A wide range of state and federal laws recognise and regulate intimate and familial relationships. Such laws include inheritance, immigration, guardianship and superannuation as well as the areas that we traditionally think of as ‘family law’: property division and disputes over children following relationship breakdown.

There is no reliable demographic data on how many adults identify as lesbian or gay in Australia, but there is information to indicate that many lesbians and gay men live in long-term relationships, some of which include children. The Australian census has never asked individuals to identify their sexuality, but in 1996 and 2001 invited people to record if they are living in a same-sex relationship. These figures underestimate the numbers of couples for a variety of reasons: in 1996 the question itself was confusingly worded, and many people were unaware that they were able to record their relationship for the first time. The census does not record couples who do not cohabit. In addition, there are still many same-sex couples who would not feel comfortable recording their relationship on an official document such as a census.

The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘the Act’) pt VIB establishes a framework for the registration and enforcement of certified agreements, which are collective industrial instruments that regulate the employment relationship for a significant proportion of the workforce. The Act provides for agreements between unions of employees and employers and agreements between employers and employees directly. A certified agreement comes into effect only after it is approved by the employer and a ‘valid majority’ of its employees and is registered by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (‘the Commission’). The significance of registration of a certified agreement lies in the imposition of legally enforceable rights and obligations upon the parties bound by the agreement. One of the most significant obligations imposed on the parties bound by a registered certified agreement is the obligation not to engage in industrial action for the duration of the agreement, which is ordinarily no longer than three years.

It is clear that s 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (‘the Judiciary Act’) operates on the common law in cases in federal jurisdiction, but its precise effect is somewhat obscure. Section 80 provides:

Until recently, the High Court tended to concentrate on s 79 of the Judiciary Act (which applies the laws of the State and Territory where a court is exercising federal jurisdiction), and to consider s 80 only as an afterthought.

That conclusion was reached in the 1560 case of Stradling v Morgan, and may be taken to correctly state the law at that time. In its context, it is clear that the phrase ‘foreign circumstances’ was intended to refer not to the state of international relations, but rather to the use of extrinsic material in statutory interpretation.

Despite this early acceptance by the English courts of the use of extrinsic material in statutory interpretation, strident restrictions on the use of extrinsic material were later to be introduced into the common law. In discussing the principle that, ‘Parliament speaks only through an Act of Parliament,’ Dicey stressed the point that, ‘the English Bench have always refused, in principle at least, to interpret an Act of Parliament otherwise than by reference to the words of the enactment.’

In a series of judgments in August and October 2004, the High Court found that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) unambiguously provides for the indefinite detention of unlawful non-citizens, and that such a law is constitutionally valid. In doing so, a majority on the High Court arguably rewrote the rule book on the operation of Chapter III of the Constitution (‘Ch III’), undermining the majority judgment in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration in the process.

This case note focuses primarily on Al-Kateb v Godwin. To the extent that they clarify or expand on the reasoning with respect to the operation of Ch III, reference is also made to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Khafaji and Behrooz v Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs which were argued at the same time as Al-Kateb, and to Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 by their next friend GS, which concerned the administrative detention of non-citizen children.

In Singh v Commonwealth (‘Singh’), the High Court was presented with the question whether a person born in Australia can be considered an ‘alien’ for the purpose of s 51(xix) of the Constitution (‘naturalization and aliens’). In a 5:2 decision the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that birth in Australia necessarily accorded her the status of non-alien and thus a constitutional nationality which could not be displaced by legislative reliance on other heads of power. The decision is important, both for its elucidation of Parliament's scope to regulate Australian citizenship — the subject of a series of important cases over the last two decades involving strong dissents and two reversals in approach — and for its consideration of principles of constitutional interpretation.

In 1994, the Commonwealth Parliament passed an amendment to the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth) (the ‘Immigration (GOC) Act’), which provided that the Minister is guardian of ‘every non-citizen child who arrives in Australia’. Although the Immigration (GOC) Act was originally enacted with respect to children who entered Australia under assisted migration or re-settlement schemes, the Act and the amendments introduced by the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Amendment Act 1994 (Cth) have been interpreted to include unaccompanied children who come to Australia as asylum-seekers. Unaccompanied children commonly apply for protection visas and bring review applications and appeals in the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) and the courts. The Minister is the decision-maker, respondent in review proceedings, and a party in appeals; and is also the children's legal guardian. This gives rise to actual and perceived conflict between the Minister's duties as guardian and as a decision-maker or party to review and appeal proceedings.