This article examines the nature of merits review, focusing upon the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Some forms of merits review are less than full merits review and some are hybrid merits review. It is contended that a proper appreciation of merits review may expose misperceptions concealed in some claims that judicial review resembles merits review.

Australian lawyers are assessed and admitted to practise at a state and territory level. An important part of that assessment is an applicant's ‘suitability’ for professional practise; also referred to as the ‘character test’ of personal morality. This test requires applicants for admission to disclose relevant information about themselves including past conduct and (in at least one state) mental health status. Very little information about the process of admission is available. Around the country, we do not know how the character test is currently administered, how many applicants reveal past conduct, and how many are refused admission.

This article focuses on the three largest jurisdictions of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. It traces their varying approaches to admission; from legislative provision, court interpretation to administrative approach. It also examines some rare data about disclosure patterns on applying for admission. The resulting analysis raises concerns about a range of matters relating to admission to legal practice in Australia. It is argued that the secrecy of process is unjustified; and there is lack of confidentiality, certainty, and possibly fairness, ensured for applicants, particularly where issues of mental health arise. Finally, it is argued that there is a great difference in law and process between the states considered. While the ostensible goal of protection of the public is the same, the approach is far from that.

Constitutional systems of Westminster heritage are increasingly moving towards fixed-term parliaments to, amongst other things, prevent the Premier or Prime Minister opportunistically calling a ‘snap election’. Amongst the Australian states, qualified fixed-term parliaments currently exist in New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria. Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia have also deliberated over whether to establish similar fixed-term parliaments. However, manner and form provisions in those states' constitutions entrench the Parliament's duration, Governor's Office and dissolution power. In Western Australia and Queensland, unlike Tasmania, such provisions are doubly entrenched. This article considers whether these entrenching provisions present legal obstacles to constitutional amendments establishing fixed-term parliaments in those two states. This involves examining whether laws fixing parliamentary terms fall within section 6 of the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth) & (UK). The article concludes by examining recent amendments to the Electoral Act 1907 (WA) designed to enable fixed election dates in Western Australia without requiring a successful referendum.

International arbitration is an important area of federal jurisdiction and federal legislative competence, and has attracted significant policy attention in Australia. This paper undertakes a study of pro-arbitration judicial policy in recent arbitration-related Australian case law which touches upon the continuing applicability of the controversial 1999 Eisenwerk decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal. Against this pro-arbitration judicial policy context, this paper reviews five Eisenwerk-related cases handed down between 2010 and 2012. It concludes that despite pro-arbitration judicial policy being embedded as a requirement of reasoning in decisions under the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), there is mixed evidence of such policy in the cases surveyed. This paper concludes that the extent to which this policy is evidenced largely corresponds with the degree to which contemporary decisions have departed from Eisenwerk.

This article considers the YouMeUnity Report proposal for the inclusion of new language provisions in the Australian Constitution as part of a package of reforms for the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The article outlines the important symbolic and substantive effects of recognising language rights in the Constitution. The article explains how the recognition of a national language and the recognition of minority languages are conceptually distinct — promoting a national language is aimed at promoting national unity and enhancing the political and economic participation of individuals in the state, whereas protecting minority languages is aimed at recognising linguistic diversity, enriching the cultural life of the State, maintaining connections with other nations, and recognising language choice as a basic human right. The article argues that there is a strong case for minority language recognition, and in particular, the recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages, in the Australian Constitution, but warns against the recognition of English as the national language.

This article analyses arguments that the prerogative should be readily displaced by statute, where a statute deals with a subject matter similar to a prerogative. It does so by examining the leading cases on displacement of the prerogative in the United Kingdom and the Australian states, and displacement of the Australian Commonwealth's inherent executive power. The cases do not adopt a single rule but the question of whether a statute will be taken to displace a prerogative is highly dependent on the facts and the provisions of the particular statute. This article defends the current approach to displacement, for three reasons. First, the courts do not allow governments to subvert or ignore statutes by using the prerogative. Secondly, the courts have almost always decided in favour of liberty and against the conferral of coercive powers on government. Thirdly, a single rule could not do justice to all the variables involved in displacement cases. Ordinary principles of statutory interpretation are sufficient to deal with questions of displacement.