Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2022
Political scientists interested in the structure of legal doctrine are especially attuned to the impact of the judicial hierarchy. They generally frame the issue as whether a higher court will issue a rigid “rule” to prevent shirking or a vague “standard” to give more discretion to lower courts. This “rules versus standards” debate rests on two presumptions: jurists write doctrine, and doctrine varies in flexibility. Using the US Supreme Court, I offer an initial empirical evaluation of these presumptions. The findings reveal that the justices almost always adopt doctrine suggested to them and that these doctrines differ little in flexibility.
This research was supported with funding from the College of Charleston and the National Science Foundation (SES 1023952). I would like to thank Natalie Prince and Melissa Neri for their excellent research assistance and the reviewers and editor for their helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank Jennifer Bowie, Micheal Giles, Thomas Walker, and Tom Clark for their comments on previous versions of this article.