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Delegation without borders: On individual rights, constitutions and the global order

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2012

ERIC BROUSSEAU ,
JEROME SGARD  and
YVES SCHEMEIL
ERIC BROUSSEAU*
Affiliation:
Université Paris Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France
JEROME SGARD*
Affiliation:
Sciences-Po (CERI), 56 rue Jacob, 75006 Paris, France
YVES SCHEMEIL*
Affiliation:
Sciences po Grenoble BP 48, 38040 Grenoble Cedex 9, France
*
*Email: [email protected]
†Email: [email protected]
‡Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Political and economic rights are envisaged as the outcome of an ongoing bargain between citizens and their rulers. Over the long run, this constitutive process shapes the development of both the economy and the state. Globalization, however, corresponds to a period where both the market and civil society extend far beyond the borders of the initial political compact. Hence, citizens may not only ask that cross-border transactions be made easier; they may also challenge the institutional cohesion and integrity of the classical, Westphalian state, i.e., its legal and judicial order, and its bureaucratic capabilities. We are proposing a schematic description of how this political process may gradually exit the national perimeter and deliver four possible models of international or global governance, depending upon the potential structuring of coalitions between the potential winners of the globalization both in the elite and in society, and the losers; national games being ultimately arbitrated by the international competition among elites, but also by the possible formation of global coalitions of citizens and merchants.

Keywords

constitutional commitmenteconomic developmenteconomics of institutionsfederalismpolitical economyrule of lawstate
Type
Articles
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , November 2012 , pp. 455 - 484
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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