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THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND THE LIMITS OF WITHDRAWAL

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2019

Campbell McLachlan
Campbell McLachlan*
Affiliation:
QC; Professor of Law, Victoria University of Wellington; Associé, Institut de Droit International; Senior Research Fellow, KFG ‘International Rule of Law: Rise or Decline?’ Berlin 2019.
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Abstract

Withdrawal from international adjudication is a contemporary phenomenon with wide implications. The act of treaty withdrawal is not to be seen as merely the unilateral executive exercise of the individual sovereign prerogative of a State. International law places checks upon the exercise of withdrawal, recognising that it is an act that of its nature affects the interests of other States parties, which have a collective interest in constraining withdrawal. National courts have a complementary function in restraining unilateral withdrawal in order to support the domestic constitution. The arguments advanced against international adjudication in the name of popular democracy at the national level can serve as a cloak for the exercise of executive power unrestrained by law. The submission by States to peaceful settlement of disputes through international adjudication is central, not incidental, to the successful operation of the international legal system.

Keywords

international adjudicationarbitrationinternational courts and tribunalstreaty withdrawalpublic international lawforeign relations lawVCLTBrexitECtHRICC
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 68 , Issue 3 , July 2019 , pp. 499 - 537
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2019 

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Footnotes

The author is a member of the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators on the nomination of New Zealand. Earlier versions of this paper were given as the KFG Tom Franck lecture at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin in June 2017 and at the Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law in Wellington in June 2018. The author thanks Helmut Aust, Eirik Bjorge, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, James Crawford, Felix Lange, Geun-Kwan Lee, Georg Nolte, Guy Sinclair and Andreas Zimmermann for comments on earlier drafts and Julian Kulaga for research assistance in the preparation of this article for publication. Any errors are the author's sole responsibility.

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69 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as amended and renamed by the Treaty of Lisbon (signed 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009), arts 3(1), 206 and 207 (Treaty of Lisbon).

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81 ‘United States Blocks Reappointment of WTO Appellate Body Member’ (2016) 110 AJIL 573; WTO Secretariat's Information and External Relations Division, WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Summary of Meeting (22 June 2018) <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_22jun18_e.htm>.

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93 China, ‘Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines’ (7 December 2014) (2018) 17 ChineseJIL 207, 655.

94 African Union, ‘Withdrawal Strategy Document’ (Draft 2, 12 January 2017) [8](e) <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf>.

95 Prosecutor v Al-Bashir ICC Case No ICC-02/05-01/09 (Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 6 May 2019).

96 The SS Wimbledon (1923) PCIJ Series A No 1, 25

97 BVerfG 2 BvE 2/08 (30 June 2009) para 220.

98 ibid 231.

99 UNCITRAL, ‘Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fifth Session’ (New York, 23–27 April 2018) UN Doc A/CN.9/935. On the application of the equality principle to investment arbitration see McLachlan, C, ‘Equality of the Parties before International Investment Tribunals’ Session of The Hague, Preparatory Works (2019) 79 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 409Google Scholar.

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107 The Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Ser A No 9, 18.

108 Monetary Gold removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France) [1954] ICJ Rep 19, 20.

109 L Helfer, ‘Exiting Treaties’ (2005) 91 VaLRev 1579.

110 Covenant of the League of Nations (signed 28 June 1919, entered into force 10 January 1920) 225 Con TS 195, art 1(3).

111 But see the Interpretative Declaration adopted at the UN founding conference concerning the right of withdrawal in the context of amendments to the Charter: United Nations Conference on International Organization I, 616, 631.

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113 Art 50(3) TEU.

114 Art 68 VCLT.

115 Case 621/18 Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union Case [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:999; Opinion of AG-Campos Sánchez-Bordona.

116 ibid, [64].

117 ibid, [66].

118 ibid, [67].

119 ibid, [74].

120 See eg art LVI Pact of Bogota (signed 30 April 1948, entered into force 6 May 1949) 30 UNTS 55, considered in Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Preliminary Objections) [2006] ICJ Rep 100, 115, [31]; art 127 Rome Statute, considered in Burundi (Decision on Authorization of an Investigation) ICC-01/17-X (Pre-Trial Chamber, 25 October 2017) [24]–[26].

