The protection of foreign investment by way of treaties and arbitration has recently suffered attacks on its legitimacy. The article turns on human rights concerns in this context and analyses what legal mechanisms and arguments can be employed to ease the tension between investment protection and human rights. Harmonization in this regard finds two key entry points: first, at the inter-State level of investment agreements, and secondly, at the intra-State level of the foreign investment contract. At the first level, human rights considerations, particularly concerning economic and social rights, can be brought to bear by way of their systematic integration qua treaty interpretation. The article subjects this inroad to close scrutiny but concludes that, while it possesses considerable merits and has attracted a certain attention (albeit still more in the academic world than in that of arbitration practice), it remains an approach ex post, possibly leaving excessive discretion to arbitrators. Thus, at the second level, already at the pre-investment stage, efforts should be made to recast investors' “legitimate expectations” under foreign investment contracts by including a “human rights audit” as part of the due diligence to be conducted by the investor and the host State, to survey the host State's human rights treaty commitments and domestic methods for implementing these commitments. The primary objective of this audit would thus be to fully include the prospective host State's international obligations as part of the body of applicable law and thus create a better map of the landscape of an investor's “legitimate expectations”.

This article provides a critical evaluation of the main provisions of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions. It examines the Guide in the context of other international and national secured transactions instruments including article 9 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code. The clear objective of the Guide is to facilitate secured financing. It is very facilitating and enabling, and permits the creation of security in all sorts of situations. Security is seen as a good thing, through enhancing the availability of lower-cost credit. The paper suggests that this closeness in approach to article 9 is likely to militate against the prospects of the Guide gaining widespread international acceptance. This is the case for various interlocking reasons including the battering that American legal and financial norms have taken with the global financial crisis.

This paper examines the current European private antitrust enforcement policy. The European Commission's White Paper of 2008, the unofficial Draft Directive of 2009 and the collective redress consultation of 2011 consider a facilitated access to private actions for all types of antitrust violations under articles 101 and 102 TFEU in order to effectively compensate the victims of anticompetitive conduct. Assuming that changes are necessary, the paper argues that it might be worthwhile to limit this policy to damages claims against hardcore violations such as cartels. This suggestion is based on two main arguments. Firstly, the current European private antitrust policy probably underestimates the risks of more damages actions against all types of infringements neglecting insights from the economic analysis of law. Secondly, a revised approach is not only in line with the thinking that underpins the reform but also addresses an actual need as revealed by a comparison of litigation data from different jurisdictions. Refining the European private antitrust policy, it is argued that a focus on hard-core anticompetitive constraints such as price fixing would mitigate the potential for a strategic use of antitrust litigation and reduce the likelihood that the reform of European antitrust damages actions will lead to negative outcomes.

This article compares the ways in which Australian and South African courts have approached issues of classification and renvoi where a defendant argues that the action is time-barred. There are two differences in approach. First, Australian courts classify all statutes of limitation as substantive, whereas South African courts distinguish between right-extinguishing statutes (substantive) and merely remedy-barring statutes (procedural). Second, the High Court of Australia has used renvoi in the context of the limitation of actions whereas South African courts have yet to decide on whether to use renvoi. This article assesses the impact of those differences in various situations.

‘Sometimes the most important historical events are the non-events: the things that did not occur,’ says the British historian Niall Ferguson.1 Such a statement may well describe in large measure the International Court of Justice's case-law regarding the methods for the identification of rules of customary international law during the period 2000–2009. The previous two decades had been marked by two milestones in this domain: the eighties by the judgment on the merits in Nicaragua,2 and the nineties by the Court's advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons.3 There was, though, no single decision by the Court of comparative significance regarding methods of customary international law during the first decade of the new millennium. Further, some of the most important determinations in this domain were those in which the Court did not declare the existence of a customary international rule. However, this is not to say that the above-mentioned conclusion applies to all of the Court's jurisprudence related to customary international law. The conclusion is limited to the Court's decisions regarding the methods for the recognition of norms of this character. In fact, the Court made very important pronouncements as to the content of customary international law in many domains, such as the use of force, territorial occupation, diplomatic protection, and international humanitarian law.

Governments intervene in the energy sector using a variety of measures to pursue a range of objectives, from security of supply and energy efficiency to environmental protection. Recent concerns about the impact of fossil fuels on climate change have resulted in the increasing promotion of biofuels as an alternative to oil. While worries exist with regard to the environmental impact of biofuel production in ecologically sensitive areas, it has been argued that with an effective regulatory framework to promote sustainable production, biofuels could provide a mechanism to provide energy security in an environmentally positive way.1 The interest of the European Union (EU) in the promotion of biofuels production is a relatively recent phenomenon and it is now the world's largest producer of biodiesel and the fourth largest producer of bioethanol. At its most basic level, the promotion of biofuels as an alternative to fossil fuels is part of a wider EU effort to support the use of renewable energy. The promotion of renewable energy is traceable to a number of goals, a central one of which is ensuring security of energy supply.2 Other policy goals supported by the promotion of renewable energies include reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with climate change, decreasing dependence upon imported oil, the promotion of technological development as well as regional and rural development and employment.3

This article analyses the contribution made to the effective implementation of international environmental law in the EU by the ECJ invoking direct application and effect of international treaties. It considers the requirements of these doctrines in international law, distinguishing them from related doctrines in EU law. It reviews jurisprudence and literature and evaluates future potential. Implications for direct application and effect from the EU doctrine of primacy and for the principle of effective judicial protection are examined, and alternatives to full transposition, implementation and enforcement explored, including non-compliance procedures.

On 27 February 2011, it was reported in the media that the United Kingdom had revoked the diplomatic immunity of Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qaddafi and his family.1 Earlier that day, the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, told BBC1's Andrew Marr Show:

The interpretation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter has been the elephant in the room, or more accurately the chamber of the Council, since the bitter divisions over the ‘revival argument’ and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.1 Although there has been some evidence of an increase in the specificity of UNSC resolutions in an effort to avoid the same difficulties reoccurring,2 the margin of appreciation provided to States in interpreting the mandates provided to them has recently come into focus again.

Osama Bin Laden was killed on 2 May 2011 in the course of an operation by US special forces (Navy Seals) in Abbottabad, Pakistan.1 The US forces were flown by helicopter from neighbouring Afghanistan. The death of Bin Laden renewed questions about the legality of such operations during armed conflicts and during peacetime.2 The potentially applicable law includes international humanitarian law, international human rights law, jus ad bellum and the domestic law of the US and Pakistan.3

By the end of 2011, China will have been a member of the World Trade Organization (the WTO) for a decade. While China has undergone dramatic changes to implement commitments contained in its Protocol of Accession,1 debate continues as to whether China has adequately complied with its obligations under the WTO Agreements in both letter and spirit. Some of this debate remains in the political arena, where China is censured over such issues as currency controls and or equality of access for foreign firms like Google; however, it is in the legal arena, and specifically within the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, that some of the most controversial issues are raised, both against and by China.

‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?’ It is to answer this question that the General Assembly of the United Nations (‘UNGA’) requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’). The request, adopted in October 20081 and initially sponsored by Serbia, was triggered by the declaration of independence of Kosovo issued on the 17 February 2008.2 Some two years later, on the 22 July 2010, the ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion.3 By a 10–4 vote, the ICJ found that the declaration of independence of Kosovo did not violate international law.