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STATE SECRETS LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 March 2015

Hitoshi Nasu
Hitoshi Nasu*
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer in Law, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
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Abstract

With the increased awareness of national security concerns associated with unauthorized disclosure of State secrets, the legal protection of State secrets on national security grounds has assumed renewed significance, while raising ever growing concerns about its impact on freedom of information. Between these competing policy concerns lies a discrete area of law that defines and protects State secrets from unauthorized communication or disclosure. This article aims to ascertain the actual State practice concerning State secrets protection on national security grounds across different countries, and examines common challenges to the delimitation of national security grounds for State secrets protection in light of the changing national security environment.

Keywords

accountabilityfreedom of informationnational securitypublic interest disclosureState secrets
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 64 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 365 - 404
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2015 

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References

1 ‘Bradley Manning Verdict: Cleared of “Aiding the Enemy” But Guilty of Other Charges’, The Guardian (online) 31 July 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/30/bradley-manning-wikileaks-judge-verdict>.

2 Law No 108 of 2013. The enactment was part of the Second Abe Administration's national security agenda, ‘protective pacifism’: Editorial, ‘NSC and Secrecy Bills Pose Dangers’, The Japan Times (online) 8 November 2013 <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/11/08/editorials/nsc-and-secrecy-bills-pose-dangers/>.

3 Law No 6532 of 2014.

4 The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, adopted on 1 October 1995, Johannesburg, South Africa <http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf> (hereinafter Johannesburg Principles); The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information, adopted on 12 June 2013, Tshwane, South Africa <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/global-principles-national-security-10232013.pdf> (hereinafter Tshwane Principles). Even though the Principles have subsequently been referred to by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and by numerous scholars and NGOs, they are to be seen as best practice standards to be promoted, rather than codification of the existing state practice: Ackerman, JM and Sandoval-Ballesteros, IE, ‘The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws’ (2006) 58 AdminLRev 85Google Scholar, 103; Coliver, S, ‘Commentary on the Johannesburg Principles’ in Coliver, S et al. (eds), Secrecy and Liberty: National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (Martinus Nijhoff 1999) 11Google Scholar, 14.

5 See its website at <http://www.article19.org>.

6 See its website at <http://www.foiadvocates.net/>. See also, Freedom of Information Advocates Network, ‘Global Right to Information Update: An Analysis by Region’, July 2013 <http://www.access-info.org/documents/Access_Docs/FOIAnet/global_right_to_information_update_28-8-2013.pdf>.

7 See its website on freedom of information at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/topics/freedom-information>.

8 As this article focuses on the restrictions of public access to State secrets, it distinguishes and excludes the State secrets privilege as an evidentiary rule in court proceedings. Although some states distinguish ‘official secrets’ from ‘State secrets’ and ‘documents’ from ‘information’, the term ‘State secrets’ and ‘information’ is adopted for the purpose of this research to encompass any government-held information broadly.

9 For an earlier comparative study with a more limited geographical scope, see, Amanda L Jacobsen, ‘National Security and the Right to Information in Europe’, Centre for Advanced Security Theory, University of Copenhagen, April 2003 <http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/national-security-page/national-security-expert-papers/jacobsen_nat-sec-and-rti-in-europe>; C Pourgourides, ‘Fair Trial Issues in Criminal Cases concerning Espionage or Divulging State Secrets’, Report to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Doc 11031 (2006) <http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefDocDetails_E.asp?FileID=9149>; Campbell Public Affairs Institute (ed), National Security and Open Government: Striking the Right Balance (Maxwell School of Syracuse University 2003)Google Scholar.

10 Including 99 countries where freedom of information law exists (see n 22) in addition to Brunei, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar/Burma, Singapore, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Turkmenistan and Vietnam where state secrets legislation exists without freedom of information law. In this section references are made to specific legislative provisions only where relevant provisions exist and in some cases only to representative examples, given that not all state secrets laws are equally well developed, are adequately translated into English, or provide a clear illustration of the point being made.

11 It remains difficult even in the modern age because scholars are ‘forced to rely upon a thin thread of evidence spun out in a bewildered array of mostly unverifiable writings and recollections by former officials (both disgruntled and not), defectors, journalists, parahistorians, and novelists’: Gaddis, JL, ‘Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins’ (1989) 13 Diplomatic History 191Google Scholar, 192.

12 See generally, Grosek, E, Secret Treaties of History (William S Hein & Co 2007)Google Scholar; Osmańczyk, EJ (Mango, A, ed), Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements, vol 3 (3rd edn, Routledge 2003) 2092–3Google Scholar; Toscano, M, The History of Treaties and International Politics (Johns Hopkins University Press 1966) 42Google Scholar.

13 See Hooper, D, Official Secrets: The Use and Abuse of the Act (Secker & Warburg 1987) 17–22Google Scholar.

14 In France, by contrast, public disclosure of government information had tightly been controlled through censorship since the seventeenth century until the introduction of the 1881 Press Law: Thogmartin, C, The National Daily Press of France (Summa Publications 1998)Google Scholar chs 1–2.

15 Post and Telegraph Act 1901 (Cth) sections 9 and 127; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) section 79. For details, see McGinness, J, ‘Secrecy Provisions in Commonwealth Legislation’ (1990) 9 Federal L Rev 49Google Scholar.

16 Official Secrets Act 1890, 1939 and 1981 (Canada), replaced by Security of Information Act 2001 (Canada).

17 Official Secrets Act 1923 (India).

18 New Zealand enacted its Official Secrets Act much later in 1951, which was replaced by Official Information Act 1982 (NZ). In Hong Kong, the UK's successive Official Secrets Acts were applied until it was replaced by Official Secrets Ordinance (No 369 of 1997) (Hong Kong): Chan, J, ‘National Security and the Unauthorized and Damaging Disclosure of Protected Information’ in Hualing, F, Petersen, CJ and Young, SNM (eds), National Security and Fundamental Freedoms: Hong Kong's Article 23 under Scrutiny (Hong Kong University Press 2005) 251Google Scholar.

19 For example, Official Secrets Act 1923 (as amended in Bangladesh); Official Secrets Act 1940 (Brunei); Official Secrets Act 1972 (Malaysia); Official Secrets Act 1923 (Myanmar/Burma); Official Secrets Act 1923 (Pakistan); Official Secrets Act 1935 (Singapore); Official Secrets Act 1955 (Sri Lanka); Official Secrets Act 1964 (Uganda); Official Secrets Act 1970 (Zimbabwe).

