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TWO OPPOSING PARADIGMS OF CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL THINKING: AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2009

András Jakab
András Jakab
Affiliation:
García-Pelayo Fellow (investigador contratado M García-Pelayo) at the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, Spain). E-mail: [email protected].
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International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , October 2009 , pp. 933 - 955
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Copyright © 2009 British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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References

1 For valuable suggestions and insightful criticism on the first German version of this paper, I would like to thank Armin von Bogdandy, Rainer Grote, Ulrich Hufeld, Otto Pfersmann, Markus Rau, Alexander Somek, Robert Walter, Ewald Wiederin for the same on the English version, the participants of the Comparative Constitutionalism section at the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in (IVR) in Cracòw (Poland), 1–6. August 2007, and the anonymous reviewer of the ICLQ. Email: [email protected]

2 Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law seeks to avoid moral and political or social considerations in legal analysis (this explains its name ‘pure’). Carl Schmitt's decisionism emphasizes the moment of political decision and political fight in constitutional law; Rudolf Smend's integrationism regards the main function of the constitution is integrating society.

3 K Doehring, Allgemeine Staatslehre (3rd edn, CF Müller, Heidelberg, 2004) para 302 ff; P Badura, Staatsrecht (3rd edn, CH Beck, Munich, 2003) 7–8; H Maurer, Staatsrecht I (3rd edn, CH Beck, Munich, 2003) 11 (framing constitutional principles as fundamental decisions).

4 K Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (20th edn, CF Müller, Heidelberg, 1995) 10.

5 See R Walter and H Mayer, Grundriß des österreichischen Bundesverfassungsrechts (9th edn, Manz, Vienna, 2000) para 4 (defining ‘material constitution’ in its classic definition); but see T Öhlinger, Verfassungsrecht, para 14 (5th edn, Facultas Wuv Universitätsverlag, Vienna, 2003) (defining ‘material constitution’ by the typical regulatory content). See also L Adamovich, B-C Funk and G Holzinger, Österreichisches Staatsrecht I (Springer, Vienna, 1997) para 01.003 ff (surveying the various opinions).

6 For further references to Austrian literature and for the history of this doctrine see A Jakab, ‘Problems of the Stufenbaulehre’ (2007) 20 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 35 ff.

7 Eg, T Schilling, Rang und Geltung von Normen in gestuften Rechtsordnungen I. (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin, 1994) 59 ff; R Lippold, Recht und Ordnung: Statik und Dynamik der Rechtsordnung. (Manz'sche, Vienna, 2000) 369 ff; D Heckmann, Geltungskraft und Geltungsverlust von Rechtsnormen: Elemente einer Theorie der autoritativen Normgeltungsbeendigung (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1997) 143 ff.

8 See, eg, F Koja, ‘Die Verfassung’ in H Mayer et al (eds), Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis: Festschrift für Robert Walter (Manz'sche, Vienna, 1991) 349 ff.

9 See eg, H Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (2nd edn, Scientia, Aalen, 1929) 53 ff.

10 Ludwig Adamovich, Jr, should be kept distinct from his father, Ludwig Adamovich, Sr, who was also President of the Constitutional Court (1946–1955) but was an adherent to the older school. See A J Noll, Sachlichkeit statt Gleichheit? (Springer, Vienna, 1996) 99. His son held the same office (President of the Constitutional Court ) from 1984 to 2002. Just to clarify, it is not a hereditary office. The President of the Constitutional Court is appointed by the Federal President on the recommendation of the Federal Government.

11 Even the very titles set the program: G Winkler, Wertbetrachtung im Recht und ihre Grenzen (Springer, Vienna, 1969) about ‘Value-Perception in Law and Its Limits’; G Winkler, Glanz und Elend der Reinen Rechtslehre (Europa Institute, Saarbrücken, 1988) about the ‘Glory and Poverty of the Pure Theory of Law’; L Adamovich and B-C Funk, Österreichisches Verfassungsrecht: Verfassungslehre unter Berücksichtigung von Staatslehre und Politikwissenschaft (Springer, Vienna, 1982); N Wimmer, Materiales Verfassungsverständnis (Springer, Vienna, 1971); K Korinek, Grundrechte und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (Springer, Vienna, 2000); P Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht (Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 2004). But, for a turn more towards social reality, see F Ermacora, Österreichische Verfassungslehre (Braumüller, Vienna, 1970).

12 Eg, Öhlinger ibid (n 5) para 15 ff. See also M Holoubek, ‘Typologie und Abwägung: Karl Korinek und die Wissenschaft vom Öffentlichen Recht’ (2005) 127 Juristische Blätter 750 ff. (discussing the Kelsenian topoi used by Korinek, a leading proponent of the anti-formalist school).

13 There are occasional exceptions, especially in more recent literature. See eg, W Berka, Die Grundrechte (Springer, Vienna, 1999) para 186 f (framing the State as bearer of the duties flowing from fundamental rights).

