Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2019
In the global struggle to protect not-yet-excavated archaeological sites from looting, despite legal strictures, the playing field remains badly tilted against the site guards, customs officials, antiquities police, and prosecutors who lack the financial resources to enforce existing laws. To supplement and give teeth to the strict, but ineffectual, legal regime now in place, economic theory points to a policy solution: a “pollution tax” on antiquities purchased by residents of “market” countries, designed to internalize the social costs of looting so that the industry either takes measures to clean itself up or pays the government to prevent or mitigate the harm the industry causes. Tailored to fall more heavily on antiquities with weaker provenance or extremely high prices, and channeled into an antiquities-protection “superfund” (as was done to clean up toxic chemical sites) or via existing governmental agencies, a Pigovian tax on antiquities could provide a sustainable funding stream for more robust monitoring and enforcement efforts against the illicit market as well as for better site security. Archaeologists and dealers may find the idea of this kind of tax repugnant, but such feelings may be overcome through sustained discussion and negotiation explaining the benefits to both sides of a more licit regulated market.