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When does the delegation of legislative powers to the executive endanger policy compliance? The European Union (EU) Lisbon Treaty introduced quasi-legislative tertiary legislation – delegated acts – which empowers the European Commission to amend secondary legislation. Formally, member states control delegated acts only ex post via a veto power in the Council, while they have both ex ante amendment powers and ex post veto over the alternative Commission legislation: implementing acts. However, as member states determine the choice of legislative instrument, we argue that they would consent to the Commission adopting delegated acts only on non-controversial issues. Such selection should result in their lower compliance with implementing than with delegated acts. Our analyses of member states’ transposition delays and infringement cases related to EU tertiary directives support this argument. The results suggest that the delegation of legislative powers to the executive does not increase non-compliance when the legislators have the means to moderate it ex ante.
The application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Member States has given rise both to a controversial phraseology and a controversial case-law. This paper offers a reconstruction of the constitutional intent and proposes a conceptualization in conformity with the structural function and the constitutional contemplation of the pouvoir constituent. As to the phraseological debate, it demonstrates that the Charter’s application to the Member States may occur by reason of either “implementation” or “interpretation” of EU law and the two strands are embraced but not synthetized by “scope” as a collective term. As to the substantive debate, it demonstrates that the CJEU’s case-law on “implementation” is not only amorphous but also inconsistent with the Charter’s constitutional mandate. The paper proposes a novel approach based on the notion that the application to the Member States is accessory to the supremacy of EU law. The paper’s argument is presented in the following steps. First, the paper presents the pristine rationale and constitutional function of the application to the Member State through its emergence and historical context. Second, it provides a taxonomy and critical overview of the CJEU’s amorphous case-law and presents the Court’s futile attempt to create a coherent doctrine that faithfully reproduces the constitutional contemplation behind the diagonal application and that reflects the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Third, it sets out the proposed doctrine of “displacement.”
This article offers a reconstruction and assessment of the emerging rebellion of European constitutional courts against the exceptionless supremacy of European Union (EU) law. It presents the ontological theories of supremacy and how the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) overcame the first two major challenges of its history: the existential challenge of canonizing the general doctrine of supremacy and the Solange challenge of national fundamental rights. It provides an account of the emerging ultra vires challenge, including its root cause and evolvement, and provides an assessment and sets out proposals. The article demonstrates that the crux of the matter is not the primacy of EU law but the interpretive primacy of the CJEU. It argues that the rebellion was triggered by the perception that the CJEU case law features a declining normative and an increasing policy character. The debate about the CJEU's evolutionary interpretation, in a certain sense, parallels US constitutional law's debate between originalism and the living constitution, with the difference that the EU is a pluralist legal order.
This chapter offers an overview of literacy development in Europe. The European Union is a political and economic union of twenty-seven Member States. Its members are industrialized nations that value inclusion and allow free movement of its citizens within the union. Good skills in reading, mathematics, and science are viewed as a prerequisite for integration in the knowledge society, but challenges remain. The chapter starts out by presenting evidence related to the spread of literacy in Europe and discusses current notions about the relationship between schooling and literacy abilities and about the role of skills for full integration in society. Furthermore, evidence is provided on the variation in reading development in different orthographies and its relationship with home and school factors. In particular, current literacy achievement levels in primary and secondary school are related to home-background factors. Finally, the chapter discusses how comparative reports on literacy development in European Member States can contribute to our understanding of reading development in Europe and inform policy decisions.
This chapter introduces and discusses the approach of each body to deference and subsidiarity, and assesses how the differences may affect convergence and fragmentation. From the margin of appreciation (MoA), typical of the European Court, to the conventionality control (CC) of the Inter-American Court, the chapter investigates all the different shades of subsidiarity and deference and put them in a comparative perspective. Moreover, through specific examples, this chapter shows how different approaches may trigger fragmentation (such as in the headscarf cases) and how convergence on the level of deference and subsidiarity may, on the contrary, foster convergence (such as in defamation cases).
IPCC reports are not produced by scientific experts disconnected from policy. They are produced within a political framework. The governmental endorsement of IPCC reports is a key element of the perceived success of the organisation. In particular, the approval of the Summaries for Policymakers makes the Member States of the IPCC active participants in the assessment process and creates ownership of their content. At first sight, the involvement of governments in the IPCC reveals a genuine exercise of co-production between science and politics. It is expected to make the reports more legitimate and policy relevant. Yet a closer look at the practices through which governmental ownership of IPCC reports is produced shows that governments may in some cases contribute to making them policy irrelevant.
Once an emergency has passed, general attention typically returns to dealing with day-to-day system management, and the opportunity to learn from the crisis and improve is missed. Lessons from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis must be learned, and the necessary changes made at all levels, both in terms of improving collaboration and strengthening health systems. This special report provides the conclusion of a workshop held in the European Parliament (EP) in Brussels, Belgium. The event explored the modalities of response and preparation to the COVID-19 pandemic, and to health crises in general. The workshop considered actions at different levels: international organizations (global level), European Union (EU) Member States ([MS] national level), and health services (local level). It provided an opportunity to look back at several initiatives taken during the pandemic, and to draw inspiration from them.
When considering ways for preventing Member States from hiding behind the institutional veil of the organization, two distinct approaches can be identified. The first focuses on the position of the Member State as a subject endowed with its own distinct personality and holder of its own rights and obligations. According to this approach, when the State acts as a member within or on behalf of the organization, it continues to be bound by its obligations and may be held individually responsible for their breach. The second approach focuses on the position of the State qua member of the organization. It relies on the institutional link binding together the organization and its members to affirm that, under certain circumstances, all members should be called upon to bear the consequences of the wrongful acts of the organization in a collective way. While much of the debate on the risk of abuse of the organization’s institutional veil tends to focus on the question of collective responsibility of members, the chapter argues that in practice it is through different forms of individual responsibility that the organization’s institutional veil has been pierced or circumvented.