14 In the treatise by Adamovich et al (n 5) not a single passage deals with the ‘State’, although its title, Österreichisches Staatsrecht (Austrian State law), might lead one to expect otherwise.

15 On the different perceptions of sovereignty amongst European countries (incl Germany and Austria), see A Jakab, ‘Neutralizing the Sovereignty Question: Compromise Strategies in Constitutional Argumentations before European Integration and since’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 375 ff.

16 In German, Anstaltsstaat. See C Schönberger, Das Parlament im Anstaltsstaat: Zur Theorie der parlamentarischen Repräsentation in der Staatsrechtslehre des Kaiserreichs (Vittorio Klosterman, Frankfurt Am Main, 1997) 369 (on Kelsen's, Duguit's, Krabbe's, and Preuß's criticism on the Jellinekian premise of the state pre-existing the law; and citing further references).

17 R Aladár Métall, Hans Kelsen: Leben und Werk (Deuticke, Vienna, 1969) 22.

18 See A Jakab, ‘German Constitutional Law and Doctrine on State of Emergency: Paradigms and Dilemmas of a Traditional (Continental) Discourse’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 453 ff (surveying the theoretical presuppositions of the German literature with remarks on Austria).

19 See F Koja, Der Staatsnotstand als Rechtsbegriff (Pustet, Salzburg, 1979) (discussing the issue in depth and citing further references).

20 A Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Springer, Vienna, 1927) 291 ff; F Koja, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Springer, Vienna, 1993) 24 ff.

21 Eg article 6(1) and article 8(1) of the Austrian Constitution. For the sake of convenience, the primary constitutional document in Austria, the Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (abbreviated ‘B-VG’), will be referred to as the Austrian Constitution, although strictly speaking the constitution comprises numerous texts and statutes (see n 80–84 and accompanying text).

22 For Kelsen's criticism on the sociologically based sovereignty (eg F Somló, Juristische Grundlehre (Meiner, Leipzig, 1917) 93, 97–98,102, see H Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts: Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1920) 31.

23 Kelsen ibid 7.

24 H Kelsen, ‘Der Wandel des Souveränitätsbegriffes’ in 2 Studi filosofico-giuridici dedicati a Giorgio del Vecchio (Sec Tipogr Modenese, Modena, 1931) 8 f.

25 Kelsen (n 22) 10.

26 ibid 13; H Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Springer, Berlin, 1925) 103; H Kelsen, ‘Les rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public’ (1926) Recueil des Cours 251, 256.

27 H Kelsen, ‘Die Einheit von Völkerrecht und staatlichem Recht’ in Abhandlungen zum Völkerrecht: Festgabe für Aleksandr N Makarov (Kohlhamer Verlag, Stuttgard and Cologne, 1958) 240.

28 Later (after emigration), Kelsen understood sovereignty as directness in international law (Völkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit). See Kelsen, H, ‘The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization’ (1944) 53 Yale LJ 207, 208CrossRefGoogle Scholar. That is, a legal order is sovereign when its validity follows directly, immediately from international law. With such a definition, it makes sense to speak of State sovereignty, as opposed to the non-sovereign (sub-)states within a federal State. This, however, did not continue to find reception in Austrian constitutional scholarship.

29 See, eg, Koja (n 20) 34. cf also Jakab, A, ‘Kelsen's Doctrine of International Law between Epistemology and Politics’ (2004) 9 Austrian Review of International and European Law 49, 55 fGoogle Scholar.

30 Walter and Mayer, (n 5) para 147 ff; Öhlinger (n 5) 66; Adamovich et al (n 5) para 11.001 ff.

31 Kelsen (n 9) 14, 99.

32 ibid 27.

33 ibid 9.

34 K Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2nd edn, CH Beck, Munich, 1984) 20.III.1.

35 ‘Ununterbrochene Legitimationskette’, see BVerfGE 83, 60 (72 f); 93, 38 (67).

36 T Öhlinger, ‘Hans Kelsen und das österreichische Bundesverfassungsrecht’ Address at the Conference ‘Die österreichischen Einflüsse auf die Modernisierung des japanischen Rechts’ 2 (20 March, 2003) available at www.univie.ac.at/staatsrecht-oehlinger/php/get.php?id=143.

37 F Koja, Das Verfassungsrecht der österreichischen Bundesländer (Springer, Vienna, 1967) 1, 14, 23 ff, 39. The Austrian Constitutional Court has also accepted this. See eg VfSlg 6783/1972; VfSlg 7653/1975; VfSlg 7791/1976; VfSlg 11669/1988.

38 Article 44(3) of the Austrian Constitution. See eg, VfSlg 11.829/1988.

39 K Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat (Müller, Karlsruhe, 1962) (in German, unitarischer Bundesstaat).

