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AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL TRADE, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2012

Melaku Geboye Desta  and
Moshe Hirsch
Melaku Geboye Desta
Affiliation:
Melaku Geboye Desta is Reader in International Economic Law at CEPMLP, University of Dundee
Moshe Hirsch
Affiliation:
Moshe Hirsch holds the Maria Von Hofmannsthal Chair in International Law at the Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is a member of the global faculty at CEPMLP, University of Dundee.
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Abstract

This article addresses an important and complex subject relating to the link between international law and economic development. There is broad agreement that trade liberalization and participation in foreign markets play an important role in economic development. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have generally pursued a liberalization route over the past two decades, but their economic performance has been deeply disappointing. In this article, we look at seven countries in the Horn of Africa and examine, from legal and institutional perspectives, the central question of why these countries have failed to translate their comparative advantage, particularly in the livestock sector, into meaningful trade-led economic growth. In order to answer this question, we have reviewed the relevant legal and policy instruments and the literature, visited five of the seven countries, and interviewed different players in the livestock value chain. Analysis of the evidence reveals that the main impediments to trade relate to rising sanitary import requirements in foreign markets and weak institutional capacity within the Horn. The limited technical and financial resources available to these countries also reduce their capacity to meet these standards. Meaningful institutional change requires substantial involvement of local actors and it takes place incrementally and over the long term. International law can play a role in this process by promoting the rule of law and tackling corruption, facilitating capacity-building, and encouraging regional integration.

Type
Article
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 61 , Issue 1 , January 2012 , pp. 127 - 170
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2012

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20 Under WTO law, a standard is a non-binding document approved by a recognized body that contains ‘rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory’ (see WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1, para 2). In this article, however, we use the term ‘standard’ in a broader sense, and, depending on the context, as synonymous and interchangeable with the term sanitary measures as defined in the SPS Agreement (see WTO SPS Agreement, Annex 1, para 1).

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28 Ohnesorge (n 12). This article refers to ‘institutions’ as a short hand for both ‘institutions’ and ‘organizations’ (as defined by Douglass North). As North explains, ‘Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both. Organizations are the players: groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives. They include political bodies (political parties, the senate, a city council, a regulatory agency): economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives); social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic associations); and educational bodies (schools, colleges, vocational training centres).’ DC North, ‘The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development’ in J Harriss, J Hunter and CM Lewis (eds), New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (Routledge 1997) 23. See also Burki, SJ and Perry, GE, Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter (World Bank, 1998) 11–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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84 These livestock products are ‘live animals’, ‘meat and edible meat offal’, ‘dairy products, eggs, honey, edible animal product’, ‘raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather’ and ‘products of animal origin’. See <http://www.intracen.org/menus/Countries.htm>.

85 ibid.

86 See Y Aklilu, ‘A Review of Policies and Their Impact on Livestock Trade in Ethiopia During Three Regimes (1965–2005)’ in J McPeak and P Little (eds), Pastoral Livestock Marketing in Eastern Africa: Research and Policy Challenges (ITDG Publishing, 2006) 187–202.

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103 ibid, para 210.

104 See also United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930—Panel Report (7 November 1989) BISD 36S/345, para 5.26; Thailand —Cigarettes (n 101) paras 74–75.

105 See Brazil —Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres—AB Report (3 December 2007) WT/DS332/AB/R, para 156.

106 Brazil —Retreaded Tyres is one good example where a respondent passed the necessity test under art XX(b) but failed on the chapeau. ibid para 228.

107 See ibid para 215. The only case in which a GATT/WTO member successfully defended a measure on the basis of GATT art XX(b) was EC Asbestos. See WTO, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products—AB Report (2001) WT/DS135, 175.

108 See GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (20 September 1986), reproduced in GATT, Focus Newsletter, No 41 (October 1986).

109 See van den Bossche, P, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, CUP 2008) 841CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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111 See ibid preamble para 1 and arts 2 and 5.

