In public administration many decisions made in purported exercise of statutory powers are, as a matter of practical necessity, made not by the officer or body in whom the power has been reposed by statute but by persons purporting to act as delegates or agents of the repository of the power. Nowadays the empowering statute will often contain a provision which expressly authorises delegations of power or the appointment of authorised officers who, by virtue of their appointment, will be invested with specified powers. The statute may limit the powers which may be delegated. It may restrict the classes of persons who may be selected to act as delegates. It may stipulate that delegations be effected by instruments in writing or by some other procedure.

Whilst the nature and scope of Commonwealth judicial power has been much examined since federation, the nature of judicial power exercised in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) or, indeed, the Commonwealth's territories more generally, has not. Usually the analysis of territory judicial power extends only to the conclusion that it does not form part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth and that it is territorially limited as a result of the operation of s 122 of the Constitution. This article examines in more detail the nature of judicial power in the ACT and identifies some of the significant limits upon, and uncertainties surrounding, that power. It examines the history of courts in the ACT, the relationship between Territory judicial power and the judicial power of the Commonwealth, the jurisdiction of ACT courts and some of the important limits on that jurisdiction.

Australia's telecommunications sector is in the process of remarkable change. Over the past decade, it has evolved from a market dominated by a government owned entity (Telecom) with a statutory monopoly, to a privatised and fully competitive market comprising “carriers”, “carriage service providers” and “content service providers”, each providing an ever-expanding range of services through a variety of delivery platforms. The aim of this paper is to review the rapidly evolving legal and administrative framework for the protection of privacy within Australia's telecommunications sector. The paper will survey the regulation of telecommunications interception by individuals and law enforcement bodies, disclosure of the contents of (tele)communications by telecommunications service providers, encryption policy, computer “hacking” offences, the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman scheme and the new “co-regulatory” approach to standards development through the Australian Communications Industry Forum (ACIF). The paper will also consider whether Australia's privacy regime is an adequate response to the challenges posed by the changing telecommunications environment.

The decision to centralise, or to decentralise, the responsibility for law-making in relation to a subject of shared legislative competence is a fundamental dilemma for the polities of a federation. The advantages and disadvantages of both are well known. Amongst other things, centralisation promotes national unity, it decreases regulatory “arbitrage”, it may reduce search and compliance costs, and it capitalises on economies of scale in administration and law-making. By contrast, decentralisation is more receptive to local conditions, and offers the advantages that derive from interjurisdictional competition.

Australian corporate law has seen its share of the debate. That debate has been undeniably directional-there has been, over the past forty years, considerable momentum towards centralisation. Each legislative step taken in that period has been one closer to centralised national laws and administration. The only real opposition came to the Commonwealth's attempt to arrogate legislative power to itself in the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth), which the High Court struck down as unconstitutional.

Australia’s second chief justice has generally received a bad press. Perhaps this is due in part to the circumstances of his departure, which did nothing to enhance the prestige of the office. But it may be worthwhile to revisit the decade of his stewardship, for it marks the commencement of a centralist approach to the interpretation of our Constitution. It may also be fruitful to examine the extent to which the justices under his leadership collaborated in preparing their judgments, for that question has a contemporary relevance.

Judicial biographies in Australia are rare. Even famous judges, who have led interesting and varied lives, pass without a proper record of their decisions and intellectual and personal struggles. So it is with the Right Honourable Sir Frank Kitto AC KBE, Justice of the High Court of Australia from 1950 to 1970. He settled in the Armidale District after the conclusion of his service on the High Court. He served as the Chancellor of the University of New England from 1970 until 1981. With his wife Eleanor he devoted his time (apart from working a small grazing property), as he put it, to “a mass of reading that I had had to put aside through the years of my professional life”. He described this reading as ranging over subjects “from history and biography … and philosophy to fiction, both light and classical”. He even spoke of the enjoyment of selected programmes on television. One suspects that his viewing was probably connected with his duties in late years as foundation Chairman of the Australian Press Council rather than a quest for enlightenment—generally elusive on the small screen.