40 BVerfGE 6, 308 (340, 364); subsequently, the court switched over to the now predominant two-State theory.

41 H Kelsen, ‘Die Bundesexekution’ in Z Giacometti and D Schindler (eds), Festgabe für Fritz Fleiner (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1927) 127 ff; Öhlinger (n 5) para 218 ff.

42 The term ‘organ’ is also differently defined in the Austrian literature: a strongly normative definition as a bundle of rights and duties. See Koja (n 20) 152. German definitions with sociological connotations, such as in E-W Böckenförde, ‘Organ, Organisation und juristische Person’ in Fortschritte des Verwaltungsrechts: Festschrift für Hans J Wolff (CH Beck, Munich, 1973) 269 ff, are not widespread.

43 E Wiederin, Bundesrecht und Landesrecht (Springer, Vienna, 1995) 40 ff.

44 One exception is the power to make international treaties. Conflicts here are resolved according to the lex posterior rule. See Öhlinger (n 5) para 257; Wiederin (n 43) 208.

45 L Fuller, The Morality of Law (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969) 33 ff.

46 Sometimes, though, protection of fundamental rights is defined as falling under a ‘substantivized’ notion of the rule of law. See eg, Adamovich et al, (n 5) para 14.015.

47 T Öhlinger, Der Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung (Manz, Wien, 1975) 29; Adamovich et al, (n 5) para 15.004 (representing the situation on a very informative drawing).

48 Öhlinger (n 47) para 32.

49 ibid 30 (in German, Stufenbau der Staatsfunktionen).

50 In contrast to his German colleague, the Austrian federal president is elected directly. The Federal Assembly, a State organ comprising members of the National Council and the Federal Council (ie, the lower house and the upper house of the federal legislature), is the supervisory body that can initiate impeachment proceedings.

51 Öhlinger (n 5) para 69.

52 Article 140 Grundgesetz: ‘The provisions of Articles 136, 137, 138, 139, and 141 of the German Constitution of August 11, 1919 shall be an integral part of this Basic Law.’ 1919 German (Weimar) Constitution: ‘Religion and Religious Societies. Article 136 (1) Civil and political rights and duties shall be neither dependent upon nor restricted by the exercise of religious freedom. (2) Enjoyment of civil and political rights and eligibility for public office shall be independent of religious affiliation. (3) No person shall be required to disclose his religious convictions. The authorities shall have the right to inquire into a person's membership in a religious society only to the extent that rights or duties depend upon it or that a statistical survey mandated by a law so requires. (4) No person may be compelled to perform any religious act or ceremony, to participate in religious exercises, or to take a religious form of oath. Article 137 (1) There shall be no state church. (2) The freedom to form religious societies shall be guaranteed. The union of religious societies within the territory of the Reich shall be subject to no restrictions. (3) Religious societies shall regulate and administer their affairs independently within the limits of the law that applies to all. They shall confer their offices without the participation of the state or the civil community. (4) Religious societies shall acquire legal capacity according to the general provisions of civil law. (5) Religious societies shall remain corporations under public law insofar as they have enjoyed that status in the past. Other religious societies shall be granted the same rights upon application, if their constitution and the number of their members give assurance of their permanency. If two or more religious societies established under public law unite into a single organization, it too shall be a corporation under public law. (6) Religious societies that are corporations under public law shall be entitled to levy taxes on the basis of the civil taxation lists in accordance with Land law. (7) Associations whose purpose is to foster a philosophical creed shall have the same status as religious societies. (8) Such further regulation as may be required for the implementation of these provisions shall be a matter for Land legislation. Article 138 (1) Rights of religious societies to public subsidies on the basis of a law, contract, or special grant shall be redeemed by legislation of the Länder. The principles governing such redemption shall be established by the Reich. (2) Property rights and other rights of religious societies or associations in their institutions, foundations, and other assets intended for purposes of worship, education, or charity shall be guaranteed. Article 139 Sunday and holidays recognized by the state shall remain protected by law as days of rest from work and of spiritual improvement. Article 141 To the extent that a need exists for religious services and pastoral work in the army, in hospitals, in prisons, or in other public institutions, religious societies shall be permitted to provide them, but without compulsion of any kind.’

53 See eg Walter and Mayer, (n 5) para 165 (representing the old school); but see VfSlg 11.196/1986 (interpreting the rule of law more broadly and less formalistically in a case involving the minimum standard of actual efficiency in institutions of protection of rights).

54 F Ossenbühl, ‘Vorrang und Vorbehalt des Gesetzes’ in J Isensee and P Kirchhof (eds), 3 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (CF Müller, Heidelberg, 1988) § 62, para 23.

55 Öhlinger (n 5) para 583 (in German, formalgesetzliche Delegation).