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113 See arts 2 and 5 of the WTO SPS Agreement.

114 See eg Japan —Agricultural Products II—AB Report (1999), paras 82–84; Australia —Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon—AB Report (1998), para 136; European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)—AB Report (1998), para 208. For a comprehensive analysis of the SPS Agreement and the body of case law on the agreement, see J Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Photosanitary Measures: Commentary (CUP 2007).

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117 One wonders if the Appellate Body was finally coming round to accepting some form of proportionality when it stated, in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres (n 106) 156, that panels must assess all ‘relevant factors, particularly the extent of the contribution to the achievement of a measure's objective and its trade restrictiveness, in the light of the importance of the interests or values at stake’ (emphasis added).

118 See J Wilson, T Otsuki and M Sewadeh, A Race to the Top? A Case Study of Food Safety Standards and African Exports (2001) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2563. For similar observations, see Josling, T, Roberts, D and Orden, D, Food Regulation and Trade: Toward a Safe and Open Global System (IIE 2004) 47Google Scholar. The Blair Commission for Africa also observed that ‘If the EU used international standards, instead of its own, for traceability requirements and regulations on pesticide residues for agricultural imports, African banana exports could grow by US$410 million a year.’ See Commission for Africa (n 1) 286.

119 See S Jaffee and S Henson, ‘Standards and Agro-food Exports from Developing Countries: Rebalancing the Debate’ (2004) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3348, 31 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=610392>. See also L Rios and S Jaffee, ‘Barrier, Catalyst, or Distraction? Standards, Competitiveness, and Africa's Groundnut Exports to Europe’ (2008) World Bank Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 39.

120 See Croome, J, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (WTO 1995) 236Google Scholar.

121 ibid 237.

122 ibid.

123 See EC—Hormones (n 114) para 165.

124 On the precautionary principle, see ibid paras 123–24, and European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (2006), panel report, paras 7.88–7.89.

125 Steinberg, RH, ‘Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development’ (1997) 91 AJIL 231, 241CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

126 See SPS Agreement, arts 7 and 12(1) and Annex B on transparency of SPS regulations.

127 The WTO SPS information database contains no documents from Djibouti, 1 from Uganda and 27 from Kenya, 23 of which relate to emergency notifications concerning avian influenza in 2005/06. See <http://spsims.wto.org>.

128 See Desta, ‘Regulatory Framework’ (n 22) 48–51.

129 The third international organization identified by the SPS Agreement is the International Plant Protection Convention for plant health: see art 3(3).

130 The Organic Statute of the OIE identified nine animal diseases, of which rinderpest and food and mouth disease (FMD) were singled out as diseases of the highest priority. See art 5 of the Organic Statutes of the Office International des Epizooties <http://www.opbw.org/new_process/mx2004/other_pres/ger_pres/int/OIE_Organic_Statutes.pdf>. All seven Horn countries are members of the OIE.

131 See Droppers, W, ‘OIE Philosophy, Policy and Procedures for the Development of Food Safety Standards’ (2006) 25 OIE Scientific and Technical Review 810Google ScholarPubMed.

132 See Blayney, D, ‘Disease-related Trade Restrictions Shaped Animal Product Markets in 2004 and Stamp Imprints on 2005 Forecasts’ (2005) USDA Outlook ReportGoogle Scholar <http://www.iatp.org/files/258_2_76146.pdf>.

133 See A Nin Pratt and others, ‘Benefits and Costs of Compliance of Sanitary Regulations in Livestock Markets: the Case of Rift Valley Fever in Ethiopia’ (2004) <https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/1723.pdf>.

134 However, a number of other almost equally significant diseases are not covered. See J Rushton, A McLeod and J Lubroth, ‘Managing transboundary animal disease’ in FAO Livestock Report 2006 (FAO 2006) 29–44.

