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Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance of Differentiated Responsibilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Duncan French
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The protection of the global environment has become one of the central objectives of the international community in recent decades. Issues such as climate change, the depletion of the ozone layer, and the loss of the biological diversity has resulted in a growing international awareness of the problems facing the planet. Moreover, there is also recognition that States will need to act more collaboratively at the international level if effective solutions are to be found to these problems. However, concurrently there is also recognition that many States have pressing socio-economic concerns of their own, and that they have neither the resources nor the capabilities with which to devote to such global issues—so called “developing” States. This article examines the response of international environmental law to these two, potentially opposing, trends, viz., the need for universalism, on the one hand, and sensitivity to the needs of developing States, on the other. In particular, the article will examine the emerging legal principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, as well as discussing the various means of operationalising it. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, there is still much debate as to the conceptual basis of this principle—leading one to question its real aim. Is it to contribute to a fairer world system in which developed States recognise their historical responsibility for past environmental damage, or is it simply an expedient means of ensuring the participation of developing States in what are primarily Northern concerns?

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Articles
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International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , January 2000 , pp. 35 - 60
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Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2000

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References

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37. Art.21 1994 Desertification Convention. The Financial Mechanisms under the Climate Change, Biodiversity and Desertification Conventions are all partly administered by the restructured GEF.

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44. Art.19.1 1994 Desertification Convention.

45. Emphasis added.

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55. Cf. the 1994 Sulphur Protocol has tried to differentiate not only on each State's contribution to the problem, but also the assimilative capacity of the receiving environment.

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65. Interestingly, the States of Nauru, Tuvalu and Kiribati issued identical statements to the 1992 Climate Change Convention declaring that it was their “understanding that signature of the convention shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any rights under international law concerning state responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change, and that no provisions in the convention can be interpreted as derogating from the principles of general international law”; see Sands, op. cit. supra nn.206, 275.

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67. Twenty-first preambular paragraph, 1992 Climate Change Convention. Hurrell and Kingsbury, op. cit. supra nn.53, 39: “rich countries [must]… provide assistance to the South to cover costs of specific measures to tackle global environmental threats sq that resources are not diverted from development”.

68. UN Doc E/CN.17/1997/8: Report of the Secretary-General: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Application and Implementation (10 Feb. 1997), para.40. See also Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration: “States shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries”.

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73. Third preambular paragraph, Rio Declaration.

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75. 1995 Report of the Expert Group on Identification of Principles of International Law for Sustainable Development, para.77.

76. Vasciannie, op. cit. supra nn.58, 25: “the interdependence of States in the international community has generated strong pressures on developed countries to assume responsibility for their developing counterparts”.

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