56 The differentiation of ‘State’ and ‘society’ implies the term Anstaltsstaat (see n 16 and accompanying text), which is a sociological and pre-legal term and, thus, does not appear along the Austrian classical, normativistic approach. See eg Böckenförde (n 42) 295 f, (exhibiting a typically German perspective on the State as Anstaltsstaat); but see C Möllers, Staat als Argument (CH Beck, Munich, 2000) 67, 161 f, 173 ff, esp 228 ff (critiquing the perspective thoroughly).

57 See D Wyduckel, ‘Über die Unterscheidung von öffentlichem Recht und Privatrecht in der Reinen Rechtslehre’ in W Krawietz and H Schelsky (eds), Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1984) 113 ff (discussing Kelsen's opinion on this differentiation).

58 For an exception, see Pernthaler (n 11) 35 f, 55 ff.

59 For a groundbreaking treatise on this differentiation, see C Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1932). Legitimacy is irrelevant for a purely legal-normativistic scholarship because it deals with an extra-legal (or pre-legal) problem.

60 Art 20(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal State.

61 The Austrian Constitution's concept of the human being is one of the liberal individual and not—as in Germany—one of the social being. See H Schambeck, ‘Menschenbild und Menschenrechte im österreichischen Verfassungsrecht’ in W Geiger (ed), Menschenrecht und Menschenbild in den Verfassungen Schwedens, Deutschlands und Österreichs (CF Müller, Heidelberg, 1983) 60, 70; W Geiger, Menschenrecht und Menschenbild in der Verfassung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ibid 46. Another liberal current can be seen in the fact that, until as recently as 1992, there was no right to review judicial decisions for violation of fundamental rights. This is because, from a liberal world view, the actual threat to liberty is the administrative agency, and the judiciary is the guardian against this threat. See Ermacora, F, ‘Holprige Wege im Grundrechtsschutz’ (1993) 48 Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung 75Google Scholar ff (discussing complaints for violation of fundamental rights before the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice). The fundamental rights complaint at the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, however, can only be submitted with respect to protection of personal liberty (BVG on protection of personal liberty, BGBl 684/1988 and article 5 ECHR). Complaints for omission in Austria can be filed only against administrative agencies. See A H Schuler, Die Verfassungsbeschwerde in der Schweiz, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Österreich (Schultess, Zurich, 1968) 161, 165 (citing further references). As opposed to Germany's Basic Law, Austria's Constitution (B-VG) and its State Basic Law (StGG) were not shaped in fearful reaction to National Socialist totalitarianism; rather, the fear was of classically anti-liberal tendencies: the Constitution dates from 1920, the State Basic Law from 1867. See generally A Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Central European University Press, Budapest, 1999) 1 ff (identifying the influence on constitution-making of fear of a return of negative historical experiences).

62 On the other hand, it should be noted that many methodological objections against basic terminology of etatism, natural law, or sociology in the traditional German scholarship are indeed well-founded. See Möllers (n 56) 418 ff (making similar observations).

63 Eg Walter and Mayer (n 5) para 122 ff. For a sampling of the older literature, see L Adamovich, Sr, ‘Probleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’ (1950) Juristische Blätter 73 ff.; Adamovich, L Sr, ‘Die verfassungsmäßige Funktion des Richters, 9 Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung 1954 409Google Scholar ff. See also Noll (n 10) 99 (speaking, in this context, of an Austrian ‘value asceticism’).

64 See H Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarke (1929) 5 Veröffentlichung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 68 ff (expressing general skepticism as to value-based terminology); K Korinek, ‘Gesetzesprüfungsrecht als Kern der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’ in E Zwink (ed), Salzburger Symposion zum Jubiläum 60 Jahre Bundesverfassung (Landespressebuero, Salzburg, 1980) 109 (discussing the traditional scepticism of the Constitutional Court as to arguments from democracy and citing further references).

65 O Pfersmann, ‘Rechtstheorieverständnis als Voraussetzung des Rechtsverständnisses: Skizze für einen Ländervergleich Frankreich, Deutschland, Österreich’ in J Jurt et al (eds), Wandel von Recht und Rechtbewusstsein in Frankreich und Deutschland (Arno Spitz Verlag, Berlin 1999) 56 ff.

66 A Somek, ‘Wissenschaft vom Verfassungsrecht: Österreich’ in A von Bogdandy et al (eds), 2, Ius Publicum Europaeum (Max-Planck Institut, Heidelberg, 2008) para 11, calls this mentality ‘scepticism as to balancing’ (Abwägungsskeptizismus) because it banishes the irrational act of balancing that should be kept to a minimum.

67 F Koja, ‘Interpellationsrecht und Verschwiegenheitspflicht’ in M Imboden et al (eds), Festschrift für Adolf J Merkl (W Fink, Munich, 1970) 155.