20 See eg Nurbek Taktakunov v Krygyzstan, Human Rights Committee Communication No 1470/2006, UN Doc CCPR/C/101/D/1470/2006 (28 March 2011) para 7.4 (observing that freedom of information ‘includes the two dimensions, individual and social, of the right to freedom of thought and expression that must be guaranteed simultaneously by the State’); Stefaan Conrad Brümmer v Minister for Social Development and Others [2009] ZACC 21 (Constitutional Court of South Africa) para 63 (Ngcobo J). For detailed analysis of different conceptions of freedom of information, see Klaaren, J, ‘The Human Rights to Information and Transparency’ in Bianchi, A and Peters, A (eds), Transparency in International Law (CUP 2013) 223Google Scholar, 227–8; Peled, R and Rabin, Y, ‘The Constitutional Right to Information’ (2011) 42 ColumHumRtsLRev 357Google Scholar, 358–60.

21 See eg Társaság A Szabadágjogokért v Hungary (2011) 53 EHRR 3, 136 para 27; Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407, 418 para 41; Handyside v United Kingdom (1979–80) 1 EHRR 737, 754 para 49. These two rationales for freedom of information are further discussed in Section V.

22 According to Open Society Justice Initiative, there are 99 countries as of February 2014 that have enacted freedom of information legislation: Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘List of Countries with Access to Information (AIT) Provisions in their National/Federal Laws or Actionable Decrees, and Dates of Adoption & Significant Amendments’, available via <www.justiceinitiative.org>.

23 See eg Stoll v Switzerland (2008) 47 EHRR 59, 1312 paras 125–129; Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433, 456 para 74; R v Shayler [2003] 1 AC 247; Meredith Larson v Department of State, 565 F 3d 857 (DC Cir, 2009); CIA v Sims, 471 US 159 (US Supreme Court, 1985).

24 For example, The Constitution of the Philippines 1987, Section 7, art III.

25 Executive Order No 464, 28 September 2005, cited in Senate of the Philippines et al v Eduardo R Ermita and Others [2006] PHSC 1216 (20 April 2006) (ruling that the Executive Order No 464 is invalid to the extent that it allows the executive branch to avoid congressional requests for information without assertion of the privilege or its reasons).

26 Law on Guarding State Secrets of the People's Republic of China 1988 as revised in 2010, Order No 6 of the President of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter Law on Guarding State Secrets 1988).

27 Ordinance on State Secrets Protection 2000 (Vietnam). See also Decree No 33/2002/ND-CP (28 March 2002).

28 Law on Protection of State Secrets 1994 (Kyrgyzstan); Law on State Secrets 1995 (Mongolia); Law on State Secrets 2003 (Tajikistan); Law on Protection of State Secrets 1995 (Turkmenistan); Law on Protection of State Secrets 1993 (Uzbekistan).

29 Law on Information Classified ‘State Secrets’ 1999 (Albania); Classified Information Protection Act 1998 (Bulgaria); Data Secrecy Law 2007 (Croatia); Protection of Classified Information Act 1998 (Czech Republic); State Secrets Act 1999 (Estonia); Act on State and Official Secrets 1995 (Hungary); Law on State Secrets 1996 (Georgia); Law on State Secrets 1997 (Latvia); Law on State Secrets and Official Secrets 1999 (Lithuania); Law on State Secrets 1994 (Moldova); Classified Information Protection Act 1999 (Poland); Law on Protecting Classified Information 2002 (Romania); Law on the Protection of Classified Information 2004 (Slovakia); Classified Information Act 2001 (Slovenia); Law on State Secrets 1994 (Ukraine).

30 Roberts, A, ‘NATO's Security of Information Policy and the Right to Information’ in Campbell Public Affairs Institute (ed), National Security and Open Government: Striking the Right Balance (Maxwell School of Syracuse University 2003) 149Google Scholar, 150.

31 cf Law concerning Access to Information held by Administrative Organs 1999 (Japan).

32 Law No 17 of 2011. cf Public Information Disclosure Act 2008 (Indonesia).

33 Earlier attempts to enact this legislation were aborted due to resistance from human rights activists, Muslim community, and internal agency rivalries: International Crisis Group, ‘Indonesia: Debate over a New Intelligence Bill’ (Asia Briefing No 124, 12 July 2011) 1 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B124-indonesia-debate-over-a-new-intelligence-bill.aspx>.

34 Moran, C, Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain (CUP 2013) 24–5Google Scholar, 36 (explaining that although most historians understood that the decision was a response to the exigencies of national security at that time, framed on the belief that Britain would soon be at war with Germany, it was in fact designed to deter the unprincipled behaviour of the free commercial press); Robertson, K G, Public Secrets: A Study in the Development of Government Secrecy (Macmillan 1982) 58Google Scholar. Similarly in the US, see, Smith, JA, War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power (OUP 1999)Google Scholar.

35 Aitken, J, Officially Secret (Weidenfield and Nicholson 1971) 15Google Scholar. Aitkin himself was charged under section 2 of Official Secrets Act 1911 for passing on to the Sunday Telegraph a British diplomat's report about the UK Government's supply of arms to Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil War: R v Cairns, Aitken and Roberts (unreported), summarized in ‘No Duty in Law for Editor to Run to Whitehall, Secrets Case Judge Says’, The Times, 4 February 1971, 2

36 Hooper (n 13) 17–44; Supperstone, M, Brownlie's Law of Public Order and National Security (2nd edn, Butterworths 1981) 246–55Google Scholar; Williams, D, Not in the Public Interest: The Problem of Security in Democracy (Hutchinson 1965)Google Scholar ch 1.

37 For example, Security Service Act 1989 (UK), section 1(2); Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), section 4 (the definition of ‘security’). See also Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 76 (Brennan J observing that ‘[t]he secrecy of the work in an intelligence organisation which is to counter espionage, sabotage, etc is essential to national security’).

38 Johannesburg Principles (n 4), Principle 2 (which draws from the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4).

39 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2000] 3 All ER 778, para 35 (adopting the government's submission on this point).

40 ibid, para 39.

41 Human Rights in China, ‘China Sharpens Legal Weapon for Information Control’ (29 April 2010) <http://www.hrichina.org/content/394>.

42 PL 107–296, 116 Stat 2135, section 212(3)(A). Idris J of the Federal High Court of Nigeria adopted this description of national security information in Boniface Okezie v Attorney-General, Federal High Court of Nigeria, 22 February 2013 (Application No FHC/L/CS/514/2012).

43 In the UK, for example, terrorism is broadly defined as ‘the use or threat of action where… (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public’: Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) section 1(1), as amended by Terrorism Act 2006 (UK) section 34.

44 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153, 182.

45 The ‘control principle’, however, is not a principle of law, but merely a ‘convenient description of the understanding on which intelligence is shared confidentially’ between States: Mohamed v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2011] QB 218, 243 para 44. For the practice of intelligence sharing generally, see Chesterman, S, Shared Secrets: Intelligence and Collective Security (Lowy Institute for International Policy 2006) 19–28Google Scholar.

