In R. v Jogee; Ruddock v The Queen, the Supreme Court abolished “joint enterprise liability”, thus removing the need for a doctrine that used to temper the harshness of joint enterprise: the “fundamental difference” rule. The Supreme Court nevertheless allowed this rule to linger on in the form of an “overwhelming supervening act” doctrine. That doctrine has led to the creation of yet another: an “escalation” doctrine. We argue that there is no place in the post-Jogee law of complicity for doctrines based on fundamental difference, overwhelming supervening acts or escalation. This is no mere semantic quibble. It has significant implications for the way in which complicity law should be applied, especially in homicide cases.

Despite its contested scientific validity, polygraph interviewing is now an established yet opaque practice within criminal justice in England and Wales, with statute law covering polygraph use in the context of probation for released offenders. In this paper, we highlight non-statutory uses of the polygraph by police forces in England and Wales by presenting analysis of responses to freedom of information (FOI) requests. The boundaries around police polygraph use are undefined and potentially elastic. The policies disclosed state that polygraph interviewing is conducted with regard to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and the Human Rights Act 1998; yet it is denied that a polygraph examination is a criminal interview conducted under PACE. Furthermore, there is a significant risk that the common law may not satisfy the quality of law requirement insofar as it is insufficiently clear who will be subject to polygraph testing, why and in what circumstances. Therefore, we argue that the legal basis for the police’s use of the polygraph is inadequate and imprecise. Without openness and scrutiny regarding the extent of this use, it is difficult to see how the key human rights principle of foreseeability can protect citizens from the risk of arbitrariness.

This paper seeks to challenge principles of culpability transfer as they appear in both criminal law and moral philosophy. I begin by discussing the legal doctrine of substituted mens rea, focusing on Section 33.1 of Canada’s Criminal Code. I argue that this doctrine violates the principle of contemporaneity, which there are sound philosophical reasons to accept. I then argue that the same reasons apply to tracing accounts of moral responsibility. Finally, drawing on the moral luck literature, I argue that cases of extreme intoxication are better analyzed in terms of harm-causation than culpability-transfer.

Consider the following argument: (1) Whether, or the degree, persons are morally culpable ultimately depends on the (final) reasons that motivate their actions; (2) The degree to which persons are morally culpable should be a central concern of criminal law; (3) Criminal law in many countries focuses more on the beliefs and intentions of agents and less on their motivating reasons; therefore (4) Criminal law in many countries is unjust and should be revised. The premises of this argument are appealing and widely accepted, yet its conclusion is radical. Therefore, the argument is interesting and important. However, the argument is not entirely clear in several respects, and the attempt to clarify it reveals several significant (although not necessarily decisive) doubts regarding its soundness. In this paper, I examine these doubts as well as a related, more general, lesson concerning normative arguments about the law.

In the twenty-first century, one of the crucial roles of the Criminal Code is to protect the rights and interests of crime victims. Criminal law is a complex field that must balance established principles with evolving societal dynamics. This involves various stakeholders, including the state, perpetrators, victims and civil society, each with differing views and implications on criminal law. The modern era, marked by post-truth narratives and a reputational society, further complicates matters. Casuistry now prevails over systematic approaches, leading to a disconnect between criminal law’s foundational principles and intended societal outcomes. Contemporary criminal law operates on multiple dimensions, addressing individual, societal and institutional levels while aiming to balance the interests of these entities. The transition from the “age of information” to the “age of reputation” underscores the importance of information subjected to external evaluation. In the context of a state of victimization and the need to harmonize Ukrainian criminal legislation with European Union and Council of Europe standards, it is vital to protect human rights. This aligns with the recommendation of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers that crime should be recognized as a wrong against society and a violation of individual rights, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding victim rights. Approaching criminal law from a victimological perspective offers unique insights into victim participation in criminal liability, crime qualification and offender culpability. This perspective encourages assessing the efficacy of Ukrainian criminal law prohibitions and promoting victim engagement in crime control on national and international levels.

Several criminal offenses can originate from or culminate with the creation of content. Sexual abuse can be committed by producing intimate materials without the subject’s consent, while incitement to violence or self-harm can begin with a conversation. When the task of generating content is entrusted to artificial intelligence (AI), it becomes necessary to explore the risks of this technology. AI changes criminal affordances because it creates new kinds of harmful content, it amplifies the range of recipients, and it can exploit cognitive vulnerabilities to manipulate user behavior. Given this evolving landscape, the question is whether policies aimed at fighting Generative AI-related harms should include criminal law. The bulk of criminal law scholarship to date would not criminalize AI harms on the theory that AI lacks moral agency. Even so, the field of AI might need criminal law, precisely because it entails a moral responsibility. When a serious harm occurs, responsibility needs to be distributed considering the guilt of the agents involved, and, if it is lacking, it needs to fall back because of their innocence. Thus, legal systems need to start exploring whether and how guilt can be preserved when the actus reus is completely or partially delegated to Generative AI.