68 See H Schäffer, Verfassungsinterpretation in Österreich (Springer, Vienna, 1971) (analyzing this interpretive style in depth); see also H Schäffer, ‘Die Interpretation’ in H Schambeck (ed), Das österreichische Bundesverfassungsgesetz und seine Entwicklung (Speyer & Peters, Berlin, 1980) 70 (defining the Constitutional Court's role as ‘guardian,’ but not ‘lord,’ of the constitution (Hüter and not Herr, respectively)).

69 This means that the wording of the division of competences between Länder and federal jurisdictions still have the original meaning from the time of their incorporation in the text of the constitution. Most of the provisions on division of competences (articles 10–14 of the Austrian Constitution) date back to 1920 or 1925; thus, the Constitutional Court, when dealing with empowerment issues, analyzes statutes and ordinances that were in force in 1920. Often, these are imperial orders from the 18th or 19th century. See, eg, H Mayer, Das österreichische Bundesverfassungsrecht:Kurzkommentar (Manz, Vienna, 2002) 17 ff. While this historical method is not completely unknown to Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, it is not followed in such an extreme form. See BVerfGE 7, 29 (44); BVerfGE 33, 125 (152 f.); BVerfGE 42, 20 (29); BVerfGE 61, 149 (175); BVerfGE 68, 319 (328).

70 As with the principle of petrification, this ‘answering nature’ (Antwortcharakter) is a sort of historical argument. See Adamovich et al (n 5) para 03.016; C Braun, Die Interpretation wirtschaftsrelevanter Grundrechte in Österreich und Deutschland: ein Vergleich der Methoden und Ergebnisse der Verfassungsinterpretation (Dissertation, University of Regensburg, 2000) 38. Here, however, the focus is not on what the wording says but on what it fails to say: the reason a given norm does not regulate a situation, which to us seems questionable, is that the situation was so clear at the time the norm was created that the issue did not even come into question. Thus, for instance, there is no explicit provision on whether the Federal Government's (Cabinet's) decisions must be unanimous or merely by majority; when article 69 of the Austrian Constitution was passed, the legal situation was undisputed, specifically in favor of unanimity. Presumably, then the constitution still implies tacitly as much. See B Raschauer, ‘Artikel 69’ in K Korinek and M Holoubek (eds), Österreichische Bundesverfassungsrecht (looseleaf collection 2003) para 28.

71 Öhlinger (n 5) para 33, 686 ff.

72 See (n 11). The shift in scholarly opinion is provocatively characterized by Bruno Binder, ‘Der materielle Gesetzesvorbehalt der Erwerbsfreiheit (Art 6 StGG): Überlegungen zur neuen Judikatur des VfGH’ (1988) 15 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1 (‘The Constitutional Court has discovered constitutional adjudication’ [author's translation]).

73 Adamovich et al (n 5) para 03.013 (self-identification, in German, kritische Wertungsjurisprudenz).

74 ibid para 02.014 (‘Experience teaches us that there is a particularly great danger of interchanging or intermixing the perspectives of constitutional scholarship and constitutional policy, and this danger can especially manifest itself in an interpreter's—conscious or unconscious— presentation of a given moral evaluation as the content of positive law’ [author's translation]).

75 H Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (2nd edn, Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1960) 349 (‘Scholarly interpretation of the law can reveal nothing other than the possible meanings of a legal norm. As cognition of its object, such interpretation cannot decide among the possibilities it discovers; it must leave this decision to the legal institution that the legal order has determined is competent to apply the law in the given case’ [author's translation]).

76 K Korinek, ‘Zur Interpretation von Verfassungsrecht’ in H Mayer et al (eds), Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis (n 8) 367 (‘Application of the traditional interpretive methods, under certain presumptions—that must be disclosed—permits one to make certain assertions as to the separate, competing normative hypotheses … . In this way, the preference of a specific normative hypothesis can be better rationalized than the pure theory of law assumes …’ [author's translation]).

77 Adamovich et al, (n 5) para 02.014.

78 T Öhlinger, ‘Verfassung und Demokratie in Österreich zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts’ in C Brünner et al (eds), Festschrift für Manfried Welan (Böhlau Verlag, Vienna, 2002) 222.

79 Öhlinger (n 5) para 35.

80 The B-VG was drafted in 1920 by the constitutional committee of the Constitutional National Assembly, which, in addition to delegates from the seven parties, also included Kelsen as an ‘expert.’ See R Walter, Die Entstehung des Bundes-Verfassungsgesetzes 1920 in der Konstituierenden Nationalversammlung (Manz, Vienna, 1984) 15. Aside from a few technical details, the Weimar Constitution had no influence on the drafting of the Austrian Constitution. See C Sima, Österreichs Bundesverfassung und die Weimarer Reichsverfassung (Peter Lang, Vienna, 1993). The B-VG is not programmatically oriented, nor does it have a preamble. One reason for this is the fact that Kelsen wanted to draft it as non-ideologically as possible. See H Schäffer, Verfassungsinterpretation in Österreich (Springer, Vienna, 1971) 64, fn 19 (citing further references). Another reason was the inability of the parties to find common ground on ideological elements. Thus, Austria's central constitutional text was construed as a model for lawmaking and the necessary oversight of legal conformity. See ibid 64.