46 UK Secretary of State for Justice, ‘Justice and Security: Green Paper’, Cmnd 8194 (October 2011) 8 para 1.22; Curtin, D, ‘Digital Governance in the European Union: Freedom of Information Trumped by “Internal Security”’ in Campbell Public Affairs Institute (ed), National Security and Open Government: Striking the Right Balance (Maxwell School of Syracuse University 2003) 101Google Scholar, 108.

47 The government inquiry, established in the aftermath of the crisis, notes the difficulty to secure reliable information from the Algerian Government or through its own intelligence network: ‘Zai Algeria Houjin ni taisuru Tero Jiken no Taiou ni kansuru Kenshou Iinkai Kenshou Houkokusho [Report by the Committee of Inquiry concerning Terrorist Attacks against Japanese Nationals in Algeria]’ (28 February 2013) 4 <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/alg_terotaiou/kensahoukokusho20130228.pdf>. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe explained at a press conference that he relied upon the information provided by British Prime Minister David Cameron in handling the hostage crisis in Algeria: the full text of the press conference in Japanese available at <http://synodos.jp/politics/6431>.

48 See generally Chesterman, S, One Nation under Surveillance: A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom (OUP 2011)Google Scholar ch 1.

49 For ‘mosaic theory’, see Wells, CE, ‘CIA v Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude’ (2006) 58 AdminLRev 845Google Scholar; Pozen, DE, ‘The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act’ (2005) 115 YaleLJ 628Google Scholar. The ‘mosaic theory’, however, does not substitute the government's burden of proof required to justify detention of individuals: Farbi Saeed Bin Mohammed v Obama, 704 F Supp 2d 1, 7–8 (DDC, 2009).

50 United States v Marchetti, 466 F 2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir 1972). The position has remained the same even after the US Congress amended its Freedom of Information Act in 1974, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, with the aim to allow courts to conduct direct, de novo review of classified records despite the government's assertion of national security. See Pozen (n 49) 636–45; Fuchs, M, ‘Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy’ (2006) 58 AdminLRev 131Google Scholar, 156–68.

51 [1990] 1 AC 109, 269.

52 [2013] FCA 1303, para 31.

53 See eg Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB 1, in which the information sought to be protected could have been gleaned by a diligent and painstaking search through scientific literature, but nonetheless the defendant was restrained from misusing the information.

54 For example, one of the legal grounds for non-disclosure obligations in common law countries is the duty of confidence, which in principle does not extend to the protection of information which is available in the public domain: see Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 2 All ER 751, 754–755 (Lord Denning MR); Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415, 417 (Lord Denning MR). See also ‘Fair-Trial Issues in Criminal Cases Concerning Espionage or Divulging State Secrets’, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Res 1551 (2007) para 10.1.

55 For details of the relationship between the information technology revolution and national security, see Goldman, EO, ‘Introduction: Security in the Information Technology Age’ in Goldman, EO (ed), National Security in the Information Age (Frank Cass 2005) 1–2Google Scholar; Roberts, A, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (CUP 2006)Google Scholar ch 2.

56 See eg Heidi Hautala v Council of the European Union (Case C-353/99P) [2001] ECJ I-9594, para 29 (holding that ‘a refusal to grant partial access would be manifestly disproportionate’).

57 Pozen (n 49) 669–70.

58 In the US, Blanton observes that the introduction of the ‘critical infrastructure information exemption’ by the Homeland Security Act 2002 essentially gave companies that voluntarily share information with the government about the vulnerability of their infrastructure not only the guarantee of confidentiality, but also immunity from civil liability even if the information contained evidence of illegal conduct: Blanton, TS, ‘National Security and Open Government in the United States: Beyond the Balancing Test’ in Campbell Public Affairs Institute (ed), National Security and Open Government: Striking the Right Balance (Maxwell School of Syracuse University 2003) 33Google Scholar, 60. See also Chesterman, S, ‘“We Can't Spy … If We Can't Buy!”: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing “Inherently Governmental Functions”’ (2008) 19 EJIL 1055Google Scholar, 1060.

59 For example, Plaintiff B60 of 2012 (n 52) paras 25–39.

60 Stoll v Switzerland (n 23) 1299 para 54. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/32 (14 December 1994) para 48 (stating that ‘the right to freedom of expression and information can be restricted only in the most serious cases of a direct political or military threat to the entire nation’).

61 For discussion of different definitions of the ‘national security state’, see Ripsman, NM and Paul, TV, Globalization and the National Security State (OUP 2010) 10–11Google Scholar.

62 cf Pourgourides (n 9) paras 56–68.

63 Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia’ (Report 112, 2009) ch 3; Wadham, J, ‘National Security and Open Government in the United Kingdom’ in Campbell Public Affairs Institute (ed), National Security and Open Government: Striking the Right Balance (Maxwell School of Syracuse University 2003) 75Google Scholar, 84.

64 For an overview, see Kosar, KR, Classified Information Policy and Executive Order 13526 (Congressional Research Service 2010)Google Scholar.

65 For example, Data Secrecy Act 2007 (Croatia) arts 5, 11 and 13; Freedom of Information Law 1999 (Israel) section 14; Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information 2002 (Peru) art 15(a).

66 For example, Official Secrets Act 1923 (Bangladesh) section 5(1); Official Secrets Act 1940 (Brunei) section 5; Official Secrets Act 1923 (Myanmar/Burma) section 5(1); Official Secrets Act 1935 (Singapore) section 5(1); Official Secrets Act 1964 (Uganda) section 4(1); Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK) section 1.

67 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) section 79(1). With respect to other official information, government employees must not disclose information ‘if it is reasonably foreseeable that the disclosure could be prejudicial to the effective working of government, including the formulation or implementation of policies or programs’: Public Service Regulations 1999 (Cth) section 2.1(3). For discussion of the constitutional validity of this regulation, see R v Goreng Goreng (2008) 220 FCR 21, 30 (Refshauge J).

68 Act on Openness of Government Activities 1999 (Finland) section 23.

69 For discussion, see Vincent, D, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832–1998 (OUP 1998) 9–12Google Scholar; Sunstein, CR, ‘Government Control of Information’ (1986) 74 CLR 889CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 912–20.

70 For example, Law on Information Classified ‘State Secrets’ 1999 (Albania) arts 4 and 6; Special Secrecy Protection Act 2013 (Japan) art 3; Law on Protection of State Secrets 1994 (Kyrgyzstan) arts 5 and 14.

