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Packing the Courts

Ideological Proximity and Expansions to the Federal Judiciary from 1937 to 2012

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2022

Elli Menounou ,
Adam Feldman ,
Thora Giallouri  and
Jordan Carr Peterson
Elli Menounou
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
Adam Feldman
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
Thora Giallouri
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
Jordan Carr Peterson*
Affiliation:
Texas Christian University
*
Contact the corresponding author, Jordan Carr Peterson, at [email protected].
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Abstract

What explains expansions to the federal judiciary? Whereas existing research focuses on unified government as an explanation, we argue ideological proximity between institutions involved in the expansion process more accurately predicts judicial expansions. We examine whether Congress chose to add seats to each federal district or circuit court annually from 1937 to 2012 and find expansions are more likely when (1) the ideological distance between chambers of Congress is smaller and (2) the ideological distance between Congress and individual district or circuit courts is greater. These findings suggest the administration of federal courts is influenced by the political concerns in another branch of government, raising important questions about judicial independence.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Law and Courts , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , Spring 2019 , pp. 81 - 106
Copyright
© 2018 by the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Footnotes

We would like to thank the editorial team and reviewers at the Journal of Law and Courts for their extremely valuable commentary and suggestions throughout the revision process. We would also like to acknowledge Christian Grose and Morgan Hazelton for reading the article and providing helpful feedback.

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