81 H Klecatsky, ‘Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und Bundesverfassungsrecht’ in H Schambeck (ed), Das österreichische Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und seine Entwicklung (Speyer & Peters, Berlin, 1980) 83 ff; H Eberhard and C Konrath, Der Österreich-Konvent, 2004–2005/01 JAP/Juristische Ausbildung & Praxisvorbereitung 18, 20. See also Öhlinger (n 8) para 291 (addressing the ‘collapse’ of Austrian constitutional law); L Adamovich, ‘Zur Fortentwicklung des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts’ in E Zwink (ed), Salzburger Symposion zum Jubiläum 60 Jahre Bundesverfassung (Landespressebüro, Salzburg, 1980) 58 (discussing the ‘atomization’ of the constitution in constitutional statutes and constitutional provisions); T Öhlinger, ‘Stil der Verfassungsgesetzgebung: Stil der Verfassungsinterpretation’ in Bernd-Christian Funk et al (eds), Staatsrecht und Staatswissenschaften in Zeiten des Wandels: Festschrift für Ludwig Adamovich (Springer, Vienna, 1992) 502 ff, especially 508 (speaking of ‘casuistry’ in the drafting of the constitution).

82 P Pernthaler, Der Verfassungskern (Springer, Vienna, 1998) VI, 85 (describing this practice as offhand violation of the constitution and abuse of constitution making).

83 Austria's Constitution includes no specific provisions on amendment, which is instead viewed purely technically as a sub-category of legislation with a special procedure. See Ewald Wiederin, ‘Grundstrukturen staatlichen Verfassungsrechts: Österreich’ in Armin von Bogdandy et al (eds), 1 Ius Publicum Europaeum (Max-Planck Institut, Heidelberg, 2008) para 27, 42 f.

84 See ‘Ein Verfassungskonvent für Österreich?’ (2003) 11 Journal für Rechtspolitik 1 (special issue dedicated entirely to the question of an Austrian constitutional convention); L Adamovich, Eine neue Republik? Gedanken zur Verfassungsreform (Holzhausen, Wien, 2004); W Berka et al (eds), Verfassungsreform:Überlegungen zur Arbeit des Österreich-Konvents (Neuer Wissenschaflicher Verlag, Vienna, 2004). For a highly informative website, including the officially proposed draft of 12 January 2005, see www.konvent.gv.at.

85 VfSlg 11.756/1988; VfSlg 11.829/1988; VfSlg 11.916/1988.

86 VfGH 11.10.2001, G 12/00.

87 T Öhlinger, Der völkerrechtliche Vertrag im staatlichen Recht (Springer, Vienna, 1973) 110 ff.

88 M Schweitzer, Staatsrecht III: Staatsrecht, Völkerrecht, Europarecht (8th edn, CF Müller, Heidelberg, 2004) 161.

89 Kelsen (n 22) 123. See also J von Bernstorff, Der Glaube an das universale Recht: Zur Völkerrechtstheorie Hans Kelsens und seiner Schüler (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2001) 70 f; A Verdross, ‘Völkerrecht und einheitliches Rechtssystem: Kritische Studie zu den Völkerrechtstheorien von Max Wenzel, Hans Kelsen und Fritz Sander’ (1923) 12 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht 415 ff.

90 H Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (CF Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1899).

91 C Amrhein-Hofmann, Monismus und Dualismus in den Völkerrechtslehren (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2003).

92 T Öhlinger, ‘Unity of the Legal System or Legal Pluralism: The Stufenbau Doctrine in Present-Day Europe’ in A Jyränki (ed), National Constitutions in the Era of Integration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999)163 ff.; H R Laurer, ‘Europarecht und österreichische Rechtsordnung: Rechtsnormen in einem einheitlichen Stufenbau?’ (1997) 52 Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung 233 ff.

93 P Pernthaler, ‘Die neue Doppelverfassung Österreichs’ in H Haller (ed), Staat und Recht: Festschrift für Günther Winkler (Springer, Vienna, 1997) 773 ff.

94 See A von Bogdandy, ‘Zweierlei Verfassungsrecht’ (2000) 39 Der Staat 163 ff.

95 See G Holzinger, Der Verfassungsgerichtshof und das Gemeinschaftsrecht, in S Hammer (ed), Demokratie und sozialer Rechtsstaat in Europa: Festschrift für Theo Öhlinger. (WU University Press, Vienna, 2004) (citing further references) 153 ff.

96 A recent decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the the Lisbon Treaty exemplifies the court's EC-unfriendly adjudication. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04 of June 30, 2009. See Cschönberger, ‘Lisbon in karlsruhe: Maastricht's Epigones At Sea (2009) 10 German Las Journal 1201 ff.