71 For example, Decree on Access to Public Information 2003 (Argentina) art 16; Law relating to Classification and Authorisation of Security 1998 (Belgium) arts 3 and 26 (excluding application of the Law relating to Public Access to Administrative Documents 1994); Classified Information Protection Act 2002 (Bulgaria) art 25; Freedom of Information Law 2013 (Côte d'Ivoire) art 9; Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Information 2004 (Ecuador) art 17; State Secrets Act 1999 (Estonia) sections 5–7; Law on Free Access to Administrative Documents 1978 (France) art 6; Law on State Secrets 1996 (Georgia) art 7; Free Access to Information Law 2008 (Guatemala) art 23(1); Organic Law on the Right to Access to Public Information 2010 (Guinea) art 16; Public Information Disclosure Act 2008 (Indonesia) art 17; Law on Access to Public Documents 2010 (Kosovo) art 12(1) and Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances 2010 (Kosovo) art 4(1); Law on Official Secrets 1996 (Latvia) section 4(2); Law on Access to Public Information 2007 (Nicaragua) art 15; Right to Information Act 2013 (Pakistan) section 8; Law on Transparency and Public Administration 2002 (Panama) art 14(1); Right of Access to Information Law 2012 (Yemen) art 24.

72 For example, Official Secrets Act 1972 (Malaysia) section 2; Law on Guarding State Secrets 1988 (PRC) section 8; Law on State Secrets 1993 (Russia) arts 4–5 and 9; Law on Protection of State Secrets 1995 (Turkmenistan) art 7; Ordinance on State Secrets Protection 2000 (Vietnam) arts 1 and 5–6.

73 For example, Law on State Secrets and Official Secrets 1999 (Lithuania) arts 4–5; Law on State Secrets 1994 (Moldova) arts 5 and 8; Law on State Secrets 1995 (Mongolia) arts 5–6 and 8; Act on the Protection of Classified Information 2004 (Slovakia) arts 1–2.

74 For example, Freedom of Information Act 2004 (Antigua and Barbuda) art 31; Freedom of Information Act 1994 (Belize) art 22(a); Access to Information Law 2011 (Brazil) art 23(I); Law on Access to Public Information 2008 (Chile) art 21(3); Law on Access to Public Information 2011 (El Salvador) art 19(b); Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information 2006 (Honduras) art 17; Access to Information Act 2002 (Jamaica) section 14; Law on Access to Public Information and Administrative Documents 2011 (Niger) art 13; Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance 2003 (Serbia) art 9(3); Freedom of Information Act 2003 (St Vincent and Grenadines) section 26(1)(a); Law on the Right to Information 2003 (Turkey) art 16; Law on Access to Public Information 2008 (Uruguay) art 9(a).

75 Right to Information Act 2005 (India) sections 8(1)(a) and (g).

76 Mendel, T, Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey (UNESCO 2008) 59Google Scholar.

77 Freedom of Information Act 2010 (Liberia) section 4.2; Law on Free Access to Information 2011 (Montenegro) art 9.

78 For example, Law on Access to Administrative Documents 2002 (Angola) art 5(1); Law on Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information 2008 (Ethiopia) art 23(1); Access to Information Law 2011 (Guyana) art 28; Law on Intelligence and Security Services 1977 (Italy) art 12; Official Information Act 1982 (New Zealand) section 6; Freedom of Information Act 2004 (Switzerland) art 7(c); Freedom of Information Act 1999 (Trinidad and Tobago) section 25; Access to Information Act 2005 (Uganda) section 32(1)(a). The New Zealand Court of Appeal interpreted ‘would be likely to’ as meaning no more than a distinct or significant possibility, given the seriousness of national security: Commissioner of Police v Ombudsman [1988] 1 NZLR 385, 65.

79 For example, Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) section 33; Freedom of Access to Information Act 2001 (Bosnia) art 6(a); Freedom of Information (Amendment) Act 2003 (Ireland) section 24(1); Freedom of Information Act 2008 (Malta) art 29; Right to Information Act 2013 (Sierra Leone) art 15; Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000 (South Africa) section 41(1). In Australia, the term ‘could reasonably be expected to’ has been interpreted as requiring less than a balance of probabilities but more than a reasonable possibility that the harm will occur: see Attorney-General's Department v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180, 190.

80 For example, Classified Information Protection Act 2002 (Bulgaria) art 25; Act on the Protection of Classified Information 2005 (Czech) sections 2–3; Federal Act Governing Access to Information Held by the Federal Government 2005 (Germany) section 3; Freedom of Information Law 1999 (Israel) section 9(1); Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law 1971 (Jordan) art 3; Federal Law on Transparency and Access to Government Public Information 2003 (Mexico) art 13(1); Government Information (Public Access) Act 1991 (Netherlands) section 10(1); Classified Information Protection Act 1999 (Poland) art 2(1); Law Relating to Access to Information 2013 (Rwanda) art 4(1); Classified Information Act 2001 (Slovenia) art 5; Decree on Access to Administrative Documents of Public Authorities, No 41 of 2011 (Tunisia) art 17; Law on Protection of State Secrets 1993 (Uzbekistan) art 3.

81 Official Information Act 1997 (Thailand) section 15.

82 For a similar finding, see Jacobsen (n 9) 7–8.

83 Official Secrets Act 1972 (Malaysia) section 2. Similarly, Classified Information Protection Act 2002 (Bulgaria) art 25; Access to Public Administration Files Act 1985 (Denmark) art 13(1); Law on Access to Public Information 2011 (El Salvador) art 19(b); Law on Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information 2008 (Ethiopia) art 23(1); Freedom of Information Act 1997 as amended in 2003 (Ireland) section 24; Law on Access to Public Documents 2010 (Kosovo) art 12(1); Freedom of Information Act 2010 (Liberia) section 4.2; Federal Law on Transparency and Access to Government Public Information 2003 (Mexico) art 13(1); Freedom of Information Act 2008 (Malta) art 29(1)(a); Law on Access to Public Information and Administrative Documents 2011 (Niger) art 13; Freedom of Information Act 2006 (Norway) section 21; Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance 2003 (Serbia) art 9(3); Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000 (South Africa) section 41(1)(a); Law on Transparency, Public Access to Information and Good Governance 2013 (Spain) art 14(1); Law on the Right to Information 2003 (Turkey) art 16.

84 Law on Guarding State Secrets 1988 (PRC) sections 8(2) and (6). It appears, however, that any of the different categories of official secrets can be seen to have the potential to cause different degrees of harm to state security according to section 9.

85 Law on Access to Public Information 2008 (Chile) art 21(3). Similarly, Access to Information Law 2011 (Brazil) art 23; Law on Free Access to Administrative Documents 1978 (France) art 6.

86 Classified Information Protection Act 2002 (Bulgaria) supplementary provisions, Item 13.

87 Law relating to Classification and Authorisation of Security 1998 (Belgium) art 26; Federal Act Governing Access to Information Held by the Federal Government 2005 (Germany) section 3(1); Data Protection Act 2002 (Liechtenstein) art 12(2); Federal Administrative Transparency Act 2004 (Switzerland) art 7(1)(c).

88 Chavez v Presidential Commission on Good Governance [1998] PHSC 762. See also Francisco I Chavez v Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation (2002) 433 Phil 506, 534.