135 See <http://www.fao.org/ag/AGAInfo/programmes/en/grep/home.html>.

136 See OIE, List of Rinderpest-free Members According to Resolution No. 16 (78th General Session May 2010). All Horn countries are on the OIE list of rinderpest-free countries.

137 This was officially pronounced, and celebrated, in successive resolutions and events by the OIE (see Declaration of Global Eradication of Rinderpest and Implementation of Follow-up Measures to Maintain World Freedom from Rinderpest (28 May 2011) <http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/documents/grep/A_RESO_18_FMD_Eradication.pdf>), and the FAO (28 June 2011 <http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/resources/documents/AH/GREP_flyer.pdf>).

138 See <http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/fmd-portal/about-fmd/>. See also Perry, B and Rich, K, ‘Poverty Impacts of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and the Poverty Reduction Implications of its Control’ (2007) 160 Veterinary Record 238CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

139 See article 5 the Organic Statutes of the OIE (n 130).

140 See Terrestrial Animal Health Code, arts 2(2)(10)(2)–2(2)(10)(6).

141 ibid, art 2(2)(10)(2).

142 See ibid arts 2(2)(10)(9) and 2(2)(10)(11). The difference in the sanitary requirement for the importation of fresh meat products between those coming from FMD-free countries and those from FMD-infected countries is even starker. Compare ibid art 2(2)(10)(19) with art 2(2)(10)(22).

143 See <http://www.oie.int/eng/Status/FMD/en_fmd_free.htm>.

144 Dyck, J and Nelson, K, ‘Structure of the Global Markets for Meat’ (2003) US Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Information Bulletin 785, 8Google Scholar.

145 See EC Commission, General guidance on EU import and transit rules for live animals and animal products from third countries (2007) 7.

146 Pan-African News Agency, 31 January 2007, as reported in Africa Research Bulletin (16 January–15 February 2007), 17270.

147 See WHO, ‘Rift Valley Fever in Saudi Arabia: Update 3’ (25 October 2000) <http://www.who.int/csr/don/2000_10_25/en/index.html> and ‘2000: Rift Valley fever in Yemen: Update 4’ (26 October 2000) <http://www.who.int/csr/don/2000_10_26/en/index.html>.

148 See Terrestrial Animal Health Code art 8(11).

149 See ibid arts 8(11)(3)–8(11)(5).

150 See Codex Statute and Rules of Procedure, ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_15e.pdf.

151 See Codex Stan 192-1995 <http://www.codexalimentarius.net/gsfaonline/docs/CXS_192e.pdf>. Para 2(a) provides a definition of a food additive.

152 See ‘Additives Permitted for Use under Specified Conditions in Certain Food Categories or Individual Food Items’ in ibid 67–141.

153 OIE, ‘Devising Import Health Measures for Animal Commodities’, <http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Internationa_Standard_Setting/docs/pdf/EN_commodity-based_approach.pdf>.

154 A closer look at the Code shows that compliance with its requirements would significantly enhance the export opportunities of Horn countries for live animals and fresh meat. The Code covers hygiene provisions for raw meat, meat preparations and manufactured meat from the time of live animal production up to the point of retail sale. See Codex, Code of Hygienic Practice for Meat (CAC/RCP 58-2005), para 6.

155 See Desta, ‘Regulatory Framework’ (n 22) 79–90.

156 The list of currently approved establishments is available at <http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/establishments/third_country/index_en.htm>.

157 See Desta, MG, ‘EU Sanitary Standards and Sub-Saharan African Agricultural Exports: A Case Study of the Livestock Sector in East Africa’ (2008) 1 Law and Development Review, 111–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

158 Around 30 per cent of Codex members do not normally send a delegation to its plenary meetings. See T Hüller and ML Maier, ‘Fixing the Codex? Global Food-safety Governance Under Review’ in C Joerges and E-U Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilateral Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing 2006), 272.