97 Austria ratified the ECHR in 1958 but elevated it to constitutional rank only in 1964. See BVG BGBl 59/1964.

98 Inability to reach compromise on the following issues was in 1920 already the reason that the Basic Law of 1867 (StGG) remained in force: the legal relationships between State and church, State and education, and State and family, the function of property, the role of the labour, etc. See F Ermacora, ‘Die Grundrechte in der Verfassungsfrage 1919/1920’ in Die österreichische Verfassung von 1918 bis 1938 (Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik, Vienna, 1980) 53 ff. Without a new catalogue of fundamental rights, the Austrian Constitution thus remained a mere torso. See F Ermacora (ed), Die österreichische Bundesverfassung und Hans Kelsen (W Braumueller, Vienna, 1982) 37 f. The 1867 Basic Law (StGG), even today, still has the force of binding constitutional law.

99 H Schambeck, ‘Zur Theorie und Interpretation der Grundrechte in Österreich’ in R Machacek et al (eds), Grund- und Menschenrechte in Österreich (Band 1) (NP Engel Verlag, Kehl am Rhein, 1991) 91.

100 See H Hausmanninger, The Austrian Legal System (2nd edn, Manz, Vienna, 2000) 147; H Schäffer, ‘Landesbericht Österreich’ in C Starck (ed), Grundgesetz und deutsche Verfassungsrechtsprechung im Spiegel ausländischer Verfassungsentwicklung (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1990) 56 f; D Merten, ‘Aktuelle Probleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Österreich’ in H Schäffer et al (eds), Im Dienst an Staat und Recht: Festschrift für Erwin Melichar (Manz, Wien, 1983) 108.

101 But, regarding the German Federal Constitutional Court's (at least rhetorically) astounding confrontation with the European Court of Human Rights, BVerfG, 2 BvR 1481/04 of Oct 14, 2004, see J Frowein, ‘Die traurigen Missverständnisse: Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte’ in K Dicke et al (eds), Weltinnenrecht: Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2005) 279 ff; M Hartwig, ‘Much Ado About Human Rights: The Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal 869 ff. That parts of Germany's scholarly approach and teaching, which are very receptive to international law (see eg, S Hobe, Der offene Verfassungsstaat zwischen Souveränität und Interdependenz (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1998) 380 ff [discussing the ‘open statehood’ or offene Staatlichkeit]), seem now to be merely academic opinions.

102 See in detail Jakab (n 6) 35 ff.

103 J Behrend, Untersuchungen zur Stufenbaulehre Adolf Merkls und Hans Kelsens (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1977) 18. See also H H Rupp, Grundfragen der heutigen Verwaltungsrechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1965) 11 ff (scrutinizing the legal nature of administrative orders in the German literature); N Achterberg, ‘Kriterien des Gesetzesbegriffs unter dem Grundgesetz’ (1973) 26 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 298; Möllers (n 56) 154 ff.

104 Öhlinger (n 47) 31; Kelsen (n 9) 69 ff.

105 Merkl (n 20) 339; Kelsen (n 9) 70 ff.

106 H Dreier, ‘Merkls Verwaltungslehre und die deutsche Dogmatik’ in R Walter (ed), Adolf J Merkl: Werk und Wirksamkeit (Manz'sche, Vienna, 1990) 76 f.

107 BVerfGE 3, 88; BVerfGE 6, 132; BVerfGE 23, 98.

108 Resistance comes from both sides: the Kelsenian tradition resists (German) natural law reasoning, and in Germany Kelsen is (in part) rejected. See N Achterberg, ‘Hans Kelsens Bedeutung in der gegenwärtigen deutschen Staatslehre’ (1974) 27 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 447. Only recently can one observe a more significant receptiveness for Kelsen. See eg, H Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1986); M Pawlik, Die Reine Rechtslehre und die Rechtstheorie HLA Harts (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1993); C Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache: Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997); M Jestaedt, Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein … : Vom Nutzen der Rechtstheorie für die Rechtspraxis (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 2006). See also (n 7); H Dreier et al, Rezeption und Rolle der Reinen Rechtslehre (Manz, Vienna, 2001) 17 ff (discussing the German reception of Kelsen).

109 Pfersmann (n 65) 63 ff; Geiger (n 61) 46. See also E-W Böckenförde, ‘Zur Kritik der Wertbegründung des Rechts’ in R Dreier (ed), Rechtspositivismus und Wertbezug des Rechts (Franz Steiner, Stuttgart, 1990) 33, 45 (assessing the relevant case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court); C Starck, ‘Zur Notwendigkeit der Wertbegründung des Rechts’ in Dreier ibid 47, 59 ff (citing further references).

