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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 January 2008
The Commission resigned on 16th March 1999 shortly after the publication of the First Report of the Committee of Independent Experts.1 The Committee had been created by common agreement between the European Parliament and the Commission in order to address the persistent allegations of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism levelled at the Commission.2 The First Report investigated allegations of fraud against individual commissioners and the Commission as a whole.3 Although most of the allegations of fraud against individual commissioners were discarded as unfounded, the Committee held the Commission responsible for a series of mismanagement, administrative irregularities and a general failure to oversee the work it had contracted out.4 The conclusions of the report were damning and it became clear that resignation of the whole Commission was the only way forward. The events came at an all-time low for the Commission and will have lasting effects on the institution and its legitimacy.
This section covers at half-yearly intervals developments during the preceding two to three years in selected fields of the law of the European Union.
1. “First Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission”, 15 March 1999.
2. See the European Parliament's resolution “on improving the financial management of the Commission”, 14 Feb. 1999.
3. The European Parliament's Conference of Presidents specified the Terms of Reference of the Committee in a note adopted on 27 Jan.1999 (see point 6 § 1 & 2): “The first report could seek to establish to what extent the Commission, as a body, or Commissioners individually, bear specific responsibility for the recent examples of fraud, mismanagement or nepotism raised in parliamentary discussions, or in the allegations which have arisen from those discussions”.
4. The granting by Commissioner Cresson to a friend, Mr Berthelot, of two research contracts was found to be highly irregular and a clear example of favouritism, see pp. 123–130.
5. “Second report on Reform of the Commission, Analysis of Current Practice and Proposals for Tackling Mismanagement, Irregularities and Fraud”, 10 Sept. 1999.
6. A number of codes of conduct were also adopted, see for instance: the “code of conduct for Commissioners” and the “code of good administrative behaviour for staff of the European Commission in their relations with the public”.
7. See the Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union, which was attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam.
8. Presidency conclusions for the Cologne European Council were delivered on 3 and 4 June 1999.
9. The issue of closer co-operation was added at the Fiera European Council, 19–20 June 2000.
10. One might rightly wonder why there was such an attachment to the number 27. After all national Governments are much larger by comparison. The grading of portfolios and positions (by creating sub-commissioners for instance) might have offered another solution to this problem.
11. An agreement on the other Commissioners must still be reached between the Council and the nominee for President.
12. The choice of President has proved to be a problem before, at a time when the Union was much smaller. If this system had been in place at the time of the appointment of the 1995 Commission, Jean-Luc Dehaene would certainly have become President instead of Jacques Santerre.
13. If any problems arise as they have in the recent past, the President will have the necessary powers to tackle them.
14. This is at variance with the present model, which holds the Commission collectively responsible.
15. For instance, the number of MEPs for the Czech Republic, 20, is much too small (see by comparison the number of Belgium MEPs).
16. Mainly France, because of the weight Germany would have in future Council negotiations.
17. The system is so complex that it will be necessary to use computer programmes during Council meetings to determine whether the thresholds are met.
18. See Arnull, “Size matters” (2001) 26 E.L.Rev. 1.Google Scholar
19. See the following table for the distribution of the new total of 345 votes:
20. These figures will be adjusted with the various accessions but the percentage of votes will never exceed 73.4%. When all the candidate countries have acceded, the threshold will be 255 with a blocking minority of 91.
21. The German delegation was responsible for this extra requirement.
22. The Treaty of Nice extended co-decision to seven provisions which will also now be subject to qualified majority (see Articles 13, 62, 63, 65, 157, 159,191 EC).
23. For instance, Articles 100, 111(4), 123(4), 133(4) & (5), 161 EC etc.
24. The Commission was particularly dissatisfied with the results of the negotiations. It had wanted to simplify the decision-making process as a whole and had made appropriate recommendations: disappearance of the co-operation procedure, pairing of the co-decision procedure with qualified majority voting (see the new Article 18 EC), entire policies moving to qualified majority voting.
25. An exception is made for co-ordination of social security: Article 42 EC retains unanimity.
26. See the negotiations and adoption of the Schengen agreements.
27. It cannot deal with matters which have military or defence implications however.
28. Former President of the European Court of Justice.
29. See “The contribution by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance to the Intergovernmental Conference”.
30. However, a number of conditions are set up in Article 225 EC.
31. Staff cases will certainly be moved to a judicial panel.
32. Or on appeal on point of fact if it is provided for in the decision establishing the panel.
33. Editor's note, see also the contribution of Betten on the Charter in this issue.
34. Member States have been particularly concerned with human rights in view of the enlargement to the candidate countries and the events which took place in Austria. Again for this reason, the Treaty of Nice amended Article 7 TEU to create a mechanism to prevent infringements of fundamental rights.
35. See the Declaration on the Future of the Union; it calls for another IGC in 2004.
36. See C–173/99 opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, 8 Feb. 2001, concerning the working time directive.
37. See European University Institute/Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies A Basic Treaty for the European Union—A study of the reorganisation of the Treaties, Report submitted on 15 May 2000 to Mr Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission.
38. See European University Institute/Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Reforming the Treaties' Amendment Procedures, second Report on the reorganisation of the European Union Treaties submitted on 31 July 2000 to the European Commission.
39. The delimitations of power between the Union and the Member States, the status of the Charter on fundamental rights, the simplification of the Treaties and the role of national Parliaments are important constitutional issues not only for the European Union, but also for national constitutions.