regulation in a generally positive light, suggesting a broad level of agreement in Chinese society about what economic functions the state ought to perform, perceptions of how the state actually carries out these roles are more mixed. Our results show that the urban young are especially inclined to critical evaluations, raising the question of how the Chinese Communist Party's legitimation strategy will fare under conditions of inter-generational value change.

The article analyzes, from a historical and institutional perspective, the sociopolitical cleavages existing between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in the Republic of North Macedonia. Although primarily ethnic, the division between the two groups is deeply connected to state ownership and the official status each group occupies and wishes to occupy in it. By scrutinizing both groups’ claims, standpoints, and dissatisfactions, the article asserts that the implementation of consociationalism in 2001, through the de facto institutionalization of ethnicity, has partly soothed both groups’ frustrations, using the pragmatic exploitation of the existing ethnic divide as a proxy for “state sharing” in addition to power sharing.

State ownership is an important phenomenon in the world economy, especially in transition economies. Previous research has focused on how state ownership influences organizational performance, but few studies have been conducted on how state ownership influences employees. I propose that different ownership structures trigger different relational models among employees who pay attention to organizational justice consistent with their model to guide their extra-role behavior. Specifically, state-owned organizations reinforce employees’ relational concern and direct employees’ attention to procedural justice, whereas privatized organizations highlight employees' instrumental concern and direct their attention to distributive justice. I leverage a sample of organizations in China to explore how different ownership structures activate different relational models among employees and alter the relationship between organizational justice and employees’ extra-role behaviors. I find that state ownership attenuates and even reverses the positive relationship between distributive justice and extra-role behaviors. Conversely, state ownership exaggerates the positive relationship between a critical procedural justice dimension (participation in decision making) and employee extra-role behaviors. Implications for the micro-foundations of corporate governance and institutional change, organizational justice literature, and cross-cultural research are developed. This study also generates new insights for transition economies such as China.

This paper investigates whether Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) decisions are influenced by state ownership. The literature has established that host country institutions affect FDI allocation, but there is no systematic evidence how state ownership affects such relationships. However, we expect that state ownership systematically affects the relation between host country institutions and FDI. Theoretical arguments indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should invest relatively more than privately owned enterprises (POEs) in countries with poor rule of law, poor property rights protection and a high degree of corruption. However, SOEs are expected to invest relatively less than POEs in dictatorships and countries with poor human rights protection. We test these hypotheses, using a new dataset on Norwegian firms' FDI from 1998 to 2006. The empirical analysis suggests that SOEs invest relatively more than POEs in countries with high level of corruption and weak rule of law. Indeed, SOEs' FDI appears not to be reduced by such institutional risk factors. However, there is no solid evidence indicating that SOEs invest more in democracies and countries with better human rights protection.

The ownership structure of Chinese firms has experienced significant changes over the last three decades, including the development of a fast growing stock market through which a large number of domestic firms have become publicly traded corporations. These changes have drawn increasing attention from researchers of corporate governance. In this article, we review the empirical research on corporate governance in China, with a focus on the internal and external governance mechanisms that have been investigated and the findings about the effectiveness of these mechanisms. On the basis of our review of 132 studies, we summarize the major findings and discuss the limitation of agency theory in understanding the governance issue in Chinese firms. We offer several ideas (e.g., the importance of the social context, new conceptualization of governance, different outcomes of governance, and data/method issues) for a new agenda to guide future research in the corporate governance of firms operating in the Chinese and other emerging economy contexts.

In China, state-controlled listed companies (SCLCs) refer to a type of Chinese domestically listed companies half of whose voting shares are held by Chinese governments or their wholly owned companies, or the resolutions of whose shareholder meetings can be substantially influenced by Chinese governments or their wholly owned companies despite the fact that the voting shares held by them account for less than half of all the outstanding voting shares issued by these listed companies. For example, they are able to have non-negligible impacts on the motions of shareholder meetings by holding only one third of the voting shares whereas two thirds supermajority voting is always required. The existing literature primarily scrutinises the corporate governance of SCLCs through the perspective of agency costs. Little attention is paid to its adaptive efficiency through the lens of venture capital. This article attempts to fill this gap on the basis of evidence from the incentive mechanisms in the operation of Chinese domestic venture capital, as compared to American venture capital experience. The template of American venture capital contains five incentive mechanisms useful for China: limited partnerships, staged financing, board representation, convertible preferred stock and stock options. Unfortunately, partly due to the institutional barriers imposed by the control-based model of SCLCs, these five mechanisms are still underdeveloped in Chinese domestic venture capital. The study shows that adaptive efficiency and agency costs are equally important factors which ought to be considered when proposing reforms of the corporate governance of SCLCs. Neglecting either of them would jeopardise the overall efficiency of the economy.