159 On Codex and the OIE, see above, section IV(C).

160 Josling and others (n 118) 25.

161 For definitions of the governance variables, see Kaufmann, D, Kraay, A and Mastruzzi, M, ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues’ (2010) Policy Research Working Paper 5430, 4Google Scholar.

162 See <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.

163 The index is compiled on the basis of surveys and assessments that include questions relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds and the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts. See Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2010’ <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010>.

164 See Heritage Foundation <http://www.heritage.org/index/About.aspx>.

165 Governance Index (n 162).

166 Transparency International (n 163).

167 Heritage Index (n 164).

168 Governance Index (n 162).

169 Transparency International (n 163).

170 Heritage Index (n 164).

171 Governance Index (n 162).

172 Transparency International (n 163).

173 Heritage Index (n 164).

174 ibid.

175 Governance Index (n 162).

176 Transparency International (n 163).

177 Heritage Index (n 164).

178 Governance Index (n 162).

179 Transparency International (n 163).

180 Heritage Index (n 164).

181 Governance Index (n 162).

182 Transparency International (n 163).

183 Heritage Index (n 164).

184 Governance Index (n 162).

185 Transparency International (n 163).

186 See, eg OECD, African Economic Outlook <www.africaneconomicoutlook.org>

187 See Desta, ‘Regulatory Framework’ (n 22) 53–78.

188 Interview with Dr MI Elhag, Deputy Director of Livestock Markets, Khartoum, March 2007.

189 See Uganda : Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (June 2006) vol 1, 62 <http://www.integratedframework.org/countries/uganda.htm>.

190 See OIE, World Animal Health 2004 (Paris 2004), 348.

191 For a detailed examination of institutional problems in the Horn countries (including weak commitment to rule of law, legal uncertainties and access to legal information), see Desta, ‘Regulatory Framework’ (n 22) 53–78.

192 ibid 70–78.

193 Djibouti established a new private quarantine facility in 2006. See ibid 58–60.

194 See eg UNCTAD (n 91) 230–31, 252.

195 North, D, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton University Press, 2005), 161Google Scholar.

196 See eg Ohnesorge (n 12) 245.

197 Prado and Trebilcock (n 27) 39. See also D Rodrik, ‘The Global Governance of Trade: As if Development Really Mattered’ (2001) paper prepared for the UNDP, 29 <http://gopher.mtholyoke.edu/courses/epaus/econ213/rodrikgovernance.PDF>.

198 See Prado and Trebilcock (n 27) 16.

199 See Spence, M, The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011) 109Google Scholar.

200 See eg Collier (n 26) xi, 12, 67, 71, 185; Davis and Trebilcock (n 50) 954–56.

201 North (n 195) 2.

202 See Bingham (n 55) 8.

203 See Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF), ‘Development of Regional Action Plans to Enhance Veterinary Capacity in East and West Africa’, STDF/PG/013 Final Report <http://www.standardsfacility.org/files/Project_documents/Project_Grants/STDF_13_Final_report.pdf>.

204 See Peerenboom, R, ‘Human Rights and Rule of Law: What is the Relationship?’ (2005) 36 Georgetown JIntlL 809Google Scholar.

205 Art 22 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); art 3 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter).

206 ICCPR, art 14; African Charter, art 7.

207 ICCPR, art 19; African Charter, art 9(2).

208 ICCPR, art 20; African Charter, art 11.

209 ICCPR, art 21; African Charter, art 10.

210 ICCPR, art 9; African Charter, art 6.

211 David Leonard argued that maintenance of the disease-free zone was difficult, inter alia because: ‘Livestock prices were higher inside it because of the privileged access to market that it brought. The temptations to evade the quarantine were high. … [T]here were too many incentives for too many people to use influence or bribes to evade the quarantine.’ Leonard, D, African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development (University of California Press 1991) 165Google Scholar.

