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A Global Surveillance Program Might Solve Several Serious Problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Erhard Geissler*
Affiliation:
Max Delbrück Center for Molecular Medicine, Germany
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Extract

There seems to be an obvious contradiction in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Whereas Article III reasonably requests restriction of transfer of biological warfare (BW) and toxin warfare (TW) agents, equipment, and means of delivery, Article X not less reasonably calls for peaceful international cooperation in microbiology. This contradiction became especially obvious in the late 1980s, for two reasons: (1) regional conflicts increased as one of the consequences of the peaceful end of the Cold War, with a corresponding increase in the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and (2) the technology gap between North and South continued to expand, not least as a direct consequence of the rapid development of molecular biotechnology in industrialized countries.

Type
Roundtable Commentaries
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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References

Geissler, E.(1992). “Vaccines for Peace: An International Program of Development and Use of Vaccines Against Dual-Threat Agents.” Politics and the Life Sciences 11: [elsewhere in this issue].CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wheelis, M.L.(1991). “The Role of Epidemiology in Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention.” In Geissler, E.and Haynes, R.H.(eds.), Prevention of a Biological and Toxin Arms Race and the Responsibility of Scientists. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.Google Scholar