Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 January 2008
This article argues that judicial independence is a poor indicator of the capacity of courts effectively to resolve commercial disputes. Judicial power is a more accurate measure because it assesses whether courts have sufficient jurisdiction, discretionary authority and enforcement powers to make decisions over socially meaningful commercial problems. In fact, judicial independence may reduce the power of newly emerging commercial courts in socialist-transforming Asia, which need politics to protect them from interference by powerful governments and private investors. This article explores the trade-offs between judicial power and political patronage by inquiring into the circumstances where patronage may slide into interference. It also investigates the conditions in which judges are most likely to acquire or arrogate discretionary powers to understand politics on their terms. Finally, this article analyses the highly polarized views in this region about what constitutes valid judicial determinations. The message for international agencies contemplating judicial reforms is that reducing political influence and promoting law-based decisions will not uniformly generate popular support and legitimacy for courts.
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52 Toa An Nhan Dan Thanh Ha Noi, Bao Cao Ket Qua 4 Nam Thuc Hien Nghi Quyet So 08-NG/TW Ngay 2.1.2002 [Report on the Results of Four Years Implementation of Resolution No 08–NG/TW Ngay 2 Jan 2002] (Hanoi, 3 Nov 2005).
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57 For a discussion about the Nam Cam case and court scandals see Unknown Author, ‘Vietnam Da Xuat Hien Toi Pham Co To Chuc o Trinh Do Cao’ [High-Level Organised Crime Makes Its Appearance in Vietnam] [15 June 2002] Vnexpress.
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59 See V Chi Cong, ‘Thay Gi Ve Cong Tac To Chuc va Quan Ly Can Bo Qua Vu An Truong Van Cam’ [What Can be Seen About Organizing and Managing Cadres Through the Truong Van Cam Affair] [2002] Tap Chi Cong San, <http://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn>.
60 Politburo Resolution No 49 NQ/TW on the Strategy of Judicial Reform to 2020.
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72 Criminal Code 1999, 181.
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77 This case study is based on interviews with Nguyen Thi Loi, Deputy Chief Judge, Civil Division, Hanoi People's Court, Hanoi, Apr 1999 and Sept 1999, and the transcript of the first instance judgment Case No 41, 16–19 Oct 1998.
78 Art 751(e) of the Civil Code gives authors rights to ‘protect the integrity of their work and permit or not permit other persons to alter the content of the work’.
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90 The author observed five cases in the Vinh Phu Provincial Court in 1994 and three cases in Civil Division of the Hanoi People's Court in 1998 and four economic, civil and labour cases in the Hanoi City Court during March and April 2006.
91 The judge erroneously referred to the superseded 1980 Constitution which provide a State guarantee to provide housing. Tu Liem People's Court, Case No 52/DSST, 2 Oct 1995.
92 Interviews with Hoang Ngoc Hien (n 88).
93 Hanoi People's Court, Case No 20-PTDS, 31 Jan 1996.
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97 eg, the Annual Report in 2000 gave economic court judges doctrinal rules to distinguish civil and economic cases. See Toa An Nhan Dan Toi Cao (Supreme Peoples Court), ‘Giai Dap Mot So Van De Ve Hinh Su, Dan Su, Kinh Te, Lao Dong, Hanh Chinh va To Tung’ [Annual Report on Criminal, Civil, Economic, Labour, Administrative and Procedural Laws] (1 Feb 2000) 63–64.
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105 In some cases, lawyers arrange for judges to attend seminars and informal workshops that explain complex doctrinal issues, such as foreign legal protocols, electronic commerce, or international banking law.
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118 See Ordinance on Residential Housing 1991.
119 For discussions about solving housing disputes see Tuoi Tre (23 June 1996); Tran Quang Minh, ‘Lay Lai Nha O Vang Chu Ma Nguoi Khac Dang Ky Su Dung’ [June 2000] Nhan Dan, <http://www.nhandan.orgvn/vietnamese/phapluat/137.html>.
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