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THE DYNAMICS OF PRIVATE FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS: A CASE STUDY ON THE REGULATORY DIFFUSION OF GLOBALG.A.P.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 November 2013

Yoshiko Naiki
Yoshiko Naiki*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan, [email protected].
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Abstract

The emergence and importance of private standards in contemporary regulatory governance have been the subject of extensive debate. Recent studies have attempted to explore several dimensions of private regulation, such as its growth or effectiveness. By contrast, this article focuses on the regulatory diffusion of private standards. There has been a broad range of literature on diffusion and reception of norms—for instance, the scholarship of legal transplants or law's migration addressed how international treaties or foreign national laws were received in States. However, norm exportation and importation does not only occur between States; this article focuses on regulatory diffusion between private actors. To do so, it examines the case of GLOBALG.A.P., a private food safety scheme started in Europe that has influenced private standard initiatives beyond Europe. This article concludes by emphasizing that successful regulatory diffusion requires taking local contexts into account and preserving diversity.

Keywords

food safetyGLOBALG.A.P.local diversityprivate standardsregulatory diffusion
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 63 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 137 - 166
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2013 

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References

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8 The term ‘diffusion’ encompasses the influential processes (rather than outcomes) of a foreign private norm (in this article, GLOBALG.A.P.). Knill, C, ‘Introduction: Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory Factors’ (2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy 766Google Scholar.

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18 Scholars tend to concentrate on the history or origins of civil regulations, and it has been pointed out that ‘there are few scholarly studies of the effectiveness of most civil regulations.’ Vogel (n 1) 275. See also Shaffer (n 12) 2.

19 With regard to the research on private norm diffusion, the FSC (the Forest Steward Council)'s certification scheme in the forestry sector is the most well-known private regulation. Vogel (n 1) 271. The acceptance or rejection of their standards has been intensively studied in political science. Cashore, B, Auld, G, Bernstein, S and McDermott, C, ‘Can Non-State Governance “Ratchet up” Global Environmental Standards? Lessons from the Forest Sector’ (2007) 16 Review of European Community International and Environmental Law 158Google Scholar.

20 Interviews were conducted specifically with the GLOBALG.A.P. team in Cologne, the team of the Japanese GAP initiative, called ‘JGAP’ in Tokyo, the team of the ThaiGAP in Bangkok, the team of GLOBALG.A.P. North America in Baltimore and the United Fresh Produce Association in Washington DC.

21 Resnik (n 11).

22 Shaffer (n 12).

23 Arvind (n13); Berkowitz et al (n 13).

24 Shaffer (n 12) 7: ‘This concept of transnational legal ordering is used to assess the construction, flow, and impact of transnational legal norms.’

25 Shaffer (n 12) 23.

26 Berkowitz et al (n 13) 171.

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28 Resnik (n 11) 1634–47.

29 ibid 1639.

30 Scholarly attention for the diffusion of regulation based on the market power is remarkable in the area of environmental governance. See Shaffer, G and Bodansky, D, ‘Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law’ (2012) 1 Transnational Environmental Law 3440Google Scholar.

31 Bradford (n 14) 3.

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36 Vogel, D, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy (Harvard University Press 1995)Google Scholar.

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38 ibid 23.

39 ibid. For a similar account for the force of the market-driven mechanisms, using the keywords of ‘reputation’, ‘information’ and ‘competition,’ see Bartley (n 14) 307 (noting that producers and retailers care about their ‘reputation’ which affects their market access, and attempt to provide ‘information’ to consumers in the market by adhering to foreign (governmental or private) standards, thereby raising ‘competitive advantage’ over competitors).

40 Scott (n 34) 899; Bradford (n 14) 7. See also Shaffer (n 34) 81.

41 Vogel, D and Kagan, RA, ‘Introduction’ in Vogel, D and Kagan, RA (eds), Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National Regulatory Policies (University of California Press 2004)Google Scholar 14 (citing Sebastian Princen, ‘The California Effect in the EC's External Relations: A Comparison of the Leghold Trap and the Beef Hormone Issues between the EC and the US and Canada’ (1999) unpublished paper read at European Community Studies Association Sixth Biennial International Conference); Vogel, D, The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and the United States (Princeton University Press 2012)Google Scholar 284: ‘[T]he adjustment costs of having a country's domestic regulations converge on the stricter standards of a major trading partner are a critical factor in explaining when policy convergence and/or trading up is or is not likely to occur.’