212 See Desta (n 98).

213 Internet Center for Corruption Research, ‘Persistent Corruption in Low-income Countries Requires Global Action’ (2007) <http://www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2007_pressTI.html>; IM Carr and M Goldby, ‘The United Nations Anti-corruption Convention and Money Laundering’ (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1409628>; Collier (n 26) 91–93, 135–37.

214 Tackling money laundering is of major importance in the struggle against corruption. Where corruption takes place in developing countries, its proceeds are likely to be laundered through the international financial system. See Carr and Goldby (n 213).

215 Contemporary international legal regimes that aim to combat corruption may be traced to the passage of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1494). See Snider, TR and Kidane, W ‘Combating Corruption Through International Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis’ (2007) 40 Cornell IntlLJ 691, 696–97, 700–03Google Scholar; Colares, J, ‘The Evolving Domestic and International Law Against Foreign Corruption: Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the International Lawyer’ (2006) 5 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 1, 5–18Google Scholar, 20–29; Posadas, A, ‘Combating Corruption Under International Law’ (1999–2000) 10 Duke JCompIntlL 345Google Scholar.

216 (1996) 35 ILM 724. See Snider and Kidane (n 215) 704–06.

217 (1998) 37 ILM 1.

218 (7 October 2003) UN Doc A/58/422. See also Snider and Kidane (n 215) 706–11.

219 (2003) 43 ILM 5. See also Snider and Kidane (n 215) 711–15, 743–47.

220 ibid 715–43.

221 6th and 7th recital of the African Union Convention.

222 OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, ‘Consultation Paper: Review of the OECD Instruments on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction Ten Years After Adoption’ (2008) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/25/39882963.pdf>.

223 N Bonucci, ‘The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 10 Years On’ (2008) OECD Observer No 264/265.

224 Schmidt, TW, ‘Sweetening the Deal: Strengthening Transnational Bribery Laws Through Standard International Corporate Auditing Guidelines’ (2009) 93 Minnesota LRev 1120, 1120–21Google Scholar.

225 On these and additional proposals, see OECD Working Group (n 222).

226 See Schmidt (n 224) 1136–39.

227 World Duty Free v Kenya (4 October 2006) ICSID Case no ARB 00/7, paras 136, 157.

228 Inceysa Vallisoletana SL v Republic of El Salvador (2 August 2006) ICSID Case No ARB/03/26, paras 234, 245–52, 257, 335–36.

229 On investment tribunals and corruption, see H Raeschke-Kessler and D Gottwald, ‘Corruption’ in P Muchlinski, F Ortino and C Schreuer (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 584.

230 Examples include GATT art X; arts 1(4)(a) and 5 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; arts 2(8), 3(2) and 5 of the Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection.

231 See eg arts XVII–XX of the GPA. For a detailed analysis of the WTO agreements relating to corruption, see KN Schefer, ‘Corruption and the WTO Legal System’ (2008) Society of International Economic Law Inaugural Conference Paper <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1145567>. See also W Abbott, ‘Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption’ (2001) 4 JIntlEconL 275.

232 See WTO Revision of the Agreement on Government Procurement as at 13 December 2010: Prepared by the Secretariat (16 December 2010) GPA/W/313, art IV(4)(c).

233 For studies on the impact of corruptive practices and international trade, see AE D'Souza, ‘The OECD Anti-bribery Convention: Changing the Currents of Trade’ (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1581429>; Lambsdorff, JG, ‘An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in International Trade’ (1998) 10 European Journal of Development Research 40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; S Bandyopadhyay and S Roy, ‘Corruption and Trade Protection: Evidence from Panel Data’ (2007), Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Working Paper 2007-022A <http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2007/2007-022.pdf>.

234 Schefer (n 231) 35–37.

235 See above, Section IV(A) and (B).

236 The special and differential treatment provisions under article 10 of the SPS Agreement provide for only limited flexibility, such as a requirement on developed countries, in the preparation and application of SPS measures, to ‘take account of’ the special needs of developing countries, to allow longer time-frames for compliance with new measures whenever that is possible, and to encourage and facilitate their active participation in relevant international organizations.