This chapter shows how biographical research can lead us to better understand the legal and political dynamics that prevailed in the court during the 1960s and 1970s. The chapter presents an innovative use of biographies in the sense that they are not a goal in themselves, but a means to create primary sources to study the court's institutional behaviour and its power struggle with national governments. This biographical methodology uncovered that the bench of judges which ‘revolutionized’ European law in the 1960s and 1970s was not as isolated and apolitical as existing literature had portrayed as so far. The judges could rely on a vast political network, which not only helped them in assessing how far they could push the integration process further in their rulings, but which was also useful when it came to persuading national decision-makers of the fact that the court’s rulings were in their interest. The chapter further addresses the challenges raised by the biographical approach and gives an account of the research strategies adopted to unearth empirical material on mostly unknown judges coming from different national, legal and professional backgrounds.
Chapter 3 looks at the rules of the organisation. It concludes that the European Commission’s claim that international responsibility follows the internal division of competences does not find support in international dispute-settlement practice. The book reveals that the European Union and its Member States are independently responsible for their joint obligations. The central argument is that while states are free to transfer their powers to an organisation, their international obligations are non-transferable.
This chapter conceptualises solidarity between the member states on the basis of two spectrums. The first deals with the reasons for acting in the interest of the collective. Its poles are taken up by normative and factual solidarity. Normative solidarity occurs when states display solidarity due to a political obligation. The chapter explains that such political obligations are grounded in joint commitments, how these commitments turn their participants into a unity, and that they may not only exist between individuals, but also between states. Factual solidarity occurs when a state acts in the interest of the whole because it serves its own interest. Two situations are singled out: interdependence and common destiny. The second spectrum is subsidiary in nature and relates to the kind of solidary behaviour displayed. Its poles are negative and positive solidarity. Negative solidarity occurs when the acts displayed by a state in support of the whole relate to itself. Positive solidarity occurs when a state acts in the interest of the collective by directly benefitting another state. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relation between joint commitments and Union law.
Brussels has often been criticised as a bureaucratic monster, a supranational juggernaut, a new empire. While the terms leave much room for interpretation, they all present the EC as a threat to the political order of its member states. In reality, member states have been central to the integration process throughout its history. That is not to suggest that Brussels simply represented an extension of their interests. It is true to an extent, yet in the course of time the integration process also fundamentally transformed the member states. But there was no need for a gigantic Brussels bureaucracy to subjugate or substitute the member states. The mechanisms involved, as this chapter shows, were much more subtle. While great change occurred at the political, administrative and legal levels, it appeared to make little difference to the everyday lives of ordinary people – who in turn showed little interest in these processes. And by the time the effects finally became more obvious the basic foundations had already been laid, making it difficult to ‘turn the clock back’.
This chapter sets the scene for the volume by introducing the notion of constitutional identity for the purpose of analysis and comparison. The chapter also describes the division of the volume into three parts by explaining what each part will focus on in presenting a picture of constitutional identity in a Europe of multilevel constitutionalism.
This article considers the relationship between the United Nations and its member states in view of the Security Council's assertion of legislative powers. It claims that the exponential growth in UN powers at the expense of the powers of its member states cannot be arrested by legal means, because of the nature of the UN system and the absence of legally enforceable criteria and compulsory dispute-settlement mechanisms. For this reason, it proposes a different approach to law-making in the area of international peace and security – one that is built around the principle of subsidiarity, as reflected in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. The role of the principle of subsidiarity in this respect is to determine which authority is best suited to exercise legislative power and how such power should be exercised in order to attain the objective of peace and security more efficiently. It is thus contended that the principle of subsidiarity promotes co-operative relations between the United Nations and its member states by protecting the latters' jurisdictional authority from unnecessary interference.
We as constitutionalists owe it to ourselves and even to the 500 million other citizens of a member state and of the Union at the same time, to come up with a legally and constitutionally readable understanding of the situation. It must not be one suffering from the split between international and domestic public law. It must not mystify the Union as a completely original structure, intelligible only in its own terms. Such understanding should encompass not only the limits but also the logic of the situation; not only its mechanics but also its evolution. It should be intelligible for the public. It should allow for the multiple dualities of loyalty, of function, of legitimacy. It should allow for shared authority. Constitutional thought is well equipped to deal with actual duality and ambivalence. These characteristics of the Union are real and are here to stay.
European Court of Justice decision of 25 July 2008, Case C-127/08, Metock et al. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform – EU citizens and their third-country family members – ECJ largely reverses Akrich case-law – Dividing line between national and Community competences on immigration – ‘Reverse discrimination’ not a matter of concern for Community law – Analysis of repercussions of decision on EU and national legal orders
Constitutionalism – Kadi ruling of EU Court of First Instance – Erosion of ‘total’ constitutional order by reallocation of public power – Constitutional vision challenge of networks approach – Emerging human rights hierarchy – Rudimentary international value system – Ius cogens and erga omnes – Barcelona Traction – Core human rights elements – Enforcement through regional and domestic courts – Review of Security Council resolutions
International law in constitutional change of EU – Rigidity of amendment – EU amending and accession treaties not reviewable – International law in internal development of Union law – Conventions/treaties by member states jointly – Acts of the representatives of the governments – International law in the agreements with third states – Exportation of legal rules – Conditionality policies – Legislating through international agreements
This article by Stig Marthinsen describes the background to the establishment of the Caselex database and outlines how it is being currently developed and the plans for its future.