This article examines the European Court of Human Rights's encounter with general international law in its Behrami and Saramati admissibility decision, where it held that the actions of the armed forces of States acting pursuant to UN Security Council authorizations are attributable not to the States themselves, but to the United Nations. The article will try to demonstrate that the Court's analysis is entirely at odds with the established rules of responsibility in international law, and is equally dubious as a matter of policy. Indeed, the article will show that the Court's decision can be only be explained by its reluctance to decide on questions of State jurisdiction and norm conflict, the latter issue becoming the clearest when Behrami is compared to the Al-Jedda judgment of the House of Lords.

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) between Member States of the EU have long been all but non-existent. However, with the two most recent rounds of EU enlargement about 190 BITs have become intra-EU. This has not only raised doubts about the conformity of these BITs with EC law, but has also prompted some (including the European Commission) to question the admissibility of arbitral proceedings brought under these Treaties. The article assesses the mechanisms through which a conflict between intra-EU BITs and EC law can become relevant from an arbitration perspective. It then analyses the principal alleged inconsistencies between BIT provisions and EC law: differing substantive standards of investment protection, unequal treatment of investors from different Member States and the lack of control by the ECJ. The discussion of these issues in the light of the relevant EC Treaty provisions shows that EC law should not, in fact, be regarded as an obstacle to intra-EU investment arbitration.

As part of the conditions for WTO accession, China is committed to a number of additional obligations stipulated in the accession documents. This article will mainly focus on the contingent trade instruments in this context, which WTO Members are entitled to take against products of Chinese origin. In this regard, the WTO rules to be examined include the buffering mechanism under Sections 15 and 16 of the Accession Protocol and the textile-specific safeguard mechanism under paragraph 242 of the Working Party Report. The discriminatory and non-beneficial nature of the latter makes it the most unfair component in China's accession. In some cases, these China-only instruments also go against some fundamental WTO principles. For example, revivals of grey-area measures and the bilateral approach are fairly evident therein, which are no longer advocated and even prohibited under the WTO system.

This article addresses the problem of democratic legitimacy posed by the executive branch's use of delegated legislative powers. After some remarks on the need for delegated legislation and the problem of legitimation the study identifies in a comparative perspective three approaches of ensuring that delegated legislation carries sufficient democratic legitimation. A first means of democratic legitimation is parliamentary predetermination of the executive role. German law proves that the proper legislature under the Damocles sword of unconstitutionality is in many cases well able to prescribe for the executive a substantive programme of delegated legislation. A second technique of democratic legitimation is that parliament in some way participates in the rule-making procedure. German and British law show that by means of subsequent approval the proper legislature assumes political responsibility for subordinate legislation beyond the original empowerment. The US Supreme Court, however, considers the legislative veto to be unconstitutional. Therefore, American law developed a third approach to solve the problem of democratic legitimacy. American experience makes clear that the democratic legitimation of secondary legislation can also be secured by means of comprehensively involving the public in the delegated legislative process. The author assesses the different models for legitimation and explains that the different approaches suggest valuable solutions to each country's problems.

Collective redress mechanisms for consumer claims seek both to allow legal systems to accommodate mass litigation without being overwhelmed and to enable litigation to be viable where individual claims would not be economic. The article maps a number of recent reforms and reform proposals relating to consumer collective redress at national level and comments on EU developments. It notes that there is insufficient recognition of the differences between schemes geared at managing mass litigation as opposed to those aimed at facilitating otherwise non-viable claims. There are however signs that a European style of collective redress procedure is developing, which emphasize the role of public authorities and consumer organizations as gatekeepers to collective redress. The EU is unlikely to be able to impose collective redress procedures on national civil procedures, but the EU could prompt Member States to reflect on the need for national reforms. There may be limited scope for an EU mechanism to address the problem of individually non-viable consumer claims. This would however have to address certain fundamental issues such as the opt-out mechanism, cy-près distribution and funding if consumer organizations are to be encouraged to bring such actions. At a legal doctrinal level, it is interesting to note the influence of comparative studies on policy development within Member States as well as at the EU level.