89 For example, Official Information Act 1997 (Thailand), section 14(1); Public Information Disclosure Act 2008 (Indonesia) art 17; Right to Information Act 2005 (India) section 8(1)(a).

90 As discussed above in Section III.

91 For example, Law on State Secrets 1996 (Georgia) art 7(1); Law on State Secrets and Official Secrets 1999 (Lithuania) art 5; Law on State Secrets 1994 (Moldova) art 5.

92 Tshwane Principles (n 4) Principle 3(b).

93 Uhl, KE, ‘The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Public's Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security’ (2003) 53 AmULRev 261Google Scholar, 269–74. Under the Obama Administration information shall not be classified ‘unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security’: Executive Order 13526, 29 December 2009, section 1.4.

94 cf Minister of Energy, Water and Communication & Another v Malaysian Trade Union Congress and Others [2011] MLJU 1382 (Mohd Hishamudin Yunus JCA dissenting judgment arguing that ‘in order to qualify as an official secret under the OSA [Official Secrets Act], it must be proven that disclosure of the Audit Report is detrimental to national security or public interest’).

95 S Kenny, ‘Secrecy Provisions: Policy and Practice’ [2011] Federal Judicial Scholarship 10 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/FedJSchol/2011/10.html>; MacDonald, J and Jones, CH (eds), The Law of Freedom of Information (OUP 2003) 391–3Google Scholar; Griffith, J, ‘The Official Secrets Act 1989’ (1989) 16 J Law&Soc 273Google Scholar, 280.

96 Freedom of Information Act 2010 (Liberia) section 4.8(c).

97 Law on Access to Information 2000 (Moldova) art 7(4).

98 Law on Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information 2008 (Ethiopia) art 28; Freedom of Information Law 2011 (Nigeria) art 12(2); Law relating to Access to Information 2013 (Rwanda) art 6; Right to Information Law 2013 (Sierra Leone) art 12(2); Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000 (South Africa) section 46(b); Decree on Access to Administrative Documents of Public Authorities, No 41 of 2011 (Tunisia) art 18; Access to Information Act 2005 (Uganda) section 34.

99 Freedom of Access to Information Act 2001 (Bosnia) art 9; Act on the Right of Access to Information 2013 (Croatia) art 16 (however, with respect to the information classified in accordance with the Data Secrecy Act 2007, only upon consent of the Office of the National Security Council); Law on Free Access to Information of Public Character 2006 (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) art 6(3); Law on Access to Public Documents 2010 (Kosovo) art 12(2). See also Law on Access to Public Information 2011 (Ukraine) art 6(2) (incorporating a public interest balancing test as part of the prejudice-based protection requirements).

100 For example, Access to Information Law 2011 (Brazil) art 21; Law on Access to Public Information 2011 (El Salvador) art 19; Law on State Secrets 1996 (Georgia) art 8(1); Free Access to Information Law 2008 (Guatemala) art 24; Law on Official Secrets 1996 (Latvia) section 5(3); Federal Law on Transparency and Access to Government Public Information 2003 (Mexico) art 14; Law on State Secrets 1994 (Moldova) art 12(1)(a); Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000 (South Africa) section 46(a)(i); Decree on Access to Administrative Documents of Public Authorities, No 41 of 2011 (Tunisia) art 18; Law on Access to Public Information 2008 (Uruguay) art 12.

101 For example, Law on Information Classified ‘State Secret’ 1999 (Albania) art 10; Law on State Secrets 1996 (Georgia) art 8(4)(c); Access to Information Law 2011 (Guyana) art 38(a); Law on State Secrets 1994 (Moldova) art 12(1)(d); Law on Free Access to Information 2011 (Montenegro) art 10; Freedom of Information Act 2003 (St Vincent and Grenadines) section 35(a); Freedom of Information Act 1999 (Trinidad and Tobago) section 35(a).

102 For example, Law on State Secrets 1996 (Georgia) art 8(4)(b); Access to Information Law 2011 (Guyana) art 38(c); Law on Official Secrets 1996 (Latvia) section 5(2); Law on State Secrets 1994 (Moldova) art 12(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 2003 (St Vincent and Grenadines) section 35(c); Freedom of Information Act 1999 (Trinidad and Tobago) section 35(c); Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 2002 (Zimbabwe) art 28(1)(i).

103 For example, Law on State Secrets 1996 (Georgia) art 8(4)(b); Law on State Secrets 1994 (Moldova) art 12(1)(b); Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000 (South Africa) section 46(a)(ii); Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 2002 (Zimbabwe) art 28(1)(ii).

104 Law on Freedom of Information 2003 (Armenia) art 8(3); Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 2002 (Zimbabwe) art 28(1)(iii)&(iv).

105 Right to Information Act 2005 (India) section 8(2).

106 For a detailed analysis in the context of Singapore, see A Kwong, ‘A Duty to Communicate: The Public Interest Defence to Offences under Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act’ (1999) 20 SingLRev 177–238; C W Cheong, ‘Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act, Bridges and Beyond’ (1998) SJLS 260–98. In the UK, the new Official Secrets Act 1989 replaced section 2 of the 1911 Act with a series of more specific offences, many of which incorporate a harm test.

107 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) section 79; Official Secrets Act 1923 (as amended in Bangladesh) section 5; Official Secrets Act 1940 (Brunei) section 5; Official Secrets Act 1923 (India) section 5; Official Secrets Act 1963 (Ireland) section 13 and Freedom of Information (Amendment) Act 2003 (Ireland) section 48; Official Secrets Act 1972 (Malaysia) section 8; Official Secrets Act 1923 (Myanmar/Burma) section 5; Official Secrets Act 1935 (Singapore) sections 5 and 17; Official Secrets Act 1955 (Sri Lanka) sections 7–9; Official Secrets Act 1964 (Uganda) section 4; Official Secrets Act 1970 (Zimbabwe) art 4.

108 Espionage Act 1917 (US) 18 US Code section 798.

109 Criminal Code 1995 (Albania) art 295. Similarly, Law on State Secrets and Official Secrets 1999 (Lithuania) art 15; Criminal Code 2005 (Slovakia) arts 319–320; Criminal Code 1937 (Switzerland) art 293.

110 State Intelligence Act 2011 (Indonesia) arts 44 and 45.

111 For example, Leigh, I, ‘Indonesian Draft Legislation on State Secrets’ in Fluri, P (ed), The Indonesian Draft State Secrecy Law: Four International Perspectives (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2010) 1Google Scholar, 2.

112 For example, Human Rights Watch, ‘Indonesia: Repeal New Intelligence Law’ (26 October 2011) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/26/indonesia-repeal-new-intelligence-law>; D Banisar, ‘Comments on Legal Regulations on Access to Information and State Secrets in Albania’, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, April 2006, available at <http://www.osce.org/fom/18934>.