121 Where the dispute is in relation to the termination of a treaty for conflict with a peremptory norm under arts 53 or 64 VCLT, a party may submit the dispute to the ICJ for decision unless the parties by common consent submit the dispute to arbitration: art 66(a).

122 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ [1966] II YBILC, 187, 262.

123 Idem.

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126 ibid 96, [49].

127 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392.

128 Ibid 420, [63].

129 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7.

130 ibid 66, [109].

131 Letter of Submittal from Rogers, US Secretary of State to President Nixon (19 October 1971) 65 Dept of State Bull 684, 687–8; US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Treaty Termination, 96th Congress [1979] Digest of United States Practice in International Law 769; American Law Institute, Restatement 4th Foreign Relations Law (Tentative Draft No 2, 20 March 2017) Part III ‘Status of Treaties in US Law,’ 129, section 313 Reporters’ Note 1.

132 The doubts expressed by the ECJ as to the customary status of art 65 relate to the specific notice periods there specified, not the principle of notice: Case C-162/96 A Racke & Co v Hauptzollamt Mainz Case C-162/96 [1998] ECR I-3688, [58]–[59]; [1998] ECR I-3659 Opinion of AG Jacobs, [96].

133 Art 56(1)(b) VCLT.

134 International Law Commission, Second Report on the Law of Treaties (Waldock, Rapporteur) [1963] II YBILC 64, 67, 71.

135 International Law Commission, ‘Summary Records of the Fifteenth Session, 6 May–12 July 1963’ [1963] I YBILC 99, 100 (Castrén), 101 (Amado), 101–2 (Verdross), 102 (Bartoš), 106 (Jiménez de Aréchaga).

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137 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (signed 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 April 1964) 500 UNTS 241; Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (signed 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967) 596 UNTS 487. This practice is cited by Aust, ibid, n 54 and by Dörr and Schmalenbach, ibid, 1054–5.

138 Arts I and II.

139 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary General, Status of Treaties, Ch.III.8, note 1.

140 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary General, Status of Treaties, Ch III.5, note 10.

141 Consular Relations Protocol: LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) [2001] ICJ Rep 466; Avena (Mexico v United States of America) [2004] ICJ Rep 12; Diplomatic Relations Protocol: Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v United States of America) (Application instituting proceedings, 28 September 2018).

142 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Preliminary Objections) [1953] ICJ Rep 111, 123; Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Preliminary Objections) [1957] ICJ Rep 125; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), [2002] ICJ Rep 3; Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom), (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 9, [38]; Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Preliminary Objections) [2016] ICJ Rep 100, 115, [31].

143 Art 70(1)(b) VCLT.

144 Art 36(1) Statute of the International Court of Justice (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 59 Stat 1055, UKTS 67 (1946).

145 Helfer, L, ‘Exiting Treaties’ (2005) 91 VaLRev 1579, 1595Google Scholar, citing eg instances of withdrawal and reaccession to membership of international organizations designed in part to prompt their reform and accountability.

146 ibid 1640–2.

147 ibid 1633–9.

148 ibid 1633–6, 1645–7.

149 African Union, ‘Withdrawal Strategy Document’ (Draft 2, 12 January 2017) [19] <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf>.

150 See eg Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York (25 September 2018): ‘We will never surrender America's sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy’ UN Doc A/73/PV.6, 17.

151 UN Secretary-General, ‘Delivering Justice: Programme of Action to Strengthen the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels’ UN Doc A/66/749 (16 March 2012), [2]: ‘The United Nations defines the rule of law as a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.’ (Emphasis added and internal references omitted.)

152 Alter, K, Gathii, J and Helfer, L, ‘Backlash Against International Courts In West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences’ (2016) 27 EJIL 293CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

153 Manneh v The Gambia ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/08, IHRL 3114 (5 June 2008).

154 Nyong'o v A G Kenya [2007] EACJ 6, Ref No 1 of 2006 (30 March 2007).

155 Campbell v Zimbabwe Case No SADC (T) 2/2007 (28 November 2008) 138 ILR 385.

156 McLachlan, C, Shore, L and Weiniger, M, International Investment Arbitration; Substantive Principles (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2017) [7.153]–[7.226]Google Scholar.