237 WTO Doc G/SPS/44 (23 April 2007) para 3.

238 Notable among these are the United Nations Millennium Declaration (General Assembly Resolution A/55/L.2 of 18 September 2000, and the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration (which devoted a special section to technical cooperation and capacity building, describing them as ‘core elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system’). See WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (14 November 2001), paras. 38-42.

239 See WTO, Focus Newsletter No. 49 (November 2000) at 12. Capacity building is not mentioned in the WTO's list of functions under article III of the WTO Agreement, but its mandate in many of the specific agreements is so significant, and its actual role in providing such assistance so prominent, that Professor Peter van den Bossche suggests that capacity building could qualify as one of the WTO's implied functions. Van den Bossche (n 110), at 98.

240 See WTO, Press Release (Press/279) 11 March 2002.

241 The IF was first established in 1997 by six multilateral institutions to support LDCs in the multilateral trading system. The role played by the IF in the IGAD countries is already significant. Given that all IGAD countries except Kenya are LDCs, we now have valuable studies (known as Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (DTIS)), completed for Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda and a concept paper for Sudan. See <http://www.enhancedif.org/>.

242 See WTO Press Release (30 April 2010) PRESS/601.

243 On the origins of the Aid for Trade initiative, see Garcia, M, Lammersen, F and Hayashikawa, M, The Development Dimension: Aid for Trade: Making it Effective (OECD 2006) 21–25Google Scholar.

244 On relations between aid and trade (with a special focus on aid for trade), see Suwa-Eisenmann, A and Verdier, T, ‘Aid and Trade’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 481CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

245 J Nielson, ‘Aid for Trade’ in R Newfarmer (ed), Trade, Doha, and Development: A Window into the Issues (World Bank 2006) 323; Stiglitz and Carlton (n 9). See also, Garcia and others (n 243) 26.

246 All IGAD countries except Somalia have benefited from some form of assistance from the STDF. For a list of all beneficiary countries, see <http://www.standardsfacility.org/>.

247 All IGAD countries except Somalia have received support to participate in Codex meetings and other activities over the past few years. See <http://www.who.int/foodsafety/codex/prog5e.pdf>.

248 The Fund particularly supports developing countries in establishing and strengthening their veterinary services so as to meet OIE international standards on quality.

249 STDF (n 214).

250 For example, Uganda reported to the WTO in 2006 that its national food control and safety system is ‘severely hampered by obsolete food laws and the lack of resources required for building a sound food safety control infrastructure, including … laboratory facilities, and necessary scientific expertise and research’. WTO, Implementation of the SPS Agreement: Communication from Uganda (31 March 2006) G/SPS/GEN/673 [11].

251 See WTO, Technical Assistance: Communication from Kenya (15 June 2010) G/SPS/GEN/1020.

252 The repeated import bans by countries in the Middle East due to outbreaks of RVF in the Horn are a good example. See above, Section IV(C).

253 See Desta, ‘Regulatory Framework’ (n 22) 50–53.

254 With technical support from the FAO and financial support from the EU, the IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative is intended ‘to strengthen the capacity in IGAD, its member states, and other regional organizations and stakeholders, to formulate and implement livestock sector and related policies that sustainably reduce food insecurity and poverty’. See <http://www.igad-lpi.org/about/Overview.htm>.

255 See ‘Regional Policy Framework on Animal Health in the Context of Trade and Vulnerability’ (10 December 2009) <http://www.igad-lpi.org/news/doc/RPF_en.pdf>.

256 A potential source of inspiration in this respect is the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), which was established in 1997 with the mandate ‘to develop, coordinate and execute an overall negotiating strategy for various external negotiations in which the Region was involved’. See <http://www.crnm.org>.

257 Dyck and Nelson (n 144) 8.

258 Rodrik (n 7).

259 Collier (n 26) xi.