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Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Mark Van Hoecke  and
Mark Warrington
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Extract

Over the past decade especially, many writers have emphasised the need for a broad approach to the subject of comparative law, thereby moving it beyond the “law as rules” approach of traditional legal doctrine. It is becoming steadily apparent that comparatists cannot limit themselves to simply comparing rules. The “law as rules” approach has to be placed in a much wider context Broader investigation reveals that it is not even rules which are at the core of the comparative endeavour; it is, rather, the legal discourse, the way lawyers work with the law and reason about it.

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International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , July 1998 , pp. 495 - 536
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Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1998

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References

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41. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it should be emphasised that the use of the concept of legal anthropology has nothing to do with some Western ethnocentricity. It simply points to the fact that a broad sociological comparison has to be the first step in any such comparison, and that societies, traditions, work) views have to be compared and not legal rules, concepts, institutions, isolated from this broad anthropological context.

42. Northrop, , op. cit. supra n.5, at pp.657–658.Google Scholar

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44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. E.g. in the Congo many Belgian statutes and codes have been kept after independence in 1960. Even today courts, including the supreme court (Cour de cassation) are constantly referring to Belgian court decisions and Belgian legal doctrine when deciding cases. However, this does not mean that legal reality or everyday legal and social practice would be identical, or even very similar to Belgian legal daily life.

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50. For a criticism of the possibility of universal rights in a culturally divided world, see Belvisi, F., “Rights, World-Society and the Crisis of Legal Universalism” (1996) Ratio Juris 60.Google Scholar

51. Mitsukuni Yasaki, “Legal Culture in Japan, Modem—Traditional”, in Jörgensen et al., op. cit. supra n. 22, pp.191–195, at p.191.Google Scholar

52. Which is the definition of “legal culture” provided by John Bell and quoted supra text accompanying n.11.

53. Kuhn, T. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd edn, 1970).Google Scholar

54. Note that the Copernican theory is already incorporated in our language, as we talk of a “solar” system rather than of a “planetary” system, and we do not use the expression “earth system”.

55. Within legal theory some attention has been paid to the concept of paradigm, albeit roughly limited to the question of the historical development of legal science and the question to what extent legal science has been faced with scientific revolutions. See e.g. Aarnio, A. et al. , Paradigms, Change and Progress in Legal Dogmatics (1983)Google Scholar; Aarnio, A., “On the Paradigm Articulation in Legal Research”Google Scholar, in Tarnmelo, I. and Aarnio, A., Zum Fortschrist von Theorie und Technik in Recht und Ethik (1981), pp.45–56Google Scholar; Wroblewski, J., “Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics and the Legal Sciences”, in Ziembinski, Z. (Ed.), Polish Contributions to the Theory and Philosophy of Law (1987), pp.75–88Google Scholar; A. Peczenik, The Basis of Legal Justification (1983), pp.129–134Google Scholar; Zuleta, E. Puceiro, Paradigma dogmarico y ciencia del derecho (1981).Google ScholarFlodin, M., “The Possibility of Revolution in Legal Science”, in Bankowski, Z. (Ed.), Revolutions in Law and Legal Thought (1991), pp.175–182Google Scholar; J. Uusitalo, “Legal Dogmatics and the Concept of a Scientific Revolution”, in Bankowski, idem, pp.113–121; Jori, M., “Paradigms of Legal Science” (1990) Rivista Intemazionale di Filosofia del Diritto 230Google Scholar. Specifically on the historical development of science, from the point of view of paradigm, see Krawietz, W., “Zum Paradigmenwechsel im juristischen Methodenstreit”, in Krawietz, W. et al. , Argumentation und Hermenevtik in der Jurisprudent (1979), pp.113–152Google Scholar; Simmonds, N. E., “Law as a Rational Science” (1980) Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 535.Google Scholar See also Jakobs, H. H., Wissenschaft und Gesetzgebung im bürgeruchen Recht (1983).Google Scholar

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62. Examples of such strongly morally laden, unwritten general principles of law accepted by courts in many European countries are: the good faith principle, or the prohibition of abuse of law (see Van Hoecke, M., “The Use of Unwritten Legal Principles by Courts”, (1995) Ratio Juris 248).Google Scholar

63. “This appeal.… raises yet again a problem that has been before the Court of Appeal on a number of occasions over the past ten years or so” (Scott LJ in Barclays Bank plc v. O'Brien, supra n.60, at p.986Google Scholar). “For some ten years the civil courts have had to deal more and more with cases in which young adults end up in a situation of high debts with no way of repaying them, because they have stood as a security for high bank loans for their partner or parents, although they had only a low income.” (“Seit etwa zehn Jahren werden die Zivilgerichte zunehmend mit Fällen befasst, in denen junge Erwachsene in auswegkne Überschuldung geraten and, weil sie für hohe Bankkredite ihrer Partner Oder Eltern gebürgt hatten, obwohl sie nur über geringfügige Einküfte verfügten”) (Bundesverfassungsgericht 19 10. 1993 (1994) 89 B.Verf.G.E., 215).Google Scholar

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65. Kahn-Freund, O., “Introduction”, in Renner, K., The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions (1949), p.10.Google Scholar

66. As e.g. the Kapauku tribe in Papua did, as recorded by Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology of Law. A Comparative Theory (1971), pp.274–302, with a diagram at p.295.Google Scholar