157 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (App No 74025/01, 6 October 2005) 16 BHRC 409; Sejdić v Bosnia and Herzegovina (App Nos 27996/06 and 34836/06, 22 December 2009, GC).

158 Shany, Y, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (Oxford University Press 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

159 Alter (n 6). But see now the potential effect of the decision of the South African Constitutional Court in Law Society of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa [2018] ZACC 51, [2018] 2 All SA 806, discussed below at (n 189).

160 See, eg, the role of the Committee of Ministers in securing compliance with the ECtHR's judgment in Mammadov v Azerbaijan (App No 15172/13, 22 May 2014). Ilgar Mammadov was released on 13 August 2018 following the Committee's resolution (CM/ResDH(2017)429, 5 December 2017) to refer to the Court under art 46(4) ECHR the question whether Azerbaijan had failed to fulfil its obligation to comply with the judgment.

161 The DSB operates by way of consensus. This has made its ability to appoint new members to the AB, and thus the survival of the AB and the system of dispute settlement that it supports, vulnerable to the blocking of appointments by the United States: Dispute Settlement Body, Summary of Meeting (22 June 2018) <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_22jun18_e.htm>; A Wolff, ‘The Rule of Law in an Age of Conflict’ (29 June 2018) 9–111 <https://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/fd/08/fd087b42-ac5b-4df8-9e91-b76220c72953/bern_june_29_2018_final_july_1_corrected.pdf>.

162 Art 112 Rome Statute.

163 ICSID, ‘Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules’ (3 vols, 2 August 2018).

164 On the impasse in appointments to the WTO Appellate Body see E-U Petersmann, ‘WTO Diplomats – Stand up to US Power Politics’ Financial Times (16 October 2018); Wolff (n 161).

165 Art 35(1) ECHR; and see also Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art 5(2)(b).

166 H Lauterpacht, ‘The Proposed European Court of Human Rights’ (1949) 35 Transactions of the Grotius Society 25, 33. The implications of this concept are explored in Bjorge, E, Domestic Application of the ECHR: Courts as Faithful Trustees (Oxford University Press 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

167 Lauterpacht ibid, 35.

168 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (signed 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, art 17.

169 cf the decisions of the US Supreme Court on the rights of foreign nationals on Death Row to consular assistance in light of the judgments of the ICJ: Breard v Greene 523 US 371, 118 S Ct 1352 (1998); Medellin v Dretke 544 US 660 (2005); Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon 548 US 331, 126 S Ct 2669 (2006); Medellin v Texas 128 S Ct 1346 (2008), discussed C McLachlan, ‘Lis Pendens in International Litigation’ (2008) 336 Recueil des Cours 199, 471–89.

170 McLachlan ibid, 489–99.

171 Thomas v Baptiste [2000] 2 AC 1, 23.

172 Idem.

173 [2000] 2 AC 1, 20 (PC), but cf Lord Goff and Lord Hobhouse dissenting, 31–3 and Higgs v Minister of National Security [2000] 2 AC 228 (PC, Bahamas, Hoffmann, Hobhouse and Henry; Steyn and Cooke dissenting).

174 Symposium on Treaty Exit at the Interface of Domestic and International Law (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 425–66Google Scholar; Verdier, P-H and Versteeg, M, ‘Separation of Powers, Treaty-Making, and Treaty Withdrawal: A Global Survey’ in Bradley, C (ed), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford University Press 2019) Ch 8Google Scholar; L Helfer, ‘Treaty Exit and Intra-Branch Conflict at the Interface of International and Domestic Law’ in Bradley ibid Ch 20.

