This is the sixth in the annual Menzies Lecture Series. This lecture was delivered at the Australian National University in October 1990.

The allocation of war powers between the President and Congress under the Constitution of the United States and the problems that have flowed therefrom for two centuries, are subjects perhaps too remote to inflict upon an Australian audience. Nevertheless, I do so, mindful that the vast nuclear capability of my country, as well as its present deployment of significant forces on land and sea in much of a shrunken world, make decisions of war and peace by the United States a matter of some concern for those living beyond its geographic boundaries, and throughout this planet.

The Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) (referred to in this article as “the Act”) provides in ss 24-26 various criteria for establishing the registrability of trade marks under the Act Those provisions require a trade mark to be distinctive or if not distinctive, capable of becoming distinctive of goods or services in respect of which registration of the trade mark is sought, before it could be registered.

This article examines s 25 of the Act, which provides for the registration of trade marks in Part B of the Trade Marks Register, in the light of some of the decisions of Australian courts. The object is to determine if such decisions conform with the terms of the provision. Some comparisons are made with the relevant provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK). The article concludes that given the terms of s 25 of the Act, acquired distinctiveness could be a sole criterion for the registration of trade marks in Part B of the Register. The frrst part of the article considers the background to the section.

The issue of the protection of privacy sums up a congeries of public anxieties about the standing of individuals in relation to those who exercise governmental and economic power. The issue has impinged increasingly on governmental and legal processes but it is one which these processes have had difficulty assimilating. At a general level, this article attempts to provide some insights into this difficulty, taking the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) as its main focus.

Until now, analyses of the Privacy Act have tended to concentrate quite narrowly upon its provisions. Although a number of shortcomings have been identified as a consequence, no detailed or systematic explanations for these shortcomings have been advanced. This article seeks both to outline the deficiencies in the Act and to explain them. It takes as its point of departure the premise that the Act's deficiencies cannot be explained adequately by looking only at its provisions or formal legislative history.

Questions relating to the Torres Strait Islands and the rights of their inhabitants have come before the High Court in the last decade. In one of these cases the High Court examined the constituent instruments by which the islands were annexed to Queensland in the nineteenth century. That case, Wacando v Commonwealth, established that Damley Island, which is situated about 92 miles north-east of Cape York Peninsula, was part of the Colony of Queensland and therefore within its boundaries at federation. The ratio of Wacando centred on the validating provisions of the Colonial Boundaries Act 1895 (Imp). There was however disagreement between various Justices in that case as to the effect of Imperial letters patent and local legislation passed in 1878 and 1879 which raised questions as to British constitutional law and practice relating to the annexation of new territory and the modification of colonial boundaries. These issues will be examined below.