It is common ground that a bill of constitutional rights regulates the relationship between individual and the state. Fundamental rights create negative obligations for the state – duties not to interfere with life, liberty, conscience, speech, privacy etc. To what extent, if at all, though, do fundamental rights also have a bearing on relations between individuals? Can they also obligate the state to actively promote liberty in society? Are they focused merely on state abuse but silent on social inequality – or can they be mobilized as vehicles for social justice? Undeniably, constitutionally-sensitive conflicts routinely arise, e.g., between capital and labour; between financial service providers and vulnerable consumers; between vulnerable groups themselves, and so on. However, the “constitutionalisation” of private law relationships has not always been seen as an unmixed blessing. A first concern is that the expansion of substantive constitutional norms beyond the negative basic liberties eliminates the domain of private law and private autonomy that is an essential characteristic of liberal societies. A second concern is that constitutionalisation transfers substantial regulatory authority from democratic legislatures to constitutional courts. This chapter argues that that neither of these two concerns necessarily arises in connection with the doctrine of (indirect) horizontal effect.

Commons are tangible and intangible goods (e.g., knowledge, health) that should be accessible to all members of a certain community (e.g., global, supranational, national, local). Private law and the commons in scientific research have traditionally been regarded as two mutually exclusive concepts. While the idea of the commons in scientific research is based on the concepts of open access to information, knowledge, data, and materials, the traditional understanding of private law evokes the opposing notions of ownership, patents, and privatization. However, scientific practice has shown how different models based on private law rules can be used to enhance and protect the commons, while at the same time encouraging innovation. This chapter explores, from a theoretical and practical perspective, how private law (property rights, intellectual property, licenses, and other contracts) can be used to develop models to lay down the legal foundation for the construction and further protection of the commons arising from the use and exchange of health data and human biological materials in scientific research for the improvement of human health.

In particular, this chapter’s general objective is to determine how, and to what extent, the interplay between private law and the commons is instrumental in protecting and promoting individual and collective human rights, with particular emphasis on the right to health and health care and the right to enjoy the benefits of science and scientific progress.

This research explores the extent of private law and the influence of private entities in healthcare in Europe. The three-part analysis reveals a complex interplay between different health system structures, laws, and influences. First, it highlights four distinctions between Europe and the United States (US) concerning universal health care, the role of government, private insurance, and the legal framework for disputes. Second, it considers the role of private law in resolving disputes in Europe. Ultimately, this research calls for further research to close those gaps in the literature concerning the number and scope of health disputes governed under contract law and the laws that health lobbies have influenced. Third, it emphasizes the influence of private healthcare lobbies in Europe and provides a case study of their influence on the United Kingdom’s (UK) health landscape.

The focus of EU lawmakers with regard to cryptoassets has been largely regulatory. Reflecting the fact that private law is predominantly under the control of the Member States, and without seeking to be comprehensive, Section 13 takes a comparative view on the private law topics most relevant to cryptoassets. It covers efforts to harmonise national private laws, refers to principles issued by UNIDROIT and the European Law Institute, and considers relevant MiCA provision with private law effects in mind. Section 13.2 covers property law, including the important rules of title and transfer when multiple parties have competing claims to the same cryptoasset. Section 13.3 addresses contract law, including “smart contracts”. Section 13.4 on company law discusses decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs) and the prospect of collaboration on the blockchain constituting a partnership as the default legal form of business organisation. Section 13.5 covers tort law, before Section 13.6 provides an overview of the difficulties often faced with enforcement of claims related to cryptoassets. Section 13.7 concludes with a perspective on the prospects of a uniform private law for cryptoassets.

In this chapter, we consider exemplary damages and aggravated damages, remedies with a strong vindicatory flavour, as recognised by the High Court of Australia in Lewis v Australian Capital Territory.

Exemplary damages vindicate the plaintiff’s interests, but also explicitly punish the defendant for the wrong in question. Punishment is not commonly recognised as a central aim of private law. Some commentators have argued that it should not be part of private law. However, exemplary damages are said to validate the plaintiff’s feelings of hurt and anger arising from the contumelious nature of the defendant’s wrong. Such damages also perform a vindicatory function. The fact that the law punishes a defendant for the manner of his interference with the plaintiff’s interests signals the importance of those interests.

Chapter 6 is the third of three chapters laying a basic foundation in German law and politics. The chapter describes the system of German legal education, which aims to develop Einheitsjuristen (a complete of full jurist). The chapter then presents the basics of German (private law) legal methodology. Finally, the chapter considers the expectations and mythology of German legal actors (judges and lawyers) by considering the standards used to exclude some former East German judges and lawyers from the legal profession (in a lustration process) after reunification.

Comparing ancient societies allows us to observe the variety of relationships that prevailed between states — in different forms and at different scales — and their complex legal environments. This chapter explores five dimensions of this relationship. First, we examine the capacity of law to shape state power. While constitutional law, strictly speaking, was comparatively rare in the ancient world, we can yet observe various ways in which law, law-like practices and other cultural norms operated collectively to both empower and constrain the state. The second and third parts of the chapter look at the inverse relationship: state power over law and legal practice in the form of legislative powers and jurisdiction, respectively. In the fourth part, we turn from ideational aspects of state law to the structure of state legal systems themselves, particularly in the context of private or non-state legal practices. Here we focus on those domains of law in which the state was most intimately engaged, what was left to non-state actors and the engagements between both across a sometimes indistinct boundary. The final part of the chapter explores the role of law in legitimizing state power.

This Handbook brings together a global team of private law experts and computer scientists to examine the interface between private law and AI, which includes issues such as whether existing private law can address the challenges of AI and whether and how private law needs to be reformed to reduce the risks of AI while retaining its benefits.

This introduction presents the book’s framework for the study of the transnational legal ordering of fiduciary law. It notes the key conceptual tools of TLO theory (such as normative settlement and the recursivity of law) and explains how these tools bear upon analytic, normative, and sociolegal inquiries into transnational fiduciary law. The introduction discusses the role of framing problems in fiduciary terms in transnational legal ordering, the potential, but uneven, formation and institutionalization of fiduciary law transnationally, the recursive, transnational development and limits of fiduciary law over time, the conceptual frontiers of transnational fiduciary law, and the contributions of the book’s chapters. The conclusion presents the book’s principal findings regarding fiduciary law and its relation to theorizing transnational legal ordering.

This chapter explores the current landscape of Latin American legal systems from a private law and public law perspective. The aim is to show the influences that have shaped each of these fields and their current state of development. The focus is on countries which are leading jurisdictions within the region, or that represent a particular trend or characteristic. Within the private law analysis, after a historical overview of the milestones in its formation process, some select topics are addressed. First, we consider how Latin American legal systems fit into the traditional categories of legal families; then, whether they can form a unique legal family; and, finally, current efforts to harmonise private law. The public law section centres on constitutional law and, in particular, on the New Latin American Constitutionalism (NLAC) movement. We identify the main features of the original NLAC Constitutions and then test them against the recent Chilean experience. The chapter concludes that interesting trends have developed within private and public law in the region but questions their distinctiveness and success.