No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 January 2008
Article N of the Treaty on European Union (TEU ) called for an intergovernmental conference (IGC) in 1996 to reform the articles of the Treaty for which a revision is provided. Also, it was felt that the institutional question should be addressed before the next wave of enlargement; the institutional structure which was adopted to deal with six member States could hardly be stretched further to include the Eastern European applicant States. A complete re-engineering of the institutional framework was required. Furthermore, the reform of the institutions should tend to increase democracy in the Union.
1. The Amsterdam Treaty failed to address major issues such as the weighting of Council votes, the number of commissioners, etc. (but see the “Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union”).
2. The Schengen acquis comprises all decisions and declarations previously taken under the Schengen Agreement (which provides for the removal of all frontier controls on movements of persons).
3. Not only is there an issue of accountability as the European Parliament was not involved in these decisions, but the Treaty creates an objectionable fiction that all acquis was enacted either under the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty or under Title VI TEU.
4. With the exception of provisions concerning monetary union; it was felt that negotiations in this area should not be reopened for fear of unpicking it entirely.
5. E.g. co-decision is used in some new measures (Arts.255, 280 EC etc.) and replaces other procedures in existing provisions (Arts.12,71(1), 80, 175(1), 179 EC etc.). However, it has been argued that it has not gone far enough, because, for instance, some existing provisions (see Art.37 EC—agricultural policy) and some new measures (see Art.11 EC—closer co-operation) use the consultation procedure.
6. In practice, the time lapse had been exploited by all institutions in order to conduct further informal negotiations prior to conciliation committee meetings. As a result, the new drafting has recognised that a certain leeway was necessary and a period of six weeks has been allowed between the Council's rejection of the Parliament's amendments and the convening of the conciliation committee.
7. See also new Art.219 EC, which mentions that the Commission “works under the political guidance of its President”.
8. See Art.189 EC.
9. This was suggested by the European Parliament itself in its report to the IGC.
10. The European Parliament adopted a resolution in 1993 containing a uniform electoral procedure. The procedure, however, needed to be agreed to by a unanimous vote of the Council, which was never obtained.
11. Most of these changes are due to the extension of the co-decision procedure (however, see also Art.166(1) EC-adoption of research framework programme).
12. For instance, Art.172 EC (joint undertakings for research and technological development), Arts.128(2) and 129 EC—some social policy provisions.
13. This form of qualified majority voting is used in three cases: Art.11(2) EC (authorisation of closer co-operation), Art.40(2) TEU (closer co-operation in police and justice matters), Art.23(2) TEU (implementing measures for the common security and foreign policy).
14. See Art.207(3) EC.
15. The presidency indicates only that “the necessary majority is given”. It is impossible therefore to trace the vote of individual member States.
16. Still, the ECJ will have jurisdiction to deal with such issue.