113 For example, A Bailin, ‘The Last Cold War Statute’ [2008] Crim LR 625, 627 (discussing the ‘defence of necessity’).

114 K K Sarin v Meenakshi Datta Ghosh and Another [1978] ILR (Delhi) 178, para 17. Note that the decision was handed down long before the Right to Information Act 2005 (India) established a prejudice-based approach to State secrets protection.

115 For example, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) section 70; Criminal Code 1992 (Estonia) section 73; Criminal Code 1889 (Finland) ch 38 section 1 (as amended by Law No 578/1995) and ch 40 section 5 (as amended by Law No 604/2002); Organic Law on the Right of Access to Public Information 2010 (Guinea) arts 22–23; Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances 2010 (Kosovo) art 50; Criminal Code 1998 (Kyrgyzstan) art 300; Law on Official Secrets 1996 (Latvia) section 15; Criminal Code 1996 (Russia) art 283; Criminal Code 1995 (Spain) art 199(2); Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK) section 1.

116 For example, Access to Information Law 2011 (Brazil) art 34; Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information 2004 (Ecuador) art 18; Law on Access to Public Information 2011 (El Salvador) arts 76–77; Law on Free Access to Information of Public Character 2006 (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) art 40; Free Access to Information Law 2008 (Guatemala) art 67; Access to Information Law 2011 (Guyana) art 50; Freedom of Information Act 2010 (Liberia) section 7.1; Federal Law on Transparency and Access to Government Public Information 2003 (Mexico) art 63; Law on Free Access to Information 2011 (Montenegro) art 27; Law on Access to Public Information 2007 (Nicaragua) art 47; Decree on Access to Administrative Documents of Public Authorities, No 41 of 2011 (Tunisia) art 20; Law on Access to Public Information 2008 (Uruguay) art 31.

117 Law on State Secrets 1996 (Georgia) art 38(3).

118 Law on Access to Information 2003 (Turkey) art 29.

119 Criminal Code 2005 (Serbia) art 316.

120 Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, Act No 3815 (the Philippines) art 229.

121 Law on Guarding State Secrets 1988 (PRC) art 31 (punishable with imprisonment of not more than 7 years, criminal detention or deprivation of political rights: Criminal Law 1979 (PRC) art 186).

122 Ordinance on State Secrets Protection 2000 (Vietnam) art 20.

123 cf Kiss, A, ‘Permissible Limitation on Rights’ in Henkin, L (ed), The International Bill of Rights (Columbia University Press 1981) 290Google Scholar, 296–7 (arguing that ‘[r]estrictions on human rights can be imposed under this concept only if the interest of the whole nation is at stake. This excludes restrictions in the sole interest of a government, regime or power group’).

124 Criminal Code 1930 (Denmark) art 152.

125 Official Information Act 1997 (Thailand) section 20.

126 Law on Access to Public Information and Administrative Documents 2011 (Niger) art 33. Similarly, Freedom of Information Act 2004 (Antigua and Barbuda) art 47(1).

127 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) sections 10, 26 and 29.

128 Law on Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information 2008 (Ethiopia) art 39(2); Law on Access to Information 2000 (Moldova) art 7(5); Ordinance on Access to Public Information and Administrative Documents 2011 (Niger) art 33; Freedom of Information Law 2011 (Nigeria) section 28(2); Law relating to Access to Information 2013 (Rwanda) art 16; Protected Disclosures Act 2000 (South Africa) section 9; Right to Information Law 2013 (Sierra Leone) section 50; Law on Access to Public Information 2011 (Ukraine) art 11(1); Whistleblowers Protection Act 2010 (Uganda) section 2.

129 Security of Information Act 1985 (Canada) sections 16–18 (offences in respect of safeguarded information to a foreign entity or to a terrorist group); Employment Rights Act 1996 (UK) section 193.

130 Griffith (n 95) 282–3.

131 Cram, I, Terror and the War on Dissent (Springer 2009) 148Google Scholar; Thomas, RM, ‘The British Official Secrets Act 1911–1939 and the Ponting Case’ [1986] CrimLR 491, 507Google Scholar.

132 UK Home Office, ‘Departmental Committee on Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911’, Cmnd 5104 (September 1972) vol 1, para 145(d).

133 ibid para 255.

134 Edwards, JLlJ, ‘The Integrity of Criminal Prosecutions: Watergate Echoes beyond the Shores of the United States’ in Glazebrook, PR (ed), Reshaping the Criminal Law (Stevens & Sons, London, 1978) 364Google Scholar, 377–80.

135 Vladeck, I, ‘Is “National Security Law” Inherently Paradoxical?’ (2011) 1 National Security Law Brief 11Google Scholar, 13–14.

136 See eg Birkinshaw, P, ‘Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human Rights?’ (2006) 58 AdminLRev 177Google Scholar, 194–6; Sedley, S, ‘Information as Human Rights’ in Beatson, J and Cripps, Y (eds), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information: Essays in honour of Sir David Williams (OUP 2000) 239Google Scholar; Marsh, NS, ‘Access to Government-Held Information: An Introduction’ in Marsh, NS (ed), Public Access to Government-Held Information (Stevens & Sons 1987) 1Google Scholar, 2–5; Cox, A, Freedom of Expression (Harvard University Press 1981) 3Google Scholar.

137 (1997) 148 DLR (4th) 385, 403. See also Brümmer v Minister for Social Development (n 20) para 62; Claude-Reyes et al v Chile, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 September 2006, Series C No 151, para 86; Handyside v United Kingdom (n 21) 754 para 49; S P Gupta v Union of India (1982) 2 SCR 365, 598 (Supreme Court of India).

138 See text (n 20).

139 cf Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2003) 204 ALR 119, 144–6 (discussing the common law duty of loyalty and fidelity to the Commonwealth); Osborne v Canada [1991] 2 SCR 69, 97–101 (Sopinka J), 108–109 (Stevenson J) (discussing the extent to which precepts of loyalty, neutrality and impartiality justify restrictions on public servants exercising freedom of expression). For discussion, see D Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd edn, OUP 2002) 794–5.

140 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 19.

141 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953) art 10(2).

142 American Convention on Human Rights, adopted 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 143 (entered into force 18 July 1978) arts 13(1) and (2). See also Access to Public Information: Strengthening Democracy, OAS Res 2252 (6 June 2006); Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, adopted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 108th reg sess, 19 October 2000 <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=26&lID=1>.

143 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, adopted 18 November 2012, Phnom Penh, para 23 <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/asean-human-rights-declaration>.

144 ibid para 8.

145 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217 (entered into force 21 October 1986) art 27.

146 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 19 September 2006, Series C No 151, para 94. Chile subsequently enacted the Law on Access to Public Information in 2008.

147 For example, Youth Initiative for Human Rights v Serbia (Appl No 48135/06) [2013] ECHR 584, paras 25–26; Kenedi v Hungary (Appl No 31475/05) [2009] ECHR 786, para 44; Rekvényi v Hungary (2000) 30 EHRR 519, 553–4, para 59; Leander v Sweden (n 23) 450 paras 50–51.