110 Adamovich et al, (n 5) para 04.017; Walter and Mayer (n 5) para 105. In contrast, German scholars addressed the topic in depth, though not always in full acceptance. See C Tomuschat, Verfassungsgewohnheitsrecht (C Winter, Heidelberg, 1972).

111 Law on the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz). An English translation is available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm.

112 Heckmann (n 7) 77.

113 See B Strehle, Rechtswirkungen verfassungsgerichtlicher Normenkontrollentscheidungen: Eine vergleichende Darstellung der Entscheidungswirkungen des schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, des deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts und des österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs (Schultess Polygraphischer Verlag, Zurich, 1980) 103 ff.

114 See Öhlinger (n 5) para 677 fn 1 (listing the few exceptional uses of the term ‘fundamental right’ (Grundrecht) in an Austrian legal document).

115 In Germany, however, fundamental rights are conceptualized as pre-legal rights, see K Stern, Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte in J Isensee and P Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (CF Müller, Heidelberg, 1992) § 108, para 6; Geiger (n 61) 47.

116 Eg, Berka (n 13) (even as title); Öhlinger, (n 5) para 677 ff.

117 M Stelzer, Das Wesensgehaltsargument und der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit (Springer, Vienna, 1991); 202 ff; Noll (n 10) 153 ff; L Adamovich et al, Österreichisches Staatsrecht 3 (Springer, Vienna, 2003) para 42.013.

118 H Schäffer, ‘Allgemeine Denkstrukturen in der Rechtsprechung europäischer Höchstgerichte, vor allem am Beispiel der Grundrechtsinterpretation der Verfassungsgerichtshöfe in Österreich und Italien’ in I H Szilágyi and M Paksy (eds), Ius Unum, Lex Multiplex: Liber Amicorum Studia Z Péteri Dedicata (Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 2005)163 ff, 174 fn 31.

119 See R Thienel, Vertrauensschutz und Verfassungsrecht (Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, Vienna, 1990) 39; K Berchtold, ‘Der Gleichheitssatz in der Krise’ in Fortschritt im Bewußtsein der Grund-und Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Felix Ermacora (Engel, Kehl am Rein, 1988) 327 ff. See also C Möllers, ‘Wandel der Grundrechtsjudikatur: Eine Analyse der Rechtsprechung des Ersten Senats des BverfG’ (2005) 58 Neue juristische Wochenschrift 1973 ff, especially 1979.

120 R Novak, ‘Die Eigentumsgarantie: Neue Aspekte, alte Fragen’ in Pernthaler et al (n 8) 266 ff (citing further references).

121 The issue is only addressed as part of the proportionality test, which makes an uncompensated expropriation possible in extraordinary circumstances. See C Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (2nd edn, Beck, Munich, 2005) para 19 f.

122 See M Kadgien, Das Habsburgergesetz (Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2005) 180 ff (criticizing the lack of compensation for the Habsburgs); L Adamovich, Sr, Handbuch des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts (6th edn Springer, Vienna, 1971) 556 ff (discussing compensation issues in the post-war process of nationalization and citing further references).

123 See C Schulz, Die aktuellen Probleme des verfassungsrechtlichen Eigentumsschutzes im Rahmen der österreichischen Rechtsordnung und im Spiegel der deutschen Rechtsauffassungen (Verlag Nottring, Vienna 1971) 145 ff; P Pernthaler, ‘Der Grundrechtsschutz des Eigentums vor allem im Hinblick auf die Beschränkungen durch die öffentliche Bodenordnung’ in H Spanner et al (eds), Grundrechtsschutz des Eigentums: Seine Grenzen und Beschränkungen im öffentlichen Interesse (Mohr Siebeck, Karlsruhe, 1977) 25 ff, especially 27 fn 10 (citing further references).

124 Pernthaler (n 123) 33.

125 Novak (n 120) 268.

126 cf K Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundsrepublik Deutschland 2, (CH Beck, Munich, 1980) 584–586. Reference is frequently made to such traditional platitudes as, for example, the equating of executive power with the application of the law without any mention of implementing orders. See eg Hesse (n 4) 88.

127 R Ooyen, Der Begriff des Politischen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2005).

128 Hesse (n 4) 97.

129 ibid 86 (in German, Recht als Ordnungsfaktor).

130 ibid 97 (in German, Bundesstaatliche Ordnung ist Form föderativer Gestaltung). One can only guess at its meaning.

131 Or etatistic combinations of both, such as the figure of a state's recognition of a right. See Stern (n 126) 588.

132 See eg N Achterberg, ‘Hans Kelsens Bedeutung in der gegenwärtigen deutschen Staatslehre’ (1974) 27 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 445 ff (citing, inter alia, H Klenner, Rechtsleere: Die Verurteilung der Reinen Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1972)). See also Dreier et al (n 108) 25, 29 (citing, inter alia, Larenz, Heller, Schmitt, and Smend); Dreier (n 108) 19 ff.