67. The recent House of Lords decision in White v. Jones [1995] 2 W.L.R. 187Google Scholar provides evidence of the increasing tendency of certain judges to refer to academic doctrine (see esp. Lord Goff at pp.202–203Google Scholar). This is in marked contrast to the traditional position, no doubt still shared by some English judges, where “It is to my mind much to be regretted, and it is a regret which I believe that every judge on the bench shares, that text books are more and more quoted in court”: Union Bank v. Münster (1887) 37 L.R.Ch. 51, 54 (per Kekewich J).Google Scholar

68. This, of course, does not mean that there once necessarily will be a “European Civil Code” or an “African Civil Code”, etc. Today, much more emphasis is laid on other, more modest approaches. E.g. Walter van Gerven puts forward his vision of such a long-term approach: making use of multinational casebooks as one important element in the creation of a common law of Europe. See generally “The Case Law of the European Court of Justice and National Courts as a Contribution to the Europeanisation of Private Law” (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law 367.Google Scholar

69. Jean Bodin defined “souveraineté as”la puissance absolue aperpéuelle d'une République” (the absolute and eternal power of a republic): De la République (1583), Book I, chap. VIII, p.122.Google Scholar

70. E.g. see Arts.85 and 86 of the EC Treaty and the following Council Directives: 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (1993) O.J. L95/29Google Scholar; 94/47/EEC on Right to Use Immovable Property on a Timeshare Basis(1994) O.J. L280Google Scholar; 90/314/EEC on Package Travel, Package Holidays, and Package Tours (1990) O.J. L158/59.Google Scholar

71. European Court of Human Rights, 13 June 1979.

72. Other examples of important decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the field of family law, all to be found in the Recueil des Arréts et Décisions de la Cour européenne des droits de I'homme, Series A, are: Johnston v. Ireland, No. 112 (divorce); F. v. Switzerland, No. 128 (right to remarry); Olsson v. Sweden, No. 130 (family separation); Eriksson v. Sweden, No. 156 (placement in a guest family and right to visit).

73. Case 152/84 Marshall v. South Hants AHA [1986] E.C.R. 732Google Scholar; Case 188/89 Foster v. British Gas plc [1990] 3 All E.R. 897.Google Scholar

74. Bell, J., “The English Lawyer in the Europe of 1993” (1992) 34 U. Leeds Rev. 181, 182–184Google Scholar, and op. cit. supra n.6, at pp.73–74.Google Scholar

75. See, for Belgian law, A. Van Mensel, “L'attitude des juges beiges face au divorce par repudiation” (1990) Revue du droit des étrangers 176.Google Scholar

76. see Aamio, A., Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence (1983), pp.163–184Google Scholar; see also Aarnio, A., Denkweisen der Rechawissenschafi (1979), pp.49–50, where he defines legal doctrine as “the science of meanings”.Google Scholar

77. For some examples of the influence of the “floodgate factor” in English common law, see Bell, J., Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983), pp.70–71 and 217–218.Google Scholar

78. [1972] 3 W.L.R. 502.Google Scholar

79. [1991] 1 A. C 398.Google Scholar

80. “If claims for economic loss were permitted for this particular hazard, there would be no end of claims. Some might be genuine, but many might be inflated or even false” (Lord Denning in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd [1973] 1 Q.B. 27).Google Scholar

81. But not only in the English legal system. The same argument plays a similar role in the area of pure economic loss in the Netherlands (see Kottenhagen, R. J. P., “Buiten-contractuele aansprakelijkheid voor economische schade. Een rechtsvergelijkende studie naar aanleiding van recente ontwikkelingen in net Engelse (bouw-)recht omtrent de mogelijkheden tot vergoeding van economic loss claims” (1991) Bouwrecht 339)Google Scholar, and in Austria (see Posch, W., “Der ungeschutzte Strombezieher als Fall des mittelbaren Schadens in der Rechtsprediung des OGH” (1973) Juristische Blätter 564Google Scholar; decision of the Oberste Gerichtshof, Z. V.R. 1979, p.93), but not at all in Belgium, France or Germany. Again the difference is not between common law and civil law, but appears to follow unexpected geographical lines.Google Scholar

82. Aulis, Aarnio (1983), op. cit. supra n.76, at p.216, defines a legal doctrinal theory as “a set of concepts and propositions which systematize legal norms in a certain way”.Google Scholar

83. See, on the problem of a common language in comparative law, Van Hoecke, M., “Honield and Comparative Law” (1996) 9 Int J. for the Semiotics of Law 185, esp. 188–201.Google Scholar

84. Samuel, , op. cit supra n.7, at p.84Google Scholar, with reference to Blanché, R., L 'épistémologie (3rd edn, 1983), pp.64–65.Google Scholar

85. Collins, H., “Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law” (1991) 11 Oxford J. Legal Studies 396, 397.Google Scholar See for some other examples of foreign influences on English law Bingham, T. H., “There is a World Elsewhere: The Changing Perspectives of English Law” (1992) 41 I.C.L.Q. 513, 522–528.Google Scholar

86. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Art.3(1).

87. Collins, H., “Good Faith in European Contract Law” (1994) 14 Oxford J. Legal Studies 229.Google Scholar

88. Supra n.1.

89. This is what the Japanese sociologist of law and comparatist Masaji Chiba has called the “identity postulate” of a legal culture: “The Identity Postulate of a Legal Culture”, in Archiv für Rechu-und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft Nr.30 (1988).