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Impotence and Intransigence: An Unavoidable Evolutionary Curse?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

David L. Weimer*
Affiliation:
University of Rochester, USA
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Abstract

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Type
Roundtable Commentaries
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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