Suppose a ‘law’ required individuals to report neighbours of a certain race for extermination. If individuals complied with such a ‘law’ to avoid the penal sanction of a death sentence, should a tribunal involved in the process of transitional justice in a successor regime punish them? Radbruch suggests that intolerably unjust ‘laws’ are not legally valid. According to Radbruch's Formula, reporting the neighbour would not be justified by law. The logical implication of this Formula is that the act of reporting was, in substance, abetment to murder (or possibly, genocide). Yet, punishing individuals who complied with the purported ‘law’ in the predecessor regime seems unfair, particularly as some legal positivists would regard the law as valid. Individuals might have acted according to what they believed was law and under duress (out of fear of penal sanction for failure to comply) in the predecessor regime. I examine whether these are valid considerations in proceedings before a tribunal prosecuting individuals for acts done in compliance with intolerably unjust ‘laws’ in predecessor regimes. While the perceived unfairness might militate against acceptance of Radbruch's Formula, if the considerations are not valid, Radbruch's Formula is unobjectionable.

Since its inception in England and Wales, the partial defence to murder of loss of control has generated a steady stream of appeals. Individually, those appeals have illuminated key aspects of the plea's operation. This paper, though, is the first to explore that operation via a systematic analysis of every loss of control appeal to date (110 cases). Using that data, the paper frames more effectively, and thus improves understanding of, a neglected phenomenon in the plea: specifically, the decision-making roles of criminal justice ‘gatekeepers’ – principally trial judges, juries and prosecutors – in governing access to loss of control. In doing so, the paper assesses how far these gatekeepers interpret the plea's requirements in a ‘civilising’ way – one which prioritises meritorious loss of control claims above those which are unmeritorious. It contends that each gatekeeper struggles to regulate loss of control in such a way. Ultimately, this diminishes the symbolic value these reforms may have had and frustrates any civilising potential of homicide law reform.

This Article examines the criminal law defense of provocation in the U.S., which employs an objective reasonable person standard, as applied to recent Asian immigrants. It discusses approaches taken in other countries and describes the cultural defense. The Article concludes with different possibilities for a hypothetical Asian defendant who was provoked: Improving education about U.S. laws as a preventative measure, using expert cultural witnesses at trial, and taking the defendant’s characteristics into consideration during the sentencing stage.

This Article uses various concepts of Husserlian phenomenology to explain the disparate opinion between the North American and Italian public in response to the prosecution and ultimate acquittal of Amanda Knox. This Article argues that the comparative difference in public opinion is due to an extensive shift in culture that is necessarily accompanied by a shift in spatial-temporal location. In this Article, the Husserlian concepts of intentionality, the Self, the Other-I, and empathy overlay the judicial opinions and media releases critical to shaping North American and Italian public perceptions of Amanda Knox. As applied, these Husserlian concepts function as interpretive lenses, providing the reader with a novel framework for analyzing the cause of interpretive difference across cultures.

This article examines how intention became key to criminal responsibility in nineteenth-century England. It focuses on trials where judges wrested with defence counsel and juries for control over its determination. The most important rule that developed to support proof of intention was the presumption that a person intended the natural and probable consequences of their actions. The article charts the origins and functions of the presumption to offer a revised view of the nineteenth-century foundations of the modern law of criminal intention.

Les modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits s’inscrivent dans une volonté de transformation de l’organisation de la justice en cherchant à régler « autrement » les litiges judiciarisés. L’émergence de ces modes répond également aux impératifs de la nouvelle gouvernance publique, où les questions de l’efficacité et de la célérité de la justice deviennent cardinales. Ces modes alternatifs exigent que les parties y participent volontairement. Or, les justiciables composent avec certaines contraintes subjectives qui se répercutent sur leur motivation à s’engager sur la voie d’un mode alternatif de règlement des conflits. À partir de données empiriques, ce texte présente de quelle façon les coûts humains et financiers qu’assument les justiciables sont susceptibles de se répercuter sur leur décision de s’engager sur une telle voie, laquelle découle généralement de l’atteinte d’un point de rupture par rapport à ces coûts. Cette recherche, effectuée au Québec, fait état de la situation en droit civil, en droit criminel et en droit administratif.