English conflict of laws is the creation of the common law. Prior to Britain's entry into the European Union, legislation played only a limited role. The few legislative measures concerning choice of law were narrowly targeted to remedy specific problems—for example the formal validity of wills, or torts. The rules for service outside the jurisdiction were a more important exception, but their practical operation largely depended on judge-made concepts and remedies, such as forum non conveniens and antisuit injunctions. The common law also provided a complete system for the recognition of foreign judgments that operated untrammelled with regard to judgments from many countries, including some of the most important, while the relevant legislation, where applicable, did little more than provide a simpler procedure.

Putativity is a useful concept in the conflict of laws, allowing reference to be made to an outcome which was intended to have come about, but which has failed, as a result of human actings or divine intervention. To apply to something which is imperfect a consequence which would arise if it were perfect is justifiable on the pragmatic grounds of convenience, speed, and cost—and thence, through the merit of certainty, to the satisfaction (perhaps) of party expectation, or at least to the forestalling of disappointment. Reference to the putative applicable law may be permissible therefore on the ground of enabling a resolution to emerge, the more so if the result of so doing commends itself to the disinterested observer and to one, at least, of the parties; on the other hand, the result may disappoint the reasonable expectations of both parties. Whatever the rationale, it can be observed that use of the device is authorized at common law, by statute, in Convention, and Regulation. But if one does not ask whether this methodological technique begs the question, one begs the question.

There is a dearth of authority and in-depth discussion concerning what the choice of law rules are for claims involving the assertion that property is held on a resulting or constructive trust. It is usually thought that the choice of law rules set out by the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (hereafter the ‘Hague Trusts Convention’), as enacted into English law by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, apply. However, it is arguable that this is not so for some types of resulting and constructive trusts, namely those governed by a foreign law; or, at the very least, that some doubt exists as to whether the Hague choice of lawrules apply to all resulting and constructive trusts. It is therefore important that the common law choice of law rules for such trusts is clearly elucidated. Unfortunately, this is an area of the law that is distinctly undeveloped. The aim of this article is to consider what are or should be the common law choice of law rules for resulting and constructive trusts.

The prohibition of discrimination, at least on grounds of nationality, has always been a constitutional principle of Community law. Such discrimination can take many forms, since Community law prohibits not only direct discrimination but various forms of indirect discrimination. Furthermore, the Court of Justice has indicated that where discrimination on grounds of nationality is in issue, the requirement of proof is not a heavy one on the complainant. All that is needed to place the burden on the respondent to justify the potentially differential treatment is that complainants show that the requirement applied to them is intrinsically likely, or susceptible by its very nature, to affect them adversely in comparison with the State's own nationals. The modern formulation of the prohibition of discrimination recognizes that protection from discrimination on grounds of nationality is central to the concept of citizenship of the Union. Advocate General Jacobs has said:

Questions surrounding the legitimate extent of the judicial role have long been the source of controversy. Concerns that unelected and unrepresentative judges are ‘legislating’ rather than interpreting the law or are interfering in matters of ‘democratically endorsed’ government policy, have often been, and will continue to be, raised by academics and politicians alike. The question is one of separation of power— of the appropriate constitutional role and division of functions between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the United Kingdom Government. This debate has been given a new dimension by the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter HRA), most obviously through the courts' exercise of their power under section 3(1) of that Act—the duty to interpret primary and secondary legislation to be, as far as possible, compatible with ‘the Convention rights’. Indeed much has been made of the unique method by which the HRA reconciles the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) with the sovereignty of Parliament by way of the ‘declaration of incompatibility’ under section 4. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty imposes limits on the scope of section 3(1); in spite of its ‘broad and malleable’ language, which might permit ‘an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained’, it does not sanction courts to act as legislators. As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead noted in Re S; Re W, attributing to a statutory provision ‘a meaning which departs substantially from a fundamental feature of an Act of Parliament is likely to have crossed the boundary between interpretation and amendment’. That case has been seen by some as a retreat from what has been termed the ‘far-fetched’ interpretation of section 3(1) adopted by the House of Lords in the earlier decision of R v A. Nicol, for one, has argued that Re S; Re W and Anderson taken together, clearly reject ‘the notion that “interpretations” could conflict with clear statutory words' — as R v A had arguably suggested — thereby endorsing parliamentary sovereignty, above the Convention, ‘as the country's supreme constitutional doctrine’. For it to retain its legitimacy therefore, the judicial act under section 3(1) needs to remain an exercise of ‘interpretation’: to attribute a meaning to a legislative provision ‘quite different from that which Parliament intended … would go well beyond any interpretative process sanctioned by section 3 of the 1998 Act’. It would ‘not be judicial interpretation but judicial vandalism’.

The Court of Justice has ruled in Owusu v Jackson that the Brussels Convention is applicable even where a case has objective connections to only one Contracting State and to a non-Contracting State. It has also held that where the court of a Contracting State to the Brussels Convention has jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's domicile pursuant to Article 2, it has no general discretion to stay its proceedings in favour of the court of a non-Contracting State on the basis that the latter is the natural forum for resolution of the dispute. However, the ruling leaves a number of important questions unresolved. This article considers the reasoning behind, and implications of the ruling, and the permissibility of staying proceedings in other situations falling within the scope of the Brussels regime post-Owusu.

The Italian Court of Cassation has recently delivered a judgment of great interest denying State immunity to Germany for commission of crimes under customary international law on the exclusive basis of international law.

At its 59th session in 2004, the General Assembly revisited the question of what should be done with the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘the Articles’), adopted by the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) in 2001. By Resolution 59/35, adopted by consensus on 2 December 2004 on the recommendation of the Sixth Committee, the General Assembly once again resolved to defer further consideration and any decision on the final form of the Articles, postponing the matter to its 62nd session in 2007. It also asked the Secretariat to prepare a compendium of jurisprudence and State practice to assist the Assembly in its consideration of the topic at that time.

On 1 March 2005 the European Court of Justice in Owusu v Jackson held that the English doctrine of forum non conveniens was inconsistent with the Brussels Convention (the ‘Convention’) when a defendant was domiciled in the United Kingdom, even if the natural forum was in a Non-Contracting State.

The wide range of developments in social policy has necessitated dividing this commentary into two parts. The first part will examine discrimination law developments; the second part, published inthe next issue, will look at general employment law developments.

Each time this writer has prepared a three-yearly update on the external relations of the Union, the Treaty framework has changed and the sense that Europe's leaders are being distracted from vital problems grows. The Constitution for Europe now on offer, the result of a mandate from the European Council at Laeken to effect a simplification of the treaties with a view to making them better understood without changing their meaning, would introduce new legal uncertainties into the framework for the conduct of external relations. Its entry into force, however, now appears unlikely.