Research suggests that institutional complexity is of strategic importance and recent calls have been made to investigate organizational strategizing in such a situation of multiple institutional logics. We therefore investigate middle managers’ strategizing for institutional complexity. In doing so, we follow theoretical suggestions of a renewed practice-based view on strategizing as a broad social accomplishment beyond top management activities. Based on a qualitative field study in a company under influence of substantive financial reform, findings show that middle managers re-strategize institutional complexity at the vertical interstices of top management strategies and the distributed agency of their followers. Furthermore, the study highlights the character and effects of lateral dynamics of middle managers’ competing strategizing. We explain how these vertical and lateral dynamics provide insight into strategizing for institutional complexity as a distributed, situated, and emergent social accomplishment. Such strategizing practices have unintended organizational consequences beyond both top and middle management control.

Japan has long strived to acquire a more influential voice in trade negotiations but failed because of the lack of decisiveness rooted in the resistance from those who have vested interests. However, a series of domestic reforms undertaken since the 1990s have made it possible for Japan to play a leadership role in the new rulemaking of international trade. After the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Japan took the initiative to conclude a new agreement called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. How have domestic factors pushed Japan to step up as a new leader in the rulemaking of international trade? How have the economic rise of China and the relative decline of US hegemonic power impacted Japanese domestic politics and economics? What implications do Japan's new roles have for the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region? By exploring empirical evidence drawn from five new books, we argue that the commitment to domestic economic reforms has enabled Japan to play a leadership role in the rulemaking of the international economic order.

Across myriad literatures, it is widely held that expanding economic grievances induce violence, protest, or other forms of backlash. In Latin America, where economic liberalization deepened the downturn of the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s (and 1990s), reform has been tightly associated with protest and mobilization. At the same time, liberal economic reforms have proven to be remarkably durable, even where long-promised benefits are hard to discern. This article makes the case that economically liberal reforms, despite inducing or deepening severe and sustained economic downturns, have actually undermined political protest. Previous work confirming the conventional wisdom foundered on two main methodological problems. First, selection into economic reform was a consequence of the very economic pain and macroeconomic imbalances it also served to induce. Secondly, because of this, these key (macro)economic characteristics are both pre- and post-treatment. Utilizing a marginal structural model approach to assess the impact of economic liberalization on protest outcomes net of this selection process, and the prior history of treatment, the study finds that painful reform reduces political protest even as it heightens grievances. This depoliticizing dynamic helps to explain the surprising durability of liberal reforms in Latin America.

Decades of research show that economic freedom is highly correlated with desirable economic outcomes both internationally and locally. Yet we still know little about the transition from low to high levels of economic freedom, particularly for institutions under local control. This research shows that while economic freedom in the United States is decreasing with regard to institutions under national control, it is increasing with regard to institutions under state and local control. Economic freedom increases gradually among the states, driven primarily by increasing labor market freedom. Decreases in economic freedom, on the other hand, occur sharply, often following stark changes to state fiscal policies.

The occupation of Iraq in 2003 involved a wide-ranging set of interventions in the domestic legal, political and economic structures of the state, interventions that provoked a debate about whether the law of occupation should recognize a category of ‘transformative’ occupation.

While the occupation itself has often been decried as an imperial venture, its administration involved a diffusion of power among international institutions as well as ratification by the Security Council through Resolution 1483. This article pursues the intuition that the transformation of norms and practices elsewhere in the international order underwrote the idea that it was the law of occupation that was problematic, at the same time facilitating the transmutation and preservation of practices that might be identified as imperial. Two developments are key: The first is the pervasive normalization of intervention in the domestic policy and legal orders of states; the second is the dissemination of norms about domestic regulation within the international order, those that touch on economic governance in particular. The orders of the occupying were infused in both form and substance with ideas of ‘normal governance’ traceable to myriad projects, policies and practices of other international institutions: development agencies, financial institutions, trade organizations. Iraq then might be a revealing case with which to consider the character and locations of contemporary imperialism, as well as the role of international law and international institutions in its unfolding.

This paper examines the political economy of the Orange Revolution in an effort to understand routes by which less democratic postcommunist countries might break with an illiberal status quo. The fusion of Ukraine's rent-seeking economic interests and illiberal political regime produced an unstable equilibrium that is poorly explained by two leading theoretical frameworks: ‘market reform’ and ‘political competition’ theory. Only by combining key insights from each do we get a full explanation of the pressures that generated Ukraine's challenge to illiberalism in 2004. We examine this story with a particular focus on the crisis-prone nature of ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ and the related strategic calculations of business elites.

I truly enjoyed reading the perspective article entitled ‘Advancing indigenous management theory: Executive rationale as an institutional logic’ by Gordon Redding and Michael Witt (2015), especially its implications for a ‘promising avenue for indigenous management research’ (179). I agree with the authors in general terms that the research on the impact of culture as an informal institution, and also the effect of formal institutions, on business practices must come down from a highly abstract level to a more pragmatic ground, especially their interaction and integration as embodied by various specific mechanisms to guide practices. For that purpose, Redding and Witt introduce an interesting notion of ‘executive rationale’ to guide action. Applying the abstract notion of institutional logic to specific business practices, executive rationale refers to the ‘socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008: 101) in the specific context of business practices. In other words, executive rationale provides a mental blueprint for practical actions in a business context. In addition, the authors have empirically generated a tentative model with multiple dimensions to compare the dominant executive rationales as institutionally-embedded across five key economies.

In this article I build an analytic narrative to provide an integrated and analytical view of the economic reforms that took place in Colombia during the years 1974-1978. Through the use of basic game theory and historical evidence, I present the core of the strategic interactions between several players: Government is depicted as a committed but poorly endowed agenda setter, Coffee as the dominant player and Industry as the contending but relatively weak player. The analysis shows that the 1976 coffee boom changed the interaction between sectors from an assurance to a prisoner’s dilemma game, and identifies as the post-boom solution the Government–Coffee coalition, which carried out a soft version of the initial reforms.