175 Under the US Constitution the established doctrine is that, despite the requirement of Senate advice and consent for the conclusion of treaties, withdrawal is the prerogative of the President acting unilaterally: American Law Institute, Restatement 4th Foreign Relations Law (Tentative Draft No 2, 20 March 2017) Part III ‘Status of Treaties in US Law,’ 129, section 313 Reporters’ Notes 2–3 for a full review of the historical practice. The Supreme Court has ruled the question of the extent of such a power vis-à-vis the legislative branch to be non-justiciable: Goldwater v Carter 444 US 996 (1979). In Germany, the established position is that withdrawal from treaties does not require the prior approval of the Bundestag: BVerfGE 68, 1 (85–86); BVerfGE 141, 1 (23, para 55), but this is increasingly questioned in doctrine: Lange, F, ‘Art. 59 Abs. 2 S. 1 GG im Lichte von Brexit und IStGH-Austritt: Zur Parlamentarisierung der Kündigung völkerrechtlicher Verträge’ (2017) 142 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 442CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hettche, J, Die Beteiligung der Legislative bei Vorbehalten zu und Kündigung von völkerrechtlichen Verträgen (Mohr Siebeck 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A Paulus and J-H Hinselmann, ‘International Integration and Its Counter-Limits: A German Constitutional Perspective’ in Bradley ibid, Ch 23.

176 Verdier and Versteeg (n 174) present the results of a global survey of constitutions showing that the number of States in which the executive can withdraw unilaterally has declined since the 1970s from a high of 89 per cent to the current level of 72 per cent. They point out that in a number of other States, provision for Parliamentary approval for withdrawal is made by statute.

177 CACJ 105-02-26-03-2010.

178 Supreme Court of Justice (Full Chamber) 2 February 2012, available at: <https://vlex.com.pa/vid/accion-inconstitucionalidad-sala-pleno-375091942>.

179 Art 4 Constitution of Panama.

180 Treaty on the Establishment of the Central American Parliament (signed 2 October 1987, entered into force 1 May 1990) 1777 UNTS 172. Art 30 provided for amendment of the Treaty, when unanimously adopted by the Member States. It excluded the possibility of reservations.

181 R (ex p Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61.

182 Treaty on European Union (signed 7 February 1992, entered into force 1 November 1993) 1757 UNTS 3, [2010] OJ C 83/01, art 50(1).

183 ibid, [61].

184 Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation [2017] 2 All SA 123, [2017] 5 LRC 69.

185 ibid, [44].

186 ibid, [53].

187 ibid, [56].

188 See eg the discussion in Lange, Hettche and Paulus and Hinselmann (n 175).

189 Law Society of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa [2018] ZACC 51, [2018] 2 All SA 806.

190 Art 36, Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (signed 17 August 1992, entered into force 5 October 1993); art 37(3), Protocol on Tribunal (signed 7 August 2000, entered into force 14 August 2011).

191 ibid, [77].

192 There are contrary examples of Latin American constitutional courts joining or leading efforts to escape from treaty obligations to submit to international adjudication: Huneeus, A and Urueña, R, ‘Treaty Exit and Latin America's Constitutional Courts’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 456CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

193 Romano, C, ‘Trial and Error in International Judicialization’ in Romano, C, Alter, K and Shany, Y (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2013) Ch 6Google Scholar.

194 Above Part II(D).

195 Madsen, M Rask, Cebulak, P and Wiebusch, M, ‘Backlash against International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts’ (2018) 14 International Journal of Law in Context 197, 217CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

196 Saul, B, Mowbray, J and Baghoomians, I, ‘The Last Frontier of Human Rights Protection: Interrogating Resistance to Regional Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific’ (2011) 18 AustILJ 23Google Scholar.

197 Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration [2016] HCA 1, (2016) 257 CLR 42, 327 ALR 369.

198 Lauterpacht, H, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford University Press 1933, rev edn 2011)Google Scholar.

199 M Koskenniemi, ‘The Function of Law in the International Community: Introduction’ in H Lauterpacht ibid, xxix, xlvii.

200 ibid 161, 166.

201 ibid 435.

202 ibid 437.

203 ibid 432.

204 Alston, P, ‘The Populist Challenge to Human Rights’ (2017) 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

205 Hull (n 13).