148 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 34, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (12 September 2011) para 30. See also American Convention on Human Rights (n 142) art 13(3).

149 For example, Lingens v Austria (n 21) 418 para 39; Handyside v United Kingdom (n 21) 753–754 para 48; Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979–80) 2 EHRR 245, 275 para 59.

150 For example, Grinberg v Russia [2006] 43 EHRR 45, 1001 para 27; Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2005) 41 EHRR 22, 433 para 87; Hertel v Switzerland (1999) 28 EHRR 534, 570–571 para 46; Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1, 15–6, para 31.

151 Human Rights Committee (n 148) para 34. See also, Leander v Sweden (n 23) 452 para 58; Lingens v Austria (n 21) 418 para 40.

152 A non-governmental organization dedicated to the promotion of the freedom of information, ARTICLE 19, has also proposed a similar interpretation of this requirement in a three-pronged test: (i) the information must be related to a legitimate aim listed in the law; (ii) disclosure must threaten to cause substantial harm to that aim; and (iii) the harm to the aim must be greater than the public interest in having the information. See ARTICLE 19, ‘Limitations’ <http://www.article19.org/pages/en/limitations.html>.

153 F La Rue, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’, UN Doc A/HRC/14/23 (20 April 2010) para 79(g). See also Tshwane Principles (n 4) Principle 3(b).

154 Leander v Sweden (n 23) 452 para 59.

155 Dworkin, R, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press 1985) 387–9Google Scholar.

156 For discussion, see especially, Waldron, J, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ (2003) 11 Journal of Political Philosophy 191Google Scholar, 198.

157 Guja v Moldova (2011) 53 EHRR 16, 551 para 72.

158 Guja v Moldova (n 157) para 74. See also Stoll v Switzerland (n 23) 1284, 1309; Fressoz and Roire v France (2001) 31 EHRR 2, 59 para 52.

159 In common law countries at least, government employees are under a lifelong equitable duty of confidence owed to the government: see eg Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 (HL), 264 (Lord Keith), 265 (Lord Brightman), 271 (Lord Griffiths), 284 (Lord Goff); Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39, 50–51 (Mason J). See also Feldman (n 139) 881–4.

160 See eg Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (House of Lords), 287 (Lord Nicholls). cf GB Lee, ‘The President's Secrets’ (2008) 76 GeoWashLRev 197, 213–42.

161 The Court only held that ‘the public interest in having information about undue pressure and wrongdoing within the Prosecutor's Office revealed is so important in a democratic society that it outweighed the interest in maintaining public confidence in the Prosecutor General's Office’: Guja v Moldova (n 157) para 91. For a critical view on the judiciary's ability to weigh competing public interests, see Henkin, L, ‘The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers’ (1971) 120 UPaLRev 271Google Scholar, 272–3 and 279.

162 In Bucur and Toma v Romania, the European Court of Human Rights simply noted that the Romanian Government did not invoke the existence of a considerable prejudice to the national interest and similarly held that ‘la Cour considère que l'intérêt général à la divulgation d'informations faisant état d'agissements illicites au sein du SRI [Serviciul Român de Informaţii] est si important dans une société démocratique qu'il l'emporte sur l'intérêt qu'il y a à maintenir la confiance du public dans cette institution’: (Appl No 40238/02) [2013] ECHR 14, paras 114–115.

163 Guja v Moldova (n 157) para 73. The same position was adopted in Heinsch v Germany (2014) 58 EHRR 31, 883 para 65.

164 Shayler (n 23) 270–4 paras 27–34 (Lord Bingham), 288 para 85 (Lord Hope), 294–6 paras 99–107 (Lord Hutton).

165 Compare Guja v Moldova (n 157) paras 80–84; with Shayler (n 23) 270–274 (Lord Bingham).

166 Shayler (n 23) 295.

167 (1979–80) 2 EHRR 214.

168 ibid 236–7 para 59.

169 Guja v Moldova (n 157) paras 85–88 and 90–91. The Court merely observed that ‘it cannot be excluded that the effect of the note [a letter by the Deputy Speaker of Parliament] was to put pressure on the Prosecutor General's Office’: ibid para 86.

170 The Law on Access to Information 2000 of Moldova provides in art 7(5) that ‘[n]o one can be punished … if releasing this information does not damage or cannot damage legitimate interests related to national security, or if the public interest for knowing the information is larger than the damage that can result from its dissemination’. However, this clause was not relied upon or discussed by the Court in Guja v Moldova (n 157).

171 Eastern Division of the High Court of Denmark, 23 September 2005 <http://fe-ddis.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/FE/Nyhedsarkiv/OSTRE_LANDSRET_PRESSEMEDDELELSE.pdf>. (Grevil was convicted of disclosing confidential information without authorization).

172 Copenhagen City Court, 4 December 2006, unofficial English translation available at <http://www.psw.ugent.be/cms_global/uploads/publicaties/dv/CPH.Court.4.12.BerlingskeTidendeversie.doc> (acquitting the journalists involved).

173 See Section IVA.

174 Commissioner Jose T Almonte and Others v Conrado M Vasquez and Concerned Citizens, Supreme Court of the Philippines, 23 May 1995 <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/may1995/gr_95367_1995.html>.

175 Freedom of Information Act 1994 (Belize) art 22(2); Proclamation on Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information 2008 (Ethiopia) art 35; Freedom of Information (Amendment) Act 2003 (Ireland) section 25(1)(a)(ii); Access to Information Act 2002 (Jamaica) section 23; Official Secrets Act 1972 (Malaysia) section 16A; Official Information Act 1982 (New Zealand) sections 6 and 7; Freedom of Information Act 2003 (St Vincent and Grenadines) section 10(2); Freedom of Information Act 1999 (Trinidad and Tobago) section 25(3); Freedom of Information Act 2001 (UK) section 24.

176 See eg C Bell, The Freedom of Security: Governing Canada in the Age of Counter-Terrorism (University of British Columbia Press 2011) ch 2.

177 Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 (Canada) sections 87, 103–4.

178 See text (nn 100–103).

179 See generally Esparza, M, Huttenbach, H R and Feierstein, D (eds), State Violence and Genocide in Latin America: The Cold War Years (Routledge 2010)Google Scholar; Cardenas, S, Human Rights in Latin America: A Politics of Terror and Hope (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

180 For example, Gomes Lund and Others v Brazil, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 24 November 2010, Series C No 219, para 202; Tiu Tojin v Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 26 November 2008, Series C No 190, para 77; Myrna Mack Chang v Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 25 November 2003, Series C, No 101, para 180.

181 For a discussion of the right to truth, see especially Davis, J, Seeking Human Rights Justice in Latin America: Truth, Extra-Territorial Courts, and the Process of Justice (CUP 2014)Google Scholar ch 4.