42 Princen, S, ‘Trading Up in the Transatlantic Relationship’ (2004) 24 Journal of Public Policy 130CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 Lavenex, S and Schimmelfennig, F, ‘EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics’ (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy 804Google Scholar (in the context of the expansion of EU rules to third countries).

44 Vogel (n 41) 286.

45 Shaffer (n 34) 64 (in the context of the influence of the EU Directive on privacy protection on the US). See also Bradford (n 14) 53 (‘[T]he relative influence of export-oriented and nonexport-oriented firms will impact the United States’ response to the Brussels Effect.’).

46 Council Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) [2007] OJ L136/3.

47 Scott (n 34) 935–6, 939–40.

48 Scott et al (n 15).

49 C Scott, F Cafaggi and L Senden, ‘The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation’ in Scott et al (n 15) 3 (referring to Bartley (n 14) 298).

50 F Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation’ in Scott et al (n 15) 39. For the importance of the focus on relationship between public and private standards in research, Vogel (n 1) 275: ‘One key research question has to do with the relationship between civil regulation and public or state regulation.’ See also Burrell (n 2) 263.

51 Scott, J, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2007) 310Google Scholar.

52 Burrell (n 2) 265.

53 Cafaggi (n 50) 48.

54 Scott et al (n 49) 13.

55 Mattli, W and Woods, N, ‘In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics’ in Mattli, W and Woods, N (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press 2009) 4Google Scholar.

56 Scott et al (n 49) 6.

57 Mattli and Woods (n 55) 12.

58 Fuchs, D, Kalfagianni, A and Havinga, T, ‘Actors in Private Food Governance: The Legitimacy of Retail Standards and Multistakeholder Initiatives with Civil Society Participation’ (2011) 28 Agriculture and Human Values 354Google Scholar.

59 See literature referenced (n 4).

60 D Casey and C Scott, ‘The Crystallization of Regulatory Norms' in Scott et al (n 15) 76: ‘A central problem of regulatory governance is seeking to understand the conditions under which regulatory rules are followed. Within regulatory research, this is often expressed in terms of the problem of compliance.’

61 Hachez, N and Wouters, J, ‘A Glimpse at the Democratic Legitimacy of Private Standards: Assessing the Public Accountability of GLOBALG.A.P.’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 681CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also DK Casey, ‘Three Puzzles of Private Governance: GlobalGAP and the Regulation of Food Safety and Quality’ (2009) UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No 22/2009, 16–17 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515702>; Schouten, G and Glasbergen, P, ‘Creating Legitimacy in Global Private Governance: The Case of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil’ (2011) 70 Ecological Economics 1891Google Scholar.

62 Bernstein, S and Cashore, B, ‘Non-State Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?’ in Kirton, J and Trebilcock, M (eds), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (Ashgate Publishing 2004) 33Google Scholar.

63 ibid 49. See also Casey and Scott (n 60) 88: ‘[F]or a regulatory norm to be legitimate, it must be accepted by those to whom it is addressed.’

64 Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Havinga (n 58) 357.

65 For the emergence and importance of the procedural dimension in environmental governance, see Scott, J, ‘Flexibility, ‘Proceduralization’, and Environmental Governance in the EU’ in de Búrca, G and Scott, J (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU from Uniformity to Flexibility (Hart Publishing 2000) 272Google Scholar.

66 Shaffer (n 12) 34.

67 Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Havinga (n 58) 359.

68 Higgins, V and Larner, W, ‘From Standardization to Standardizing Work’ in Higgins, V and Larner, W (eds), Calculating the Social: Standards and the Reconfiguration of Governing (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 206Google Scholar.

69 For a history of GLOBALG.A.P., see the GLOBALG.A.P. website (n 3).

70 For a background of the rise of EurepGAP in the context of an emerging corporate-environmental food regime, see Friedmann, H, ‘From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of Food Regimes’ in Buttel, FH and McMichael, P (eds), New Direction in the Sociology of Global Development (Elsevier 2005) 251–5Google Scholar.

