1999 may well go down in history as a watershed in the legal struggle for gay and lesbian equality. While in the late 1990s many legislatures across the world extended various statutory benefits to same-sex relationships,1 most legal systems continue to make a clear statutory distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples (usually by ignoring the former completely), as well as the more obvious (and deliberate) distinction between married and unmarried couples. Both distinctions have come under increasing challenge and in 1999 decisions from each of the highest courts in Canada, South Africa and Vermont, U.S.A. held legislation to be unconstitutional which treated same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples. In that year too, the British House of Lords held that a same-sex couple could be a “family” for certain statutory purposes,2 and the European Court of Human Rights for the first time accepted that the prohibition of discrimination contained in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights covered sexual orientation discrimination.3

What do we know about the role of legal systems as determinants of the location of foreign direct investment (FDI)? The short answer to this question is: not enough.1 In recent decades, most governments have come to believe that FDI is an important source of the capital and technology necessary for economic development, and to seek new ways to induce foreign investors to locate within their jurisdiction.2 Commentators and development agencies regularly argue or imply that FDI flows are to some extent determined by the effectiveness of the host State's legal system.3 That is, it is suggested that the manner in which laws are implemented in a State can act as a deterrent or an attraction to potential foreign investors.4

The legal version of post-modernism has not failed to challenge comparative law. It points out that, traditionally, comparatists have participated in a project of objectivity, universalism and neutrality of law, of which the “new” approach to comparative law is altogether sceptical.1 In the era of globalisation, both the discipline and its critique have gained relevance. What the transition of post-socialist countries and the unification of Europe have effected regionally, globalisation now accomplishes on a global scale: it creates desires for harmonisation and, as a pre-requisite, legal comparison. However, not only the technical function of comparative law is needed, but also its critical potential. In the process of globalisation, different legal systems and different cultures are confronted with each other and must interact. This provokes new questions about the options and limits of comparative law and legal unification, regarding, for instance, the applicability of specific moral and legal standards to other cultures by comparatists and law-makers. These questions are all the more pressing as we begin to realise that governing globalisation, in particular economic globalisation, with the help of global law perhaps requires a concept of a global legal order which is based on a “global legal pluralism”.2

The beginning of the new millennium spawned a biosafety protocol1 for the transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms,2 against the background of an existing WTO code3 concerned mainly with liberal trade. The co-existence of the two codes, and their almost separate development, reflects the fact that the international movement of GMOs raises concerns both of biosafety and liberal trade. However, their co-existence also invites a number of questions—viz., the level to which they complement each other, the level of duplication, and the levels to which they are adequate qua normative frameworks for biotechnology products. In short, the two systems beg the question whether they co-exist happily, or provide for incoherence. This article is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of the codes, but rather as a framework for a focus on the respective codes, as well as their relationship to each other, from a legal perspective.

New technologies bring new problems as well as benefits. New technologies also involve unknown dangers and fears. So it is with biotechnology and living modified organisms (LMOs).

On 1 July 1997 Hong Kong entered a new era when it was transformed from a British colony into a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The impact of the handover of Hong Kong cannot be overstated but, for the time being perhaps, may lie more in the sphere of ideology than in institutions.

Following NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the United Kingdom House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee commenced an inquiry with the following terms of reference: “To inquire into the foreign policy lessons of the Kosovo crisis and how the Foreign and Commonwealth Office might best promote peace and stability in the region.” The Committee heard oral evidence from government ministers, diplomats, FCO staff, journalists, academics, and lawyers. It also received written memoranda. The President of Montenegro and the Foreign Minister of Albania were interviewed in private, and the Committee visited Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. The Committee's Report was published on 7 June 2000 as the 4th Report of The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (HC28-II, ISBN 010 2331006) together with the evidence and appendices (HC28-II, ISBN 010 2333009).

1. This Memorandum has been prepared in accordance with the request of the Foreign Affairs Committee (letter dated 28 July 1999), which request referred to a written memorandum “on the area of international law“.1 In the course of his career as a member of the English Bar, specialising in international disputes, the writer has worked as legal adviser and/or advocate for at least 35 States. In this context it is necessary to point to the fact that, as a part of his professional involvements, he has acted as Counsel and Advocate in the recent proceedings before the International Court of Justice on behalf of Yugoslavia. It is also necessary to stress that the Memorandum represents his own views and that there has been no input from any Government or Government-related organisation.

1. In his letter dated 16 February 2000 Mr Silk, on behalf of the Committee, invited me to prepare an additional memorandum on any of the issues raised during the taking of evidence on 8 February. I have also been supplied with the transcript and the additional written questions.

The use of force has been prohibited in international relations since at least the United Nations Charter, 1945. Article 2 (4) of the Charter states:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the United Nations.

This memorandum is submitted in response to a request from the Foreign Affairs Committee in connection with its hearings on the NATO intervention in Kosovo in March 1999. The memorandum addresses the following issues of international law:

(1) Was the resort to force by NATO consistent with international law? and

(2) Were the means employed by NATO, once the decision to use force had been taken, consistent with international law?

[In 1999, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee invited a number of international lawyers to submit papers on the legal aspects of the Kosovo crisis. Papers were submitted by Professor Ian Brownlie QC, Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor Christopher Greenwood QC, Professor Vaughan Lowe, and Mark Littman QC. The three last-named answered questions on the issue at a session of the Committee held in February 2000.

The process of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom instituted by the present Labour government has been considerable but it has proceeded on a piecemeal basis. Its aim is to reinforce accountability for the exercise of public power but, in the absence of a comprehensive scheme of reform, the achievement of this ambition has the same lack of coherence as the reform programme itself. Some matters remain untouched by the process, centrally and crucially the domination of the House of Commons and therefore effectively the legislature, by the Executive, a condition exaggerated by the massive majority enjoyed by the government.1 The justification for this arrangement, which so infringes the separation of powers, lies in the claim that it produces effective, stable and accountable government. This is not the place to assess the accuracy of these claims but to note the importance of recognising the particular relationship between executive and legislature which characterises the British Constitution when considering the likely impact of proposals for its reform.

The participation of the Freedom Party in the Austrian government has given rise to exceptional reactions both in Austria and internationally. The imposition of a freeze in bilateral diplomatic relations by Austria's European Union partners has been particularly notable, amounting to an unprecedented response to the election of a new government in another Member State. This note seeks to describe the development of events and assess the status of the 14 Member States' actions under international law, in particular in the light of any developing norms concerning non-intervention, respect for human rights and the right to democratic governance.

The decision of the International Court of Justice of 13 December 1999 in the dispute between Botswana and Namibia concerning the island known to the former as Sedudu and the latter as Kasikili is the latest in a line of cases dealing with the identification of colonial boundaries,1 including the two Eritrea/Yemen arbitration awards, the second of which (on Maritime Delimitation) was delivered four days after the Kasikili/Sedudu Island judgment itself.2 While not as wide-ranging in either the geographical or legal senses as some of the preceding decisions on territorial issues, the decision of the Court in this case nevertheless raises some interesting and important questions.

Under Part XV of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention which cannot be settled by the consensual means set out in section 1 of that Part, may be referred by any party to the dispute for compulsory settlement under section 2. There are four possible fora for such settlement—the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (hereafter ITLOS), an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention, and a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII. If the parties to a dispute have made a declaration under Article 287 (which is optional) specifying their choice of forum, and their choices coincide, that body will be the forum for the settlement of the dispute. If their choices do not coincide or if not all parties have made a declaration, the forum for settlement will be an Annex VII arbitral tribunal.1