182 La Rue (n 153) para 57.

183 Fuchs (n 50) 136–7. See also Pozen, DE, ‘Deep Secrecy’ (2010) 62 StanLRev 257Google Scholar, 278–9.

184 For explanation of various barriers to effective accountability, see Chesterman (n 48) 78–82.

185 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN Doc A/67/275 (9 August 2012) para 110.

186 Wolfers, A, ‘“National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol’ (1952) 67 Political Science Quarterly 481CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 488.

187 Chevigny, PG, ‘Information, the Executive and the Politics of Information’ in Shetreet, S (ed), Free Speech and National Security (Martinus Nijhoff 1990) 130Google Scholar, 138.

188 Kitrosser, H, ‘Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited’ (2007) 92 IowaLRev 489Google Scholar, 539–40; Anonymous, ‘Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts, and National Security Information’ (1990) 103 HarvLRev 906Google Scholar.

189 cf Cohen, SA, ‘Freedom of Information and the Official Secrets Act’ in McCamus, JD (ed), Freedom of Information: Canadian Perspectives (Butterworths 1981) 152Google Scholar, 157.

190 D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1977] 1 All ER 589, 608–609.

191 Centre for International Environmental Law v Office of the US Trade Representative, 718 F 3d 899 (DC Cir, 2013); Meredith Larson v Department of State (n 23) 865; Leghaei v Director General of Security (2007) 241 ALR 141, 147 (Brennan CJ); A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68 (House of Lords), 128 (Lord Nicholls).

192 The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77, 107 (Lord Parker).

193 Datuk Haji Dzulkifli bin Datuk Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 112, 112 (Salleh Abbas FJ), cited with approval in See Kok Kol @ See Liong Eng v Chong Kui Seng and Others [2009] MLJU 1098, para 15; Minister of Energy, Water and Communication & Anor v Malaysian Trade Union Congress & Others [2013] 1 MLJ 61, 76–77 (Zaleha Zahari JCA).

194 [1985] AC 374, 412.

195 Attorney-General v Guardian (No 2) (n 159) 220.

196 Chandler v Director of Public Prosecution [1964] AC 763, 811 (Lord Devlin).

197 See text (nn 74–81).

198 Setty, S, ‘Formalism and State Secrets’ in Cole, D, Febbrini, F and Vedaschi, A (eds), Secrecy, National Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 57Google Scholar, 69–70.

199 Nurbek Toktakunov v Krygyzstan (n 20) para 7.7.

200 BverfG, Case No 2 BvE 3/07, 17 June 2009, 124 BVerfGE 78, 134 (in relation to the constitutional right of Parliament to investigate and obtain information); Ministry of Defense v Gisha Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Supreme Court of Israel, 19 December 2011, para 28; Advisory Opinion, Constitutional Court of Guatemala, 8 March 2005 (No 2819–2004).

201 (1980) 147 CLR 39, 52; followed by majority in Attorney-General (United Kingdom) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30, 45.

202 [1990] 1 AC 109, 258 (Lord Keith), 267 (Lord Brightman), 270 (Lord Griffiths), 283 (Lord Goff).

203 Commonwealth v Fairfax (n 159) 52; Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] 1 QB 752, 765 (Lord Widgery CJ).

204 See Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Intelligence Services [2008] ZACC 6, para 55 (Constitutional Court of South Africa).

205 For example, Center for National Security Studies v US Department of Justice, 331 F 3d 918, 932 (DC Cir, 2003); North Jersey Media Group, Inc v Ashcroft, 308 F 3d 198, 219 (3rd Cir, 2002).

206 Pozen (n 49) 664–6.

207 Center for National Security Studies v US Department of Justice (n 205) 951 (Tatel J dissenting); Detroit Free Press v Ashcroft, 303 F 3d 681, 708–709 (6th Cir, 2002). For discussion, see Pozen (n 49) 658–63; K Anderson, ‘Is There Still a “Sound Legal Basis”?: The Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World’ (2003) 64 OhioStLJ 1605, 1628–46.

208 See eg Stoll v Switzerland (n 23) 1306–1307 para 101; Guja v Moldova (n 157) 550 para 69; Grinberg v Russia (n 150) 1001 para 27; Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (n 150) 433–434 para 87; Hertel v Switzerland (n 150) 570–571 para 46; cf Jersild v Denmark (n 150) 14 para 30 (although this case is cited as the first authority for this position, there is no mention of ‘an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts’ in this judgment).

209 Leander v Sweden (n 23) 454–455 para 65.

210 Morrison, JNL, ‘Political Supervision of Intelligence Services in the United Kingdom’ in Tsang, S (ed), Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism (Stanford University Press 2008) 41Google Scholar, 49–51; Kitrosser, H, ‘Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels’ (2008) 29 CardozoLRev 1049Google Scholar; Koh, HH, The National Security Constitution (Yale University Press 1990) 163–4Google Scholar.

211 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The Decision to Go to War in Iraq’, Ninth Report of Session 2002–03, HC 813-I, vol 1 (3 July 2003) 49. The Intelligence and Security Committee itself subsequently published its own inquiry report with a narrow focus on the adequacy of intelligence material used: Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments’ Cmnd 5972 (9 September 2003).

212 White, ND, Democracy Goes to War: British Military Deployments under International Law (OUP 2009) 280Google Scholar.

213 For a brief discussion on the role and limitation of the Independent Reviewer of Adverse Security Assessments in the context of immigration status determination in Australia, see Saul, B, ‘Security and Fairness in Australian Public Law’ in Gloves, M (ed), Modern Administrative Law in Australia: Concepts and Context (CUP 2014) 93Google Scholar, 102.

214 Schulhofer, S, ‘Oversight of National Security Secrecy in the United States’ in Cole, D, Febbrini, F and Vedaschi, A (eds), Secrecy, National Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 22, 27–8Google Scholar.

215 Lord Hutton, ‘Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G.’, HC 247 (28 January 2004).

216 ‘Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, HC 898 (14 July 2004) 93–117.

217 For an analysis of these inquiry reports, see, Aldrich, RJ, ‘Whitehall and the Iraq War: The UK's Four Intelligence Inquiries’ (2005) 16 Irish Studies in International Affairs 73Google Scholar. Another Committee of Privy Counsellors was established in 2009, led by Sir John Chilcot, with broad terms of reference which then-UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown described as ‘unprecedented’ and with access to all the information held by the government in relation to the military action in Iraq and its aftermath to the end of July 2009. As of February 2015, this Iraq Inquiry is still in progress and its impact upon the legal protection of State secrets on national security grounds remains to be seen. See its website at <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk>.

218 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, ‘Report to the President of the United States’ (31 March 2005) 157–196 <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf>.

219 New York Times Co v United States, 403 US 713, 728 (1971).