71 It has been noted that there is a tendency in contemporary private standards to ‘bundle [together] safety, environment and social standards'. World Bank Report, No 31207, Food Safety and Agricultural Health Standards: Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Country Exports (2005) 28.

72 Other standards developed by GLOBALG.A.P. are ‘compound feed manufacturer standard’, ‘animal transport’, ‘plant propagation material standard’ and ‘risk assessment on social practice’.

73 See GLOBALG.A.P. Presentations, ‘Introduction Presentation Crops USA by Dr Kristian Moeller, Washington DC 2011’ 9 at <http://www1.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=40> accessed 26 December 2012.

74 See GLOBALG.A.P. Procedures for the Setting and Revision of GLOBALGAP Standards, V1.0-1_Aug08, at <http://www1.globalgap.org/cms/upload/The_Standard/Standards-Development/GLOBALGAP_Standard_setting_procedure_V1_Aug08.pdf> accessed 26 December 2012.

75 Some studies have suggested that there is a pattern between these three compliance levels and GLOBALG.A.P.'s holistic approach which covers food safety, environmental protection, and workers' and animal welfare in farming. That is, standards relating to food safety are mostly categorized in ‘major must’, while standards relating to environmental protection and workers' and animal welfare are categorized as ‘major must’ less often and are instead treated as ‘minor must’ and ‘recommended’ categories. See Van Der Grijp, NM, Marsden, T and Cavalcanti, JSB, ‘European Retailers as Agents of Change Towards Sustainability: The Case of Fruit Production in Brazil’ (2005) 2 Environmental Sciences 36Google Scholar. Such a pattern was also demonstrated by the presentation by EurepGAP in 2004. See K Moeller, ‘Reducing the Use of Methyl Bromide via EUREPGAP: The Private Sector Holistic Approach’ 14 at <ec.europa.eu/clima/events/0014/standards_3_en.pdf> accessed 27 December 2012.

76 Cashore et al (n 19) 162. See also Bain, C, Ransom, E and Worosz, MR, ‘Constructing Credibility: Technoscience to Legitimate Strategies in Agrifood Governance’ (2010) 25 Journal of Rural Social Sciences 176–7Google Scholar; Cashore, Auld and Newsome (n 37) 26–7; Bartley (n 14) 302.

77 However, some studies have expressed caution over the credibility of the third-party certification systems. For instance, some have argued that GLOBALG.A.P.'s assessment and inspection system is not sufficiently stringent when it comes to improving workers' welfare. See C Bain and M Hatanaka, ‘The Practice of Third-Party Certification: Enhancing Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice in the Global South?’ in Higgins and Larner (n 68) 64–8. For a similar criticism over the verification of GLOBALG.A.P. standards, Bain, Ransome and Worosz (n 76) 180–1. For a cautionary note over the effectiveness of the third-party certification systems in general, see Silva-Castañeda, L, ‘A Forest of Evidence: Third-Party Certification and Multiple Forms of Proof: A Case Study of Oil Palm Plantations in Indonesia’ (2012) 29 Agriculture and Human Values 361-70Google Scholar.

78 See GLOBALG.A.P. Certification at <http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/what-we-do/the-gg-system/certification/> accessed 20 December 2012.

79 GLOBALG.A.P. General Regulations, English Version, Final Version 4.0, March 2011, Part III, Certification Body and Accreditation Rules.

80 See GLOBALG.A.P. Board at <http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/governance/board/> accessed 20 December 2012.

81 It has been pointed out that it is important for a non-European to be elected as a member of the Committees in order to allow perspectives outside Europe to influence the development or revision processes of the standards. See Bain, C, ‘Governing the Global Value Chain: GlobalGAP and the Chilean Fresh Fruit Industry’ (2010) 17 International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 11Google Scholar.

82 However, there have been critics of this supposedly equal partnership. One criticism is that the equal representation seems to be superficial, because the majority of producers attending the Committees are major corporate suppliers, and do not represent the interests of local producers or farmers. Bain, ibid 7. See also Rosin, C, Campbell, H and Hunt, L, ‘Audit Me This! Kiwifruit Producer Uptake of the EurepGAP Audit System in New Zealand’ in Stringer, C and Le Heron, RB (eds), Agri-food Commodity Chains and Globalising Networks (Ashgate 2008) 64Google Scholar : ‘The current retailer membership of EUREP incorporates the top corporate European supermarkets. These form an important concentration of retailer power… .’ Another criticism is about geographical inequalities. Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Havinga (n 58) 361: ‘The majority of both retailer and producer members in this committee is from Europe.’

