The principle of non-discrimination constitutes a corner-stone in different fields of international economic law, notably international trade in goods and services as well as intellectual property and investment protection. While its basic rationale appears to be straightforward, the application of the different legal elements which constitute a non-discrimination obligation has proven to be most challenging. Adjudicating bodies have been applying different interpretations and standards with regard to the legal elements of ‘less favourable treatment’, ‘likeness’ and ‘regulatory purpose’, which leads to a high fragmentation of the non-discrimination principle in international economic law. This article maps out the different theories for each of these elements on the examples of WTO law, NAFTA, bilateral investment treaties (BIT) and EU law and analyses how these theories affect the scope and liberalizing effect of the non-discrimination obligation. The article then attempts to develop a coherent factor-based application of non-discrimination rules suitable for all fields of international economic law. The article submits the theory that the elements of non-discrimination should not be applied as strict legal conditions which must be proven by a complainant, but as a range of factors which are weighed and balanced by the adjudicating bodies.

This article looks at the recent phenomena of internationalisation and constitutional borrowing in drafting Bills of Rights. Using South Africa, Canada and Northern Ireland as its focus, this article posits key lessons to be considered in any society hoping to use these two strategies to best effect in designing indigenous Bills of Rights. This contribution makes the case that while these are viable strategies in equality and other rights provision drafting, before embarking on such trajectories, the local context must be considered. In short, effective and sensitive interaction between the ‘local and the global’ can result in a more rewarding project when those involved in formulating an indigenous Bill of Rights simultaneously reflect best international practice. The article is supported in its conclusions by a series of semi-structured interviews with key players involved in the drafting process in Northern Ireland and Canada.

This article challenges the rhetoric of hardening, according to which international standards become binding through WTO endorsement. The analysis of the system of presumptions set up in the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement reveals that international standards are actually used as a ‘ceiling’ rather than a ‘floor’ benchmark of protection, contrary to their original spirit. They represent a codified and agreed yardstick for least trade-restrictive measures, a minimum compromise between the regulatory regime and the trade litigation machinery. It follows that their nature—at least within the WTO system—is irreversibly distorted; they are treated as facts rather than as safety or quality devices.

In the light of the Supreme Court decision in OFT v Abbey National on unarranged overdraft fees in current account contracts, this article analyses the price term exemption at the heart of Directive 93/13 in its European context, and on a comparative basis. It argues for an interpretation in line with the ‘market for lemons’ rationale, which best fits the regulatory outline of Directive 93/13, and the European Court of Justice's case law. Under this approach, only those contract terms that are subject to the correcting forces of markets and competition are part of the ‘main subject matter of the contract’ and should be exempt from assessment of fairness under Directive 93/13.

In recent years, the European Union (‘eu’) has taken a number of initiatives with a view to co-ordinating consular assistance in third countries. Not only have EU citizens an entitlement to consular assistance by any EU Member State in the absence of a representation of their own, but EU Member States themselves are encouraged to co-operate by means of the Lead State Concept and other forms of co-operation. While this may seem relatively unproblematic from the perspective of the EU, it is very difficult to reconcile with general international law. The various EU agreements in this area have no application to third States: some do not have legally binding form and even those that do only apply to the parties to the treaties, ie EU Member States. This article will present the situation, analyse its complexities and offer some reflections on the global application and desirability of the regime created by the EU.

It is generally considered that an international organization (‘IO’) has an international legal personality which is distinct from that of its Member States, as a result of which the IO itself, rather than the Member States, is to be held responsible for the IO's internationally wrongful acts.1 It appears to be an accepted principle that Member States cannot generally be held liable for the acts of IOs by virtue of their membership of an IO alone. This view can be found in a 1996 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, which provides that ‘there is no general rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are members.’2 This is echoed in the International Law Commission's (‘ILC’) Commentary to article 62 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (‘ILC DARIO’): ‘It is clear that … membership does not as such entail for member States international responsibility when the organization commits an internationally wrongful act’.3 The ILC holds the view that only in the case of an intervening act by a Member State that influences the commission of a wrongful act by the IO (aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, avoidance of compliance, acceptance) could the Member State be held responsible.4

A critical observer would not deny that the practice of European Union (‘EU’) policy making in the field of criminal law in the past decade since the implementation of the Tampere Programme has been mainly repressive and prosecution-oriented.1 The idea of introducing a set of common (minimum) rules, guaranteeing the rights of defence at a EU-wide level, has not been accorded the same attention as the introduction of instruments aimed at improving the effectiveness of crime-fighting. What does this mean for the future of EU criminal policy? Will the EU succeed in the coming years in developing an area where freedom, security and justice are truly balanced? According to several authors, to date the EU has evolved in the opposite direction. As one observer put it:

Community activity in this field continues to be extensive. Intellectual property is seen as a key resource for the European Union (‘EU’), and crucial to its position in the global economy. The EU's manufacturing sector is much decreased in importance in comparison with the services sector. New information and communications technologies have transformed the economic environment. The Commission repeatedly emphasises the importance of intellectual property rights for innovation, employment, competition, and economic growth. Intellectual assets are regarded as central to success in the new ‘knowledge economy’. There are two main strands to the Commission's work with intellectual property. One is the harmonisation of the laws of Member States, in order to eliminate barriers to trade. The other is the creation of unitary systems to protect intellectual property rights throughout the Community on the basis of a single application for protection. The Commission also demonstrates particular concern regarding counterfeiting.

The United Kingdom (‘UK’) has indicated its intention not to opt-in to two proposals from the European Commission aimed at further developing the Common European Asylum System through the replacement of existing instruments on asylum procedures and reception conditions. The purpose of the European Union (‘EU’) amendment process is to establish rules that more closely align the legal framework for asylum in the Member States so that asylum seekers receive the same higher standard of treatment in any Member State in which they choose to make their application, and to address criticism that the Directives are incompatible with human rights obligations. The UK asserts that its asylum procedures satisfy the standards imposed by its obligations under international and European law, and does not view further harmonization of asylum matters at EU level as necessary or appropriate. Its decision not to opt-in raises issues regarding sovereignty, subsidiarity, the rule of law and European integration. This article will explore these issues, as well as provide an overview of select provisions from the proposals in light of UK asylum policy.

On 28 October 2010, the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People's Congress adopted China's first statute on the Conflict of Laws: the ‘Act on the Application of Laws over Foreign-related Civil Relationships’ (‘Conflicts Act’).1 The adoption was an historic event in Chinese legislative history, as it indicates China has modernised its conflict-of-law rules after many years of unremitting efforts made by legislators and scholars. More importantly, it means that ‘a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics’ has been successfully established, and allows China to claim to have a systematic legal system.2