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On the Relevance of “Relevance” to the Theory of Legal Factfinding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2014

Anat Scolnicov
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In modern evidence theory two main theories of legal factfinding have emerged. One of these is the mathematical probabilistic approach, which claims that the universal rules of mathematics apply to legal factfinding as to any other rational decision-making. The opposite approach, of Tribe, Nesson and others, contests this view. Those opposing the mathematical theory have done so mostly on grounds of legal policy, which I shall not be concerned with. However, some of the sharpest criticism, at least from the point of view of the adherents of the mathematical explanation, has been of the soundness of the mathematical explanation. In certain instances typical to the legal process, the mathematical approach has been claimed to lead to absurd results which contradict common sense and legal doctrine.

In this paper I will claim that the rules of mathematical probability must apply to legal factfinding and if fallacies in its application are exposed, their existence must be due to error in the way in which the rules have been applied. I will argue and try to prove that the concept of relevance, an essential concept to any theory of legal factfinding, has been disregarded in mathematical probability theory.

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Articles
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Israel Law Review , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , Summer 2000 , pp. 260 - 301
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2000

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References

1 For a collection of the literature on this issue, see the collected conference papers devoted to the subject in 13 Cardozo L. Rev., nos. 2–3 (1991) and 66 Boston Univ. L. Rev. (1986).

2 Nesson, C., “The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts” (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tribe, L.H., “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process” (1971) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also the rebuttal of Saks, M. and Kidd, R., “Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristice” (1980–1981) 15 L. & Society Rev. 123, 125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an interesting review of a forerunner of this discussion in Scots jurisprudence, see Harira, Abu, “An Early Holistic Conception of Judicial Factfinding” 1986 Juridical Rev. 79.Google Scholar

3 Oxford Univ. Press (1977) (hereinafter cited as “Cohen”).

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23 Lempert, supra n. 22, at 1028.

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31 See ibid.

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39 These are the real facts of an Israeli case, Tassa v. State of Israel, 1419/86 CA. (T.A.), 1988(1) P.M. 309.

40 As required by article 80 of the Israel Courts Law (combined version) 1984, as amended in 1992. See discussion in Feller, S.Z., “Majority and Dissent – Means of Concretization” (1988) 15 Iyunei Mishpat 31Google Scholar (in Hebrew).

41 These, too, are the facts of a real case decided by the Supreme Court of Israel, Afenger v. State of Israel (1979) 33(iii) P.D. 141.

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52 Ibid., at 132.

53 In a recent decision, a U.S. appellate court accepted 99% as the standard for reasonable doubt. United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890 (3d Cir., 1994).

54 For an explanation of the civil cases model see Kaye, D.H., “The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiable Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation” (1982) American Bar Foundation Research Journal 487–516Google Scholar, reprinted in Twining, William and Stein, Alex, eds., Evidence and Proof (Aldershot, England, Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1992).Google Scholar

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66 Cohen, supra n. 3, at 87–92.

67 For a counterargument, see Nesson, supra n. 2, at 1361.

68 A logical (if somewhat cruel) answer to this Problem would be to punish the factfinder if a mistake is found, thus making him bear the risk.

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