83 EuroFruit Magazine, No 403, January 2008, available at GLOBALG.A.P. in the Press 2008 <http://www1.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idart=736> accessed22 January 2013.

84 See GLOBALG.A.P. ‘Who We Are’ at <http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/> accessed 20 December 2012.

85 See GLOBALG.A.P. Annual Report 2011, 30-1 at <http://www.globalgap.org/export/sites/default/.content/.galleries/documents/120501_Annual_Report_2011_web_en.pdf> accessed 26 December 2012.

86 ibid 30. The certified number in Spain was 25,923; Italy was 15,892; and Greece was 12,414.

87 ibid 30–1.

88 See the GLOBALG.A.P. National Technical Working Groups (NTWG) at <http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/ntwgs/> accessed 20 December 2012.

89 See GLOBALG.A.P. List of all GLOBALG.A.P. National Technical Working Groups at <http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/ntwgs/list-of-ntwgs/> accessed 20 December 2012.

90 Hachez and Wouters (n 61) 703.

91 van der Valk, O and van der Roest, J, National benchmarking against GLOBALGAP: Case studies of Good Agricultural Practices in Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico and Chile, Report 2008.079, Project code 40432 (LEI Wageningen UR 2009)Google Scholar.

92 Bain (n 81) 11.

93 Friedmann, H and McNair, A, ‘Whose Rules Rule? Contested Projects to Certify Local Production for Distant Consumers’ (2008) 8 Journal of Agrarian Change 420–1Google Scholar.

94 Tallontire, A, Opondo, M and Nelson, V, ‘Beyond the Vertical? Using Value Chains and Governance as a Framework to Analyse Private Standards Initiatives in Agri-Food Chains’ (2011) 28 Agriculture and Human Values 432Google Scholar.

95 GLOBALG.A.P. Benchmarking Regulations, English Version 4.0, Edition 4.0 Feb 2012, Obligatory from 7 February 2012. In general, the procedure consists of three major stages after the application: (1) independent technical review, (2) peer review among GLOBALG.A.P. members, and (3) final accreditation by cross-checking the review under the previous stages with a real case in which local certification has been issued. In order to complete the equivalence process in this third stage, there must be at least one case in which a certification occurred under the local standard. In some situations, standards have been newly developed and have not been used by local producers yet (ie no prior example of certification under the local standard exists) so there is no way to certify that the local standard's certification process is equivalent to GLOBALG.A.P. certification.

96 Since 2001 when the benchmarking procedure first started, there have been two benchmarking categories: the ‘Full Benchmarked Scheme’ and the ‘Approved Modified Checklist’. These two categories remain the same in the new benchmarking regulation. Under the ‘Full Benchmarked Scheme’, an applicant scheme is assessed for the equivalency of both its procedural and substantive components (ie equivalency with GLOBALG.A.P.'s general certification rules and the CPCC). In the case of the ‘Approved Modified Checklist’, an applicant scheme is assessed only in terms of substantive equivalency with the CPCC, but not in terms of equivalency with GLOBALG.A.P.'s general certification rules. In this case, the applicant is using GLOBALG.A.P.'s certification system and not developing their own procedural certification system. Local schemes that have run for years and are accustomed to using their own general certification rules would apply for the ‘Full Benchmarked Scheme’, while newly developed schemes would apply for the ‘Approved Modified Checklist’, as this category does not require local schemes to develop their own certification system.

97 Interview by the author with Mr Ignacio Antequera, the GLOBALG.A.P. secretariat in Cologne, 23 January, 2012.

98 The group was originally established as ‘Japan Good Agricultural Initiative (JGAI)’ in 2005.

99 Interview by the author with Mr Yasuaki Takeda, managing director of JGAP, at the JGAP secretariat office in Tokyo, 13 August, 2012.

