The purpose of this article is to address two related false assumptions, or myths. The first is an assumption of public international law. It is the myth that the history of international law is one of progressive expansion, of increasing concern in public international law with matters traditionally considered private or internal to States, and that this expansion is a relatively recent phenomenon.1 The second is an assumption of private international law. It is the myth that private international law is not actually international, as it is essentially and necessarily a part of the domestic law of States.2 These assumptions, taken together, constitute the myth that public and private international law are discrete, distinct disciplines, with independent, parallel histories. This article addresses these myths through an analysis of the role played by international law theory in the history of private international law.

Constitutionalism is a deeply contested but indispensable symbolic and normative frame for thinking about the problems of viable and legitimate regulation of the complexily overlapping political communities of a post-Westphalian world.1

The purpose of this article is to consider the scope of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as set out in the Treaty on European Union. Pursuant to Article 46 TEU, the ECJ has virtually no competence over foreign policy and security matters—although some limited scope for judicial supervision may be derived from the combined effect of this provision with Article 47 TEU, which prevents encroachment by EU law on Community competence, with respect both to reviewing the choice of legal basis and to determining any violations of EC policy-making procedures. It is submitted that the absence of judicial control over the exercise of powers by the Union and its Member States in this area of potentially sensitive action does not guarantee the preservation of the institutional balance established by the EU Treaty. It may also prove incompatible for individuals to have a legal remedy in the event of a breach of directly effective CFSP provisions.

In December 2004, Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights added its voice to the call for a greater parliamentary role in the making of treaties. In its report on Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Joint Committee included a one-page chapter on ‘Increasing Parliament's involvement in the adoption of human rights treaties’, expressing the view that it was desirable for Parliament to become more involved prior to ratification on the grounds that effective parliamentary scrutiny would serve to ‘enhance the democratic legitimacy of human rights obligations incurred… by the Executive pursuant to the prerogative power.’1 Motivated by this concern, the Committee has undertaken, on its own initiative, an extensive review of the UK's treaty commitments in the human rights field with a view to securing greater parliamentary support for these obligations through the mechanism of public scrutiny.2

The new legal order in European asylum is being shaped by a key document: the Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals as refugees and persons otherwise in need of international protection and the content of the protection granted (hereinafter the Qualification Directive). The Qualification Directive was adopted by the Council of the European Union on 29 April 2004.2 It entered into force on 20 October 2004, that is 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal.3 The Member States have until 10 October 2006 to implement its provisions into national legislation.4 Meanwhile, they have a duty not to adopt measures contrary to it.5 For those countries that have already implemented the Qualification Directive, such as France,6 the judiciary will need to ensure compliance with it.7

International human rights law advocates tolerance, inclusivity and the promotion of equality among peoples, nations and individuals across the world. It seems disappointing, therefore, that these standards do not always apply to the discipline of international human rights law itself. Instead there seems to be a hierarchy in the international human rights system. Others have written about such an approach in relation to different types of rights,1 reflecting political power struggles.2 This paper will consider whether African institutions are ‘third generation’ organs and perceived as of less value than others. It will argue that international human rights law has focused primarily on European and Western sources and neglected those from other jurisdictions. It has failed, therefore, to use African institutions, for instance, to provide examples of good practice, relying on them only as examples of what not to do. As Okafor and Agbakwa state, there is evidence of a one-way traffic, with Western scholars giving the impression that they feel they have little to learn from African institutions and their experiences:

‘Nothing ventured, everything gained!’ is an apt summary of the position recently adopted by the French Cour de Cassation towards the subject of mitigation of loss. In two seminal judgments of 19 June 2003,1 the French supreme court2 explicitly rejected the introduction of a general principle of mitigation in the French law of tort, thereby departing from the solutions reached in England and other neighbouring legal systems.

In the wake of their so-called ‘completion strategies’,1 both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), creations of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, have for some time grappled with the question of how to unclog their congested dockets and dispose of those accused which are generally viewed as ‘small fry’. The fact that many of the accused have had to spend very long, some say excessively long, times in the custody of the Tribunals prior to and during trials, led the Tribunals to devise a mechanism for the transfer of cases to national jurisdictions, preferably those of the national States of the defendants, which were mostly identical to the post-conflict countries. The mechanism was an amendment of Rule 11bis of their Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) which allowed the Tribunals to refer cases to the national courts under certain circumstances. It is helpful to trace the history of the Rule. For the sake of simplicity, only the ICTY2 will be looked at here, as there are no real differences in substance with regard to the ICTR as far as the latest version of the Rule3 is concerned.

On 31 March 2005 the Security Council made its first referral to the International Criminal Council (‘the ICC’). The Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the ICC. Given the USA's stated opposition to the ICC, that there was a referral at all could be seen as a triumph for the Court.s supporters. However, Security Council Resolution 1593 has a number of problematic features. Its genesis was long and convoluted, and it has been seen by some as a substitute for effective action by the United Nations to end the humanitarian crisis and systematic atrocities being committed in Darfur.