100 See Articles of Organization, Article 14(2) (in Japanese) at <http://jgap.jp/JGAP_Assoc/teikan.pdf>. Currently, the governing board of JGAP consisted of eight producers, eight retailers, and five more representatives. See the JGAP Newsletter, ‘JGAP Plus’ September 2012, at <http://jgap.jp/navi_01/JGAP_plus_201209.pdf> accessed 30 December 2012.

101 JGAP (ed), Official Handbook on JGAP (Nougyou Gijutsu Tsushin Sha 2010) 19.

102 See the JGAP Newsletter, ‘JGAP Plus,’ July 2012, at <http://jgap.jp/navi_01/JGAP_plus_201207.pdf> accessed 30 December 2012.

103 Interview by the author with Mr Yasuaki Takeda, 18 February, 2011.

104 Currently, JGAP's basic standards plus export standards (namely, JGAP's ‘2010 Version’ Standards of Fruits and Vegetables) are in the process of being benchmarked with GLOBALG.A.P.

105 Cabinet Decision of 25 March 2005 at <http://www.maff.go.jp/j/keikaku/k_aratana/pdf/20050325_honbun.pdf> accessed30 December 2012.

106 ibid 34.

107 See the MAFF website at <http://www.maff.go.jp/j/seisan/gizyutu/gap/g_torikumi/index.html> accessed 30 December 2012.

108 See the MAFF website, at <http://www.maff.go.jp/j/seisan/gizyutu/gap/guideline/index.html> accessed 30 December 2012.

109 The main export destinations of Japanese agricultural products (including fishery and manufactured food) in 2006 were the US, Hong Kong, China, South Korea and Taiwan. See the MAFF website at <http://www.maff.go.jp/j/wpaper/w_maff/h18_h/trend/1/t1_2_4_04.html> accessed 30 December 2012.

110 Interview by the author with Mr Yasuaki Takeda on 13 August, 2012. JGAP team also developed new standards for green tea and rice, but JGAP did not seek GLOBALG.A.P. equivalence for these sets of standards.

111 Aeon developed own GAP named ‘A-Q’ in December 2002. COOP introduced ‘COOP GAP’ in 2004.

112 See the JGAP website at <http://jgap.jp/LB_01/index.html> accessed 30 December 2012 (where it states that ‘JGAP's 2010 Version Standards of Fruits and Vegetables is in line with the MAFF guidelines for GAP’).

113 See the MAFF website at <http://www.maff.go.jp/j/seisan/gizyutu/gap/yosan.html> accessed 30 December 2012.

114 Cafaggi (n 50) 48.

115 V Sardsud, ‘National Experiences: Thailand’ in UNCTAD (n 17) 53.

116 ibid 54: ‘Such an approach creates doubts as to the independence and credibility of the system and certification.’

117 The eight standards include: (1) safety of water used, (2) site, (3) use of agro-chemicals, (4) product storage and on-site transportation, (5) data records, (6) pest-free products, (7) quality management and (8) harvesting and post-harvesting handling. ibid 58.

118 Interview with the ThaiGAP office, 18 July, 2011. At that time, one US foundation, the Kenan Institute, provided aid to this private initiative, in order to support the creation of the cluster among the universities, local governments and producers.

119 Western Cluster GAP, ThaiGAP and EurepGAP (2006).

120 As for ‘worker health’ issue, it included a standard similar to the EurepGAP 12.3.1, stating that ‘are First Aid boxes present in the vicinity of the work?’ As for ‘environmental’ issue, it included two standards: one was similar to the EurepGAP 13.2.4 concerning animal and plant diversity on the farm, and another relates to setting up a place to throw rubbish.

121 In the years of the preparation of its launching (2004–06), GIZ (the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH), a German enterprise which implements programmes commissioned by the German government, offered aid. Interview with the ThaiGAP office, 18 July, 2011.

122 Interview with the ThaiGAP office, 18 July, 2011. Two NGOs are Kasetsart University and the GIZ. One consumer group is Thai Health Promotion Foundation.

123 ThaiGAP Version 2.0 is now benchmarked with GLOBALG.A.P. ‘Version Four’, in March 2013. See GLOBALGAP website <http://www.globalgap.org/nl/1303/uk_en/media-events/news/articles/ThaiGAP-Successfully-Re-benchmarked-for-GLOBALG.A.P.-Integrated-Farm-Assurance-Standard-Version-4/> accessed 29 March 2013.

124 By July 2012, seven producers had been certified by ThaiGAP Version 1.0. Email from ThaiGAP office to the author, 13 July, 2012.

125 UNCTAD, ‘VII. Recent Developments and the Way Forward’ (n 17) 85.

126 ibid.

127 Interview with the ThaiGAP office, 18 July, 2011.

128 GLOBALG.A.P. North America Newsletter, March 2012 at <http://hosted-p0.vresp.com/903543/18cfa65e13/ARCHIVE> accessed 30 December 2012.

129 See the United Fresh Produce Association website, ‘Produce GAPs Harmonization Initiative’ at <http://www.unitedfresh.org/newsviews/gap_background> accessed 30 December 2012 (where it states that ‘[i]nclusion of non-food safety standards (environmental, social issues) is a likely obstacle to harmonization, particularly in North America. These issues may need to be addressed separately.’).

130 See the United Fresh Produce Association website <http://www.unitedfresh.org/newsviews/gap_harmonization> accessed 29 March 2013.

131 See Harmonization of Produce Food Safety Standards Steering Committee Meeting Summary, 22 September 2009 at <http://www.unitedfresh.org/assets/GAPs2009/Steering_Committee_Meeting_Summary_090922.pdf> accessed 29 March 2013.

132 D Gombas, ‘Produce GAP Standards: Harmonizing Food Safety’ (August/September 2010) Food Safety Magazine at <http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/magazine-archive1/augustseptember-2010/produce-gap-standards-harmonizing-food-safety/> accessed 29 March 2013.

133 See Produce GAPs Harmonization Initiative Technical Working Group Meeting, 16–17 December 2009, Meeting Summary at <http://www.unitedfresh.org/assets/GAPs2009/TWG_meeting_summary_12_16_09.pdf> accessed 29 March 2013: ‘Of the 18 standard owners approached, 10 replied in time for the meeting: Mushroom GAPs, AIB, GlobalGAP, CanadaGAP, Silliker, CA Strawberry, CA LGMA, SENASICA, AFDO Model Code for Produce Safety and USDA GAPs.’

134 For the completed harmonized standards, see the United Fresh Produce Association website <http://www.unitedfresh.org/assets/food_safety/Harmonized_Standard_pre-farm_gate_110722.pdf> accessed 29 March 2013.

135 Interview by the author with Mr Thomas Fenimore, Executive Vice President of GLOBALG.A.P. North America in Baltimore, 6 April, 2012.

136 Börzel, T and Risse, T, ‘When Europeanisation Meets Diffusion: Exploring New Territory’ (2012) 35 West European Politics 196Google Scholar.

137 For the context of the REACH Regulation, which may cause friction between the European system and local systems, see Fisher, E, ‘The “Perfect Storm” of REACH: Charting Regulatory Controversy in the Age of Information, Sustainable Development, and Globalization’ (2008) 11 Journal of Risk Research 556Google Scholar; Heyvaert, V, ‘Globalizing Regulation: Reaching Beyond the Borders of Chemical Safety’ (2009) 36 Journal of Law and Society 122Google Scholar.

138 For the competition between foreign norms and domestic ones, the case of the FSC standards should be recalled. In some countries, FSC standards gained wide acceptance, while in others, such as the US or Sweden, rival standards emerged from domestic companies, creating more flexible and somewhat lower alternatives to the FSC scheme. See Cashore et al (n 19) 165–6. Also, for the competition among multiple standard-setters to become a single, dominant global standard, see Büthe, T and Mattli, W (eds) The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton University Press 2011) 18–19Google Scholar.

139 There is another development within GLOBALG.A.P. It recently created the new ‘localg.a.p. program’, in response to the large number of local GAP schemes around the world. Under this new programme, GLOBALG.A.P. assists local GAP initiatives that want to develop their own customized standards that meet local needs. GLOBALG.A.P. now increasingly attempts to consider local contexts and is involved from the time local schemes are created. See GLOBALG.A.P., the localg.a.p. program at <http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/what-we-do/localg.a.p./localg.a.p.-Program/> accessed 4 April 2013.

140